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Abstract
The critique of the laws of war (and international law in general) coming out of America as the 
war on terror began seemed to have emerged as a response to the horror of 9/11 and the belief 
that the US was now engaged in a ‘new paradigm’ of warfare. However, the Bush 
administration’s argument needs to be situated in a wider historical context. The source of the 
arguments against the post-Vietnam US military legal regime emerged well before 9/11 and can 
be traced to the end of the Cold War. These doctrines emerged out of the work of the ‘new 
sovereigntists’ and out of the frustrations guided by coalition warfare.
The implications of the Bush administration’s arguments are very significant for America’s 
relationship with the laws of war, challenging the traditional division between jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello associated with the rise of the Westphalian system. As the world’s most powerful 
army, and the most active army in the West, America’s stance will have important implications as 
to how the laws of war are applied to future conflicts. Additionally, as the war on terror has 
generated new ethical dilemmas for the American military, the rebalancing of the priority 
between international law and the need for security has proved very problematic. Legal 
uncertainties and inconsistent policies have arguably resulted in several scandals, most notably 
the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The thesis will trace US thinking on the laws of war since 
1945, noting in particular the impact of Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Politics o f the Laws of War
In his controversial book on the 1990-1 Gulf War, Anthony Swofford describes the 
following scene:
The instructor breaks in. “Hey, gents, can we talk about the rifles? It’s 
not news that this war is gonna be all-American. I’m here to teach you 
how to kill people and disable vehicles with your new toy. By the way, 
you all know you can’t hit a human target with a fifty-caliber weapon, 
right? It’s in the Geneva Convention. So you hit the gas tank on their 
vehicle, and they get blown the hell up, but you can’t target some 
lonely guard or a couple of towlies in an OP calling in bombs. You’ll 
have to get closer with the forty or call in your own bombs.”
“We can’t shoot people with this thing? Fuck the Geneva Convention” 
a sniper from the Fifth Marines says.
Dickerson says, “You fuck the Geneva Convention and I’ll see you in 
Leavenworth. That’s like shooting a nun or a doctor. Where’d we find 
this retard?”1
Perhaps it is a little crude, but Swofford’s narration illustrates a debate over restraint 
in warfare that has challenged the United States from its inception. What are the 
obligations to one’s enemy? Can killing be done humanely? When a cause is just why 
should a nation hold back its armies?
Of course, these are the questions that challenge all nations (or perhaps, more 
correctly all conscientious nations) with armies that find their interests and security 
challenged by military threats. Yet in the case of the United States, the influence of its
1 Anthony Swofford, Jarhead: A Soldier’s Story o f  Modem War. London: Scribner, 2003. pp. 157-8. 
The debate to which Swofford is referring is one over how .50 calibre weapons could be used in 
conflict. There was concerned that the .50 calibre rifle, used against a human target would cause 
wounds that were considered excessive and in contravention o f the laws o f  war. The determination o f  
the legality o f weapons is a very complex issue but a useful discussion looking at the history, current 
issues and the way the US currently conducts legal review o f weapons can be found in Donna Marie 
Verchio, “Just Say No! The SIrUS Project: Well-Intentioned but, Unnecessary and Superfluous”, Air 
Force Law Review. Vol. 51, 2001. pp. 183-228. Also see the article by W. Hays Parks, “Means and 
Methods o f Warfare” George Washington International Law Review. Vol. 38 No. 3,2006. pp. 511- 
539.
2founding ideologies, its expanding empire and the sheer scale of its military 
engagements abroad have, for the last 60 years, prompted a lot of soul searching on 
these questions by soldiers, lawyers and philosophers alike. There is no doubt that 
America’s global position and even its global role are unique. But what are the 
implications of this for the way it conducts its military affairs abroad -  if any?
With the possible exception of Vietnam, the debates on this issue have traditionally 
been held behind closed doors in the Pentagon, or at international conferences in 
Geneva, The Hague and San Remo. Certainly before 1995 the moral complexities and 
practical dilemmas of the laws of war had not caught much media attention or 
scrutiny. It is true that citizens in America and throughout the world were familiar 
with the Geneva Conventions -  if only through cliched World War II movies or 
through television programs like Hogan's Heroes. However, debates over whether 
killing an enemy with .50 calibre ammunition constituted an inhumane practice under 
the laws of war, or the obligations of a defender with regards to placing munitions 
factories in a populated area, or the legality of using white phosphorus (etc), largely 
escaped public notice.
True, there was some attention given to the laws of war as the conduct of the wars 
following the break-up of Yugoslavia came under media scrutiny.3 However, it was 
the publication of pictures of prisoners in orange jumpsuits, blindfolded and strapped 
to stretchers at Guantanamo Bay’s Camp Delta, in January 2002 that this rapidly 
changed. The assertion by the Bush administration that the Geneva Conventions could 
not, and should not, apply to the war on terror put the Conventions in the spotlight and 
under a new media scrutiny.4 The result was to generate a largely uninformed debate
2 There was, however, an effort made by the ICRC to ban weapons according to their health-effects on 
the human body under the Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering (SIrUS) Project. The effort 
however, which would have ultimately taken away the determination o f a weapon’s legality from the 
state to international law, was not supported by many states, including Canada, Denmark, Germany, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (all traditional supporters o f the ICRC) as well as the US. The effort 
was subsequently abandoned in 2001. But whether this was a pressing issue on the international agenda 
is doubtful. See Verchio, “Just Say No!”. Other efforts, such as the international campaign to ban 
landmines were more successful in garnering international attention, winning the 1997 Nobel Peace 
Prize.
3 These controversies are outlined and discussed in Chapter 4.
4 Defining the “war on terror” is as problematic as determining when it really began. For the purpose of  
the argument here, the war on terror refers to the mostly military campaign being waged by western 
nations, lead by the United States, against terrorists and their support networks. It is possible to argue 
that the ‘war’ began with the attacks o f 11 September against the United States. On the other hand, it
3in the popular press about the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war. Are there 
such things as unlawful combatants? Did the rules apply if the Taliban did not wear a 
distinctive mark? How could the laws of war possibly apply to terrorists?
As the attention switched from Afghanistan to Iraq, the focus on the laws of war 
somewhat diminished in favour of a debate over the legality of the 2003 Iraq invasion. 
Yet the laws of war still attracted some significant media attention. Certainly this was
may be more accurate to say the war on terror began earlier with the first attack against the World 
Trade Center in 1993 and the August 1998 bombings o f the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania.
In the 2002, White House outlined what it meant by the war on terror in its National Security Strategy: 
“The United States o f America is fighting a war against terrorists o f global reach. The enemy is not a 
single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism —  premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents... The struggle against global terrorism is 
different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly 
elusive enemy over an extended period o f time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation 
o f successes— some seen, some unseen.. .Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist 
organizations o f global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; 
material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists’ ability to plan and 
operate.” See White House, “The National Security Strategy o f the United States” September 2002. 
Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
Another report released by the White House in September 2003 described the global war on terror from 
the Bush administration’s point o f view “The United States is engaged in a comprehensive effort to 
protect and defend the homeland and defeat terrorism. Using all instruments o f national power, the 
United States and its partners are attacking terrorists both at home and abroad, denying terrorists 
sanctuary and sponsorship, disrupting the financing o f terror, and building and maintaining a united 
global front against terrorism.” See White House “Progress Report on the Global War on Terror”, 
September 2003. Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress/.
By 2006 the Administration began to change its rhetoric and increasingly began to use the term “the 
long war” to describe the activities describe the global conflict. The Quadrennial Defense Review 
released by the Pentagon on 6 February 2006 made clear reference to the term: “The United States is a 
nation engaged in what will be a long war. Since the attacks o f September 11, 2001, our Nation has 
fought a global war against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon o f choice, and who 
seek to destroy our free way o f life. Our enemies seek weapons o f mass destruction and, if they are 
successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Currently, the 
struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will need to be prepared and arranged to 
successfully defend our Nation and its interests around the globe for years to come. This 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review is submitted in the fifth year o f this long war.” See Department of  
Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 6 February 2006. Available online at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf. It has been suggested that the renaming 
has come about as an attempt to brace US public opinion for a lengthy battle with a determined foe.
See James Westhead, “Planning the US 'Long War' on terror” BBC News 10 April 2006. Available 
online at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/americas/4897786.stm.
This work will use the term “war on terror” as this was the term usually employed by the Bush 
administration during the events examined.
There are many sources on the war on terror available. Some o f the useful ones include, Ken Booth and 
Tim Dunne eds. Worlds in Collision. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. See the special section in 
Ethics and International Affairs “Roundtable: The New War -  What Rules Apply?” Vol. 16, No. 1. pp 
1-26,2002. James Hoge and Gideon Rose have put out several useful collections on the war on terror. 
See James F. Hoge and Gideon Rose, eds Understanding the War on Terror. New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2005; War on Terror: Updated and Expanded. New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2003; How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2001.
4the case as US soldiers were captured by Iraqi troops in March 2003 and shown on 
Iraqi national television. But the Conventions also came into sharp focus once more as 
the Abu Ghraib prison scandal broke in the spring of 2004.
Thus, it is hard to deny that the laws of war has played an important role in the 
conduct, but perhaps more importantly, the public perception of the war on terror 
since military action began in Afghanistan in October 2001. During the initial phase 
of the campaign the US military and its allies took care to demonstrate that while 
engaging in military activities, they were also feeding the Afghan population and 
going to great lengths to spare civilians. And it is clear that controversy and scandal 
relating to the laws of war had a great effect upon the conduct of the campaign and on 
the political leadership. When asked in May 2006 about what he most regretted in 
respect to the 2003 Iraq War, in May 2006, Bush replied:
...I think the biggest mistake that's happened so far, at least from our 
country's involvement in Iraq is Abu Ghraib. We've been paying for that 
for a long period of time.5
Therefore the goal of this work is to tell the story, chronologically, of the engagement 
of the United States with the laws of war -  its participation in drafting legislation, 
how it trains and disciplines its military and how it ultimately implemented the laws 
of war on the battlefield. In doing so, the effect that its wars had on American 
engagement with laws of war will be examined. Additionally, it will look at how US 
participation in these wars changed the way we look at the laws of war, both through 
US failures and mistakes (in My Lai and Son Than) but also US successes (such as 
the 1990-1 Gulf War).
Particular attention will be paid to the effect of ideology and its corresponding 
political imperatives in terms of the decisions the US has made with respect to the 
laws of war, and what happens when these ideological imperatives clash with the 
tenets of international law. The effect of ideological and political imperatives on the
5 “President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair o f the United Kingdom participate in Joint Press 
Availability” 25 May 2006. Available online at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/2006Q525-12.html
5implementation of the laws of war in the war on terror will be examined to suggest 
reasons why the United States, or more accurately, the Bush administration, chose to 
act in the manner it did and what the effects of this have on the ongoing military 
campaigns throughout the world.
But before going any further, it will first be useful to determine just exactly what is 
meant by ‘the laws of war’.
What is the ‘laws of war’?
Definitions in political and legal works are always going to involve some measure of 
controversy. And when it comes to the laws of war, how one defines the concept says 
much about the way one views the law’s purpose. A very basic definition might be 
“the law applicable once there has been a resort to force”.6 However, it is going 
beyond this limited definition which generates differences of opinion as to what the 
central aim of the laws of war is.
Michael Byers describes it as the law that “seeks to limit the human suffering that is 
the inevitable consequence of war.”7 Similarly, Philippe Sands describes the law as 
that which:
...aims to protect any person who is caught up in war or armed 
conflicts, whether civilian or combatant. It places constraints on 
sovereign freedoms, prohibits certain types of weaponry, regulates the 
conditions under which an occupied territory and its populations are to 
be treated, and creates minimum standards of protection in the
O
treatment of prisoners of war.
The ICRC tends to agree with these approaches and views the laws of war as:
6 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework o f International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. p. 217.
7 Michael Byers, War Law: International Law and Armed Conflict. London: Atlantic Books, 2005. p. 
115.
8 Philippe Sands, Lawless World: American and the Making and Breaking o f Global Rules. London: 
Allen Lane, 2005. p. 146.
6...a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the 
effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no 
longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and 
methods of warfare.9
On the other hand, there are individuals who see the law in more state and military 
terms. In 1967, Georg Schwarzenberger gave a “formal definition” of the laws of war 
as the rules which “determine the possible forms, areas and objects of the exercise of 
physical pressure by belligerents against one another.”10 And Yoram Dinstein sees the 
laws of war as a set of rules which:
...can and does forbid some modes of behaviour, with a view to 
minimizing the losses, the suffering and the pain [of war]. But it can do 
so only when there are realistic alternatives to achieving the military 
goal of victory in war.11
Clearly, then, one of the key problems with the laws of war is its definition -  and the 
political baggage that goes with it.
Yet to suggest that the proceeding definitions have no common ground would be to 
overstate the case. While the devil may be in the details (as will be seen in Chapter 4) 
it is also true that there is a great deal of overlap between these definitions which can 
be used to generate a kind of consensus on the basic characteristics of the law:
1. The laws of war restrains the use of military force in military operations and 
this includes limits on both weapons and strategies or tactics. For example, it 
goes against the principles of the laws of war to deliberately target religious 
sites (such as churches and mosques) and hospitals. In terms of weapons, the 
laws of war bans the use of gas and weapons designed for the sole purpose of
9 Definition found on the ICRC website,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsfiiwpList2/Humanitarian law:IHL in brief?OpenDocument
10 Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law. 5th Edition. London: Stevens & Sons 
Limited, 1967. p. 196.
11 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct o f Hostilities under the Law o f International Armed Conflict. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 1.
7blinding. However, it also bans the way certain weapons can be used. For 
example, it may be legal to shoot an enemy soldier with a pistol, but it is 
illegal to use that same pistol to beat a prisoner of war.
2. The laws of war differentiates between various roles in armed conflicts -  
between legal and illegal combatants, participants and non-participants 
(normally civilians) and gives different rights depending on the role that one 
plays in the armed services. For example, medical and religious personnel are 
given certain duties and obligations separate from regular soldiers and
19officers. This differentiation is important as individuals, by virtue of their 
role in the conflict, are assigned rights. These rights are different from human 
rights in the sense that the laws of war limits these ‘rights’ to some groups and 
not others. Although everyone does fall under the laws of war in some 
manner, the rights conferred are not universal.13
3. As suggested by the proceeding paragraph, the laws of war outlines 
protections for non-combatants. This includes restrictions on targeting civilian 
areas of no military value, and the rights and responsibilities of civilians in 
occupied territory. Ideally, this part of the law seeks to minimize the impact on 
and suffering of non-combatants in conflict areas.
In summary, for the purpose of this work, the laws of war will be considered to be the 
body o f international law which governs military activities and defines the duties and 
responsibilities o f  the various roles o f participants and non-participants in conflict 
situations with the (usual) intention o f  preventing unnecessary suffering.
In some sense this definition remains vague, but the intention here is to generate a 
definition that is, for the most part, free of the implied purpose found in other 
definitions.
12 See Geneva Convention III, Article 33 and Additional Protocol I, Article 43.
13 There is not a lot o f scope to go into the differences and similarities between the laws o f war and 
human rights. It is sufficient here to say that the issue is controversial within the international 
humanitarian and legal communities. A discussion o f why these two strands o f international law are 
increasingly blending can be found in Antonio Cassese, International Law. Second edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 396-410. For the opposite perspective, see Dinstein, The Conduct 
of Hostilities, pp. 20-5.
8What the laws of war are not
Having established a working definition of the laws of war for this work, it also 
should be clarified as to what the law is not. Such a task is, perhaps, even more 
controversial than actually defining the laws of war, but it will help to evaluate the 
nature of the laws of war. First, the laws of war needs to be separated from the law 
which governs the resort to force. Sometimes referred to as ju s ad bellum, this is the 
set of laws which govern when a state may legally resort to force -  nowadays, 
normally situations of self-defence or with United Nations Security Council approval. 
Therefore, in plain language, the jus ad bellum is concerned with why nations fight. 
This work, on the other hand, is concerned with how nations fight or ju s in bello.
In medieval times, these two branches of law were not considered to be separate. 
Rather, the justness of one’s cause determined the tactics one could employ on the 
battlefield. Those who were on the side of the “unjust” could expect little mercy from 
those who had divine approval for their actions. However, with the gradual impact of 
the Treaty of Westphalia, the influence of the writings of Hugo Grotius and 
Enlightenment thinking on the laws of war, including that of Rousseau, there came 
about a general sense that the enemy soldier and civilian needed to be recognized as 
human beings with intrinsic worth. This gradually solidified (at least within Europe) 
so that it was seen as states, and not people, which fought wars and the belief that 
there were some basic rules of humanity which should be applied on the battlefield. 
The legality of war became separated from the means which one could legally employ 
on the battlefield.14
14 A full discussion o f the emergence o f  the development o f jus ad  bellum and ju s in bello is beyond the 
scope o f this work. Yet it should be noted here that, according to Augustine, just wars were those that 
either avenged injuries, punished wrongs or restored what had been unjustly taken from it. To 
Augustine, the legal wrong that had been committed by the enemy was also proof o f a moral wrong. It 
was this moral wrong which obliged the Christian to wage war against the unjust enemy as the resort to 
war was conceived o f as a means o f punishing an enemy’s ungodly behaviour. Augustine did not 
explicitly discuss ju s in bello and the incorporation o f punishment in Augustine’s just war doctrine 
reduced the likelihood o f the ju s ad bellum providing an internal restraint on the conduct o f war. As 
Colm Mckeogh argues: “The emphasis on punishing wrongs rather than repelling attackers or 
recovering lost goods opened the way to unlimited wars whose aim was the punishment o f wickedness 
and vice.” See Colm Mckeogh, Innocent Civilians. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. p. 23. 
Augustine’s failure to address restraint in warfare had grim consequences for civilians. Essentially, his
9There is not the space to go into a lengthy discussion of the differences and 
relationship between these two strands of international law. Sufficient to say for now 
that it is widely accepted that the two branches are separate. Because ‘just cause’ has 
traditionally been used to excuse atrocities in conflict throughout the globe, lawyers 
and humanitarians (as well as military personnel) are eager to differentiate the two 
branches of law as separate -  and insist that an illegal war must still be conducted by 
legal means.
Secondly, it must be said that the laws of war are not instruments of peace or a set of 
laws to either prevent or end conflicts. At the end of the day, the laws of war dictates 
who and what may be targeted legally and how military ends may be achieved 
legitimately. It has certainly been a goal of some international lawyers (past and 
present) to expand the law so as to make any form of military legal activity
just war doctrine placed subjective guilt to the entire population o f the “unjust” enemy which 
“precludes any necessity to act mercifully toward the enemy population.” See Richard Hartigan, The 
Forgotten Victim: A History o f the Civilian. Chicago: Precedent, 1982. p. 31. As Frederick Russel 
argues, Augustine’s doctrine contains a certain degree of indifference with respect to the fate of  
civilians in war. See, Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975. p. 19. Still, not everyone agrees. Paul Ramsey maintains that the jus in bello 
elements o f Augustine’s thought are obvious. He argues that Augustine’s emphasis on Christian love as 
the root o f the Christian just war ethic essentially constitutes “the genesis o f non-combatant immunity.” 
See Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modem War be Conducted Justly. 
Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1961. p. xviii.
Aquinas can be said to have largely followed the Augustinian model o f warfare. He did, however, put 
forward a theory o f  non-combatant immunity in his discussion o f  ecclesiastical immunity which 
suggested that there were categories o f individuals who should be immune. However, this could be said 
to have been undermined by his theory o f “double effect” which essentially excused ‘mistakes’ in 
warfare which had been carried out with “right-intention”. Despite some canonical efforts to limit war 
(through the Peace o f God which sought to protect ecclesial persons and the Truce o f God which 
sought to prohibit fighting on certain holy days), an explicit argument for the separation o f jus ad  
bellum and ju s in bello considerations did not emerge until the 16th Century writings o f  Fransciscus de 
Vitoria and the later 17th Century writings o f Hugo Grotius. For an excellent o f how the ju s in bello 
emerged as a separate doctrine see Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modem History o f  
International Law o f Armed Conflicts. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1980.
For a concise essay underlying the historical development o f these issues see Chapter 1 “What is -  
Why Is There -  the Laws o f war?” in L.C. Green Essays on the Modem Laws o f  war. Second Edition, 
New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1998. Also see, James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea 
in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park, Pa. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, 
Stephen Lammers, “Approaches to Limits on War in Western Just War Discourse,” in James Turner 
Johnson and John Kelsay eds., Cross. Crescent and Sword: the Justification and Limitation o f War in 
Western and Islamic Tradition. New York, Greenwood Press, 1990.
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fundamentally impossible.15 However, because it outlines both duties and rights of 
belligerents this has so far been, and is likely to remain, unsuccessful. The laws of war 
restricts military activity, it does not prevent it.
A law by any other name?
When discussing the ideas encapsulated in the concept Taws of war’, it is not 
uncommon to also hear individuals speak of the Taw of armed conflict’ and 
‘international humanitarian law’ (IHL). For the most part the terms are 
interchangeable -  they all refer to the same body of law which outlines the duties and 
responsibility of states (though increasingly, some would argue, individuals and non­
state actors) in war fighting. So why the difference? And why has this work chosen to 
use the term “laws of war”?
Part of the problem, of course, comes with defining war. War is, arguably, outlawed 
in the Charter of the United Nations, and clearly a politically sensitive activity. Since 
1918, states have heavily resisted declaring war or describing their military activities 
as such (even when it is patently obvious that this is indeed what they are engaged in.) 
Therefore, such military operations are usually referred to as “police actions” or 
“military assistance”, especially since the Second World War. There is even less 
willingness for states to recognize civil wars as anything beyond national 
emergencies.
The problem for this in terms of the laws of war, then, is its name. States not engaged 
in “war” can argue that the “laws of war” cannot and should not apply to their military 
activities -  seemingly creating a gap for a lot of abuse. The solution of lawyers and 
NGOs like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been to
15 This was certainly a complaint o f the head of the American delegation to the 1899 Hague Conference 
who complains about the pressures placed upon the delegation and Conference as a whole by the early 
pacifist NGOs and activists. See Andrew D. White, The First Hague Conference. Boston: The World 
Peace Foundation, 1912. W. Hays Parks argues that the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference which 
drafted the 1977 Additional Protocols was plagued by attempts by the Non-Aligned movement and the 
ICRC to turn the Protocols on the regulation o f warfare into an arms control agreement to prevent wars 
or hinder fighting abilities. See W. Hays Parks, “Air War and the Laws o f war”, Air Force Law 
Review. Vol. 32. 1990. pp. 1-225. See p. 103-104, including note 325.
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increasingly use the terms “Law of Armed Conflict” and “International Humanitarian 
Law” to try and impress upon belligerents the need to apply the Geneva and Hague 
principles in situations tantamount to armed conflicts.
Yet this shift, largely influenced by NGOs and the international legal community, is 
also somewhat political and these names, but especially “international humanitarian 
law” come with some baggage. In particular is the potential confusion over the word 
‘humanitarian’ and what it implies. The nature and scope of humanitarian activities is 
usually concerned with a general relieving of suffering and the promotion of human 
welfare. Whether or not this can be said to be true for militaries and their activities (at 
least for populations outside of their own) is problematic. A second difficulty comes 
with the similarity in terms to international human rights law (IHRL) and the potential 
for confusion. Yet there is a crucial difference -  as Yoram Dinstein argues, “The 
adjective ‘human’ in the phrase ‘human rights’ points at the subject in whom the 
rights are vested: human rights are conferred on human beings as such.”16 
Humanitarian, however, refers to a description of the motivation of those responsible 
for the formation and formulation of the legal norms.17 Additionally, as Adam Roberts 
and Richard Guelf note:
The term ‘international humanitarian law’ could be seen as implying that 
the laws of war have an exclusively humanitarian purpose, when their 
evolution in fact reflected various practical concerns of states and their
armed forces on ground other than those which may be considered
humanitarian.18
Therefore, given the potential for confusion, the vagueness of the term and the fact 
that it only seems to suggest new questions where it has resolved old ones, for the 
most part this thesis will avoid the term international humanitarian law.
This leaves a choice between the law of armed conflict and laws of war. The term law 
of armed conflict is appealing because it suggests a way to get around problems of
16 Dinstein, The Conduct o f Hostilities, p. 20.
17 Dinstein, The Conduct o f Hostilities, p. 20.
18 Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War. Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. p. 2.
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defining conflicts that may be internal or go across multiple state boundaries and are 
not interstate wars. Governments and armed forces do not have an excuse for failing 
to apply restraint in their military actions by suggesting that they are not engaged in a 
‘war’ where a body of law would apply. Additionally, given the (normally legal) 
contention that only states can engage in war, a name which suggests that these laws 
can still be applicable in multiple situations of conflict is useful.
However, there are several reasons why this work will use the term “laws of war”. 
First, in reality, defining what constitutes an international armed conflict can be just 
as political and problematic as defining what constitutes a war. When a conflict is 
recognized as an armed conflict, it brings about a certain set of duties, regulations and 
responsibilities regardless of how this conflict is characterized by the belligerents or 
international community. The name by which the applicable law is called seems to 
matter less than how it is actually implemented. Indeed, states have, or have not, 
implemented the law regardless to the name given to it.
More importantly, the events that this work is primarily concerned with are, in fact, 
wars as they have been traditionally understood. The title “The United States and the 
Politics of the Laws of War” implies that there is an interplay between the politics of 
the law and the politics of ‘war’ which, in turn, suggests a certain emotional or at least 
passionate response to the term and what we normally associate with it. Certainly, 
there is no doubt that there is a particular aesthetic resonance to the word war -  it is 
definitely a word with baggage. However, it is the contention of this work is that this 
is useful baggage when exploring the relationship of America and the laws of war 
because of what war entails, what it has been able to achieve for the US and because 
of the commemoration of war in the American memory. If nothing else, ‘war’ is how 
most individuals regard the actions of their armies on the battlefield, whether the 
operation is an invasion, peace-enforcement or police action.
Sources of the laws of war
Interestingly, rather than going through this muddled process of defining exactly what 
the laws of war are, many books are content with pointing to a number of treaties of
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which it is considered to be composed. This brings us to the question as to what 
exactly the sources of the laws of war are. Since it is a branch of international law, it 
is perhaps easiest to turn to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice which lists treaties, customary international law and the “general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations” as the sources of international law.
So, in looking at these areas to answer a question about sources, the most obvious 
answer is, of course, treaties to which states have given their consent. In terms of the 
laws of war, this includes the major treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
1977 Additional Protocols and more specific treaties such as the 1954 Hague 
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property and the 1997 Ottawa Land Mines 
Convention. Beyond this, customary law -  essentially long-standing patterns of 
behaviour by states which can be said to have reached a status where there is a general 
understanding that the behaviour constitutes a rule of international society -  plays a 
role in filling in any “gaps” that may occur as time, weapons and circumstances 
change.19 The role of “general principles” is harder to define. Sufficient for our 
purposes here, these general principles fill the gaps between treaties and custom. For 
example, the decision to treat rape as a war crime was based on applying general 
principles rather than treaty or customary law with the understanding that a general 
principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning of the laws of war.20
Prisoners of War
As suggested by the above discussion, the laws of war covers a broad area and 
governs a wide variety of military activities. Traditionally, this includes targeting, 
protection of cultural property, treatment of the sick and wounded, shipwrecked, 
civilians in occupied territories, and prisoners of war. However, the law has
19 For a look at the role o f custom in the laws of war, see the report released by the ICRC: Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume 1: Rules. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. The report is not entirely free o f controversy as it may 
exaggerate its claims in certain places, but it still provides a good example o f how custom influences 
the laws o f war. W. Hays Parks argues that the customary law makes several assertions about the law 
which contravenes US practice. In particular he focuses on incendiary weapons and the use o f lasers in 
conflict. See W. Hays Parks, “The ICRC Customary Law Study: A Preliminary Assessment” American 
Society o f International Law Proceedings. Vol. 99. 2005. pp. 208-212.
20 For more on “general principles” see Cassese, International Law, p. 188-9. In note 3, Cassese refers 
to the December 1998 Furundzija judgement at the ICTY as an example o f the application o f general 
principles.
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increasingly expanded to cover blinding weapons, landmines and protection of the 
environment. Therefore, although the laws of war seems to be a small branch of 
international law as a whole, it covers a lot of ground. Writing a thesis which covered 
each of these aspects of the law would require a lot more space, time and resources 
than are available.
For this reason this work has chosen to focus on one particular aspect of the laws of 
war: issues relating to the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs). A case can be made 
for focusing on prisoners of war for a number of reasons, not least because the 
treatment of prisoners of war in the war on terror has been a major issue since the 
images of Guantanamo Bay were splashed across newspapers throughout the world. 
In this sense the question over treatment of combatants or terrorists who themselves 
have little respect, and a lot of contempt, for the laws of war, and who refuse to abide 
by its rules, is seen as a very interesting, political and morally complex issue.
This is not to say that decisions over what is and is not a legitimate target are
irrelevant or boring. During the 1999 Kosovo War the issue of targeting was certainly
9 1a highly contested debate. However, such debates tend towards arguments that are 
more legal than political. The issues involved make for discussions over legal texts as 
to what may be permissibly targeted and under what conditions. Such legal 
interpretations cannot, of course, avoid at least some political influence. But during 
the heavy bombing phase of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, there were few suggestions that the laws governing targeting were 
“obsolete” and the overall political impact of targeting in the Afghanistan and Iraq 
campaigns seems to be less than that of the recognition and treatment of POWs.
21 This debate is discussed in Chapter 4. For more on targeting, Dinstein looks at the law regarding 
targeting and aerial bombardment in his book, The Conduct of Hostilities as does A.P.V. Rogers in his 
book Law on the Battlefield. Second Edition, Manchester University Press, 2004. Duffy provides a 
summary o f the law in her book The War on Terror, pp. 228-239. The ICRC’s customary law report 
puts forward a series o f customary ‘rules’ regarding targeting. Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, see especially rules 7-24, 35-45. Michael N. Schmitt has written several articles on targeting and 
the laws o f war. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Conduct o f Hostilities During Operational Iraqi Freedom: 
An International Humanitarian Law Assessment”, 6 Yearbook o f International Humanitarian Law. 
2003, pp. 73-110; “Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues”, 34 Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights. 2004, pp. 59 - 104.
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Issues over the environment and landmines are fairly new and do not have the same 
historical background for analysis. On the other hand, ever since there has been war, 
there have been victims of conflicts and moral doctrines as to how to treat one’s 
enemy. Prisoners of war have featured prominently in almost every war that the 
United States has taken part in since its inception. In this sense there is a history 
which can be examined, and analysed. The United States has had to deal with POWs 
in its Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, Civil War and the wars against the First 
Nations. This has continued in the modem era as American military personnel were 
captured in the two world wars and the issue of POWs became politicised in the 
Korea and Vietnam. The treatment of prisoners of war has been one of the most 
prominent when it comes to the laws of war in the war on terror. The recent debates 
over Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and the moral standing of al-Qaida as an enemy 
suggest that these issues still challenge the United States, morally, politically and 
legally, today. Given this history and blend of political, moral and legal concerns, the 
POW issue makes for an interesting case study in terms of the restraints on waging 
modem war.
The laws of war as codified hypocrisy?
Most of these sources date from the end of the 19th Century through to the beginning
i.L
of the 20 . However, many lawyers and theorists are eager to look back throughout 
history to the rules and norms which have traditionally guided and restricted the way 
wars were waged. Usually they point to ancient codes and medieval treaties to 
illustrate their point that the laws of war is really as old as war itself. Such a history 
suggests a sturdy foundation for the application of mles and the laws of war on the 
battlefield.
Yet anyone who reads of the savagery of the Napoleonic wars, colonial battles or the 
Russian front in the Second World War could probably be forgiven for thinking that 
this was not the case. Certainly it is true that the laws of war have their origins in 
chivalrous codes that are centuries old. But one might be forgiven for thinking that 
such codes were honoured more often in breach than in practice, or for wondering 
how much of an impact the law has really had.
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This work is interested in the engagement of the United States with the laws of war 
and therefore operates on the premise that the laws of war do in fact matter. The 
question over whether or not the US takes the laws of war seriously (and the argument 
Ihere is that, for the most part, the US military does), will be addressed in later 
chapters. However, before proceeding further, it is useful for the rest of the work to 
take seriously the question of whether the term ‘laws of war’ is in fact an oxymoron.
In books on the laws of war it is not rare to find references to Cicero’s dictum inter 
arma enim silent leges or “in war law is silent”, and there has certainly been renewed 
use of the phrase since 9/11. The pessimistic tone of the saying suggests that matters 
o f  national interest or security will always triumph over well established rules and 
customs. The ideas of “raison de guerre”, “raison d'etat” in earlier centuries and 
“military necessity” in times closer to our own, have always been invoked by 
commanders and politicians justifying breaches of the laws of war. Although
Napoleon is quoted as having said “The natural law...forbids us to multiply the evils
0 0o f war indefinitely” he was clearly quite content to have his soldiers raid towns and
villages for food and supplies, leaving little left for the inhabitants to survive the
0*1
winter. Such policies, of course, were justified with reference to necessity. In the 
present, to answer charges of laws of war violations, many commentators and 
politicians in the United States have argued that the necessity of defeating al-Qaeda is 
much more important than any shallow humanitarian political obligations.24
To address the balance between ancient codes and their constant violation, a 
consideration of the role of law in war is needed. While one may point to the brutality 
and savagery commonplace in warfare, war always has had some kind of mles which 
guide its conduct. Without these mles, war cannot be distinguished from chaotic, 
purposeless murder, serving no goal or interest. As Michael Howard argues:
22 Cited in Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare, p. 49.
23During Napoleon’s march to Moscow it had pretty much been expected that troops would be able to 
live off the land as they marched to victory. When this did not pan out as expected and villages were 
swarmed with hungry and half starved troops, the result for the inhabitants was usually devastation. See 
Adam Zamoyski, 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. London: Harper Perennial, 2004.
24 For example, see Jeremy Rabkin, Law Without Nations: Why Constitutional Government Requires 
Sovereign States, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. This work will examine these arguments 
in Chapter 4.
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War... is not the condition of generalized and random violence pictured 
by Thomas Hobbes as the ‘state of nature’. It is on the contrary a highly 
social activity -  an activity indeed which demands from the groups 
which engage in it an unique intensity of society organization and 
control.25
Therefore, there is a link between war and discipline -  states with unrestrained armies 
have often found that their goals cannot be achieved without enforcing discipline. 
Worse, these nations have been attacked by their own marauding troops. But beyond 
self-preservation, the rape and pillage of towns could often lead to disastrous 
consequences for political and military objectives of an invading army. While such 
policies could create fear within a population to encourage docility, it could also turn 
a population against an army, making occupation or future advancement very difficult 
and costly. In this sense, restraint was not only humane, it was militarily 
advantageous.
In this way, claims that war is an ungovernable explosion of violence with no rule but 
kill or be killed are just as mistaken as the belief that law alone will ensure that 
civilians will never die in conflict zones. In short, the laws of war are a strange beast -  
frequently honoured in words, regularly broken in deeds. It is effective in so much as 
states want it to be -  but to suggest that states do not have a choice in the matter is 
wrong.
If war is a norm governed activity, then importance can be attached to those norms 
which do or should apply and the ways they are incorporated into military doctrine; 
and this in turn is worthy of academic scrutiny. Examining the development and 
implementation of the laws of war is the aim of this work -  but through the lenses of 
the United States: its military, its politicians and its citizens.
The United States, Politics and History
25 Michael Howard, “Tempermenta Belli'. Can War Be Controlled” in Michael Howard, ed. Restraints 
on War: Studies in the Limitation o f Armed Conflict. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979. p. 1
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Having briefly looked at what exactly is meant by ‘laws of war’, its sources and its 
relevance to modem warfare, the next section of this introduction will look at three 
questions implied in the title “The United States and the Politics of the Laws of war 
Since 1945”: Why the United States? Why politics? And why a chronological 
approach?
The United States and the Laws o f War
Anyone familiar with current events should not find it too difficult to understand why 
this work has chosen to focus on the United States and its relation with the laws of 
war. The United States has participated in nearly every major conflict of the 20th 
Century, especially so in the period since 1945. In this way it has seen the changing 
development of the laws of war throughout the 20th Century and experienced only too 
well the difficulties posed by the changing nature of conflict.
Because of its military engagement and status as a world power, the United States has 
had an effect on the development of (or at least the way we consider) the laws of war. 
It has participated in virtually every conference which aimed to modify or further 
develop the laws of war since the 1899 Hague Convention. Even where the United 
States has chosen not to sign on to various legal treaties for political or moral reasons, 
this has had an effect on the law. First, although it has not formally signed many of 
these treaties, the United States has incorporated many of their principles into its own 
military doctrine. One only need look at the targeting provisions of Additional 
Protocol I and compare them to US practice to see that the US, for the most part, 
follows the mles laid out in the text. Second, as the nation that is most heavily 
engaged throughout the world in terms of sheer scale and numbers, it is clear that US 
practice is going to have an effect on the interpretation of treaties and in the 
development of customary law whether or not the US is, itself, a signatory.
However, this discussion would undoubtedly be amiss if it did not mention the rather 
obvious fact that the US has probably been the nation most embroiled in controversy
26 See part IV o f  Additional Protocol I for the targeting provisions, protection o f civilians and civilian 
targets.
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regarding the laws of war since 1945. Certainly it is not the only country to come 
under scrutiny in this regard. French military actions in Algeria shocked western 
nations and Canada faced international shame when a scandal broke in 1994 over the 
torture and murder of Somali youths by its soldiers. Recently stories of UN 
Peacekeepers (from several nations) sexually abusing women in conflict areas such as
onthe Congo have also emerged.
Yet whether it be because of the sheer scale of military operations the US has 
conducted since 1945, the nature of the conflicts in which it has chosen to participate 
in, or its own moral understanding of itself as ‘a law abiding nation’, there has been 
much domestic and international focus on the conduct of American and American- 
lead military operations. Clearly, US citizens expect that their soldiers will behave in 
a way which coincides with American values and principles. Part of the soul- 
searching which followed Vietnam (inside and outside of the military) was a result of 
the realization that US soldiers could and did carry out a massacre of civilians. That 
US soldiers could be induced to participate in such activities contrasted dramatically 
with public expectations. Additionally, because many of the conflicts that the US has 
participated in since 1945 have been controversial, American leaders and military 
commanders have gone to great lengths to ensure that more fuel is not added to the 
fire by laws of war violations and this has sometimes produced strange results. For 
example, during the Kosovo campaign, the Clinton administration insisted on 
carefully going over and approving targeting lists, rejecting those which seemed likely
9o
to lead to civilian casualties.
Therefore, it should not come as that much surprise that there is a lot of domestic and 
international scrutiny of US military operations in the ongoing ‘war on terror’. 
However, the public announcement that the laws of war would not technically apply 
to captured combatants in Afghanistan, and the outcry over Guantanamo Bay and Abu
27 Colum Lynch, “U.N. Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo” Washington Post. December 16, 2004; Page 
A26, available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dvn/articles/A3145-2004Decl5.html.
Also see Brian Ross, David Scott and Rhonda Schwartz, “U.N. Sex Crimes in Congo” ABC News, 10 
February 2005, available online at:
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/UnitedNations/storv?id~489306&page=l: BBC News, “UN sexual 
allegations double” 6 May 2005, available online at: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/americas/4521481 .stm.
28 See Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modem War: Bosnia. Kosovo and the Future o f Conflict. Oxford: 
Public Affairs, 2001 and Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Uglv: NATO’s War to 
Save Kosovo. Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000.
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Ghraib have thrown the US, and some of its more controversial policies regarding the 
laws of war, into the spotlight. This work seeks to examine these controversies, the 
arguments on both sides and the implication for the laws of war. Do the arguments 
and justifications make sense? And if so, on what grounds?
Politics and the Laws o f war
This brings us to the next question regarding this work -  why “the politics of the laws 
of war” and not just the “laws of war”? The most immediate answer to this question 
is that the line of inquiry and arguments put forward are not legal per se. In fact, the 
thesis specifically aims to avoid legal debates over interpretation of treaty texts. 
Instead, it seeks to present an argument that is about law, but is not legal.
Since the war on terror began, there have been many books and articles published on 
problems with the law, determining which law applies and the legal obligations of 
combatants. Therefore, to present a legal work on these matters would be to follow a 
well trodden path. That the author of this work is not a lawyer would probably result 
in the presentation of an inaccurate, unoriginal argument.
However, it is an assumption of this work that the law cannot and should not be left to 
the lawyers alone. Rather there is room for much non-legal scrutiny of how the law 
develops, is implemented and regarded by states, groups and individuals. Examining 
such attitudes does not require a law degree, but an understanding of politics and 
history. That law is often affected by politics and our ideological perceptions is a fact 
that a cold, ahistorical reading of a legal text cannot bring to light.
International Lawyers and International Law
29 For a presentation o f  the law relating the war on terror see, Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and Dominic 
McGoldrick, From ‘9-11’ to the ‘Iraq War 2003’: International Law in an Age o f Complexity. 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004.
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Where lawyers have crossed over into the political realm, the results have been only 
somewhat satisfactory. Most international lawyers who have written on this area have 
written condemnatory books which present lists of violations of the laws of war and 
long tirades against the Bush and Blair administrations for their actions. In these 
books there is little appreciation for the role of politics in law, especially international 
law. Instead, international law is treated as a sacred body of rules of which any 
violation is presented as a betrayal of humanity as a whole. As Philippe Sands writes
<2 I
in his book, “The ‘war on terrorism’ has lead many lawyers astray” -  without ever 
explaining exactly what lawyers have led been astray from. Rather it is assumed that 
international law is good and international politics are bad. Michael Byers concludes 
his book on war law arguing:
The immense power of the United States carries with it an awesome 
responsibility: to improve the world -  for everyone. Obeying the 
requirements of war law is a necessary first step.
The reader is therefore apparently to assume that law is the solution to our problems 
and unquestioning obedience to it is necessary for world peace and victory in the war 
on terror. One cannot help but be reminded of E. H. Carr’s contention that among 
people interested in international affairs, there is “a strong inclination to treat law as 
something independent of, and ethically superior to, politics.”
Perhaps, one might argue, where politics leads to policies and practices of torture, the 
ethical superiority of law is defensible. And this brings us to a second set of lawyers 
who are, perhaps, only too willing to dismiss international law as vague and without 
substance. These lawyers (who will be referred to as the ‘New Sovereigntists’ in 
Chapter 4) argue that the only supreme law that binds a nation can be its own 
constitution. The only international law which matters is that which states have 
explicitly agreed to and ratified. Even then, they argue, states only too often ratify 
international treaties with absolutely no intention to do anything about their new
30 See Byers, War Law and Sands, Lawless World.
31 Sands, Lawless World, p. 205.
32 Bvers. War Law, p. 155.
33 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Year’s Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study o f International 
Relations. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001. p. 159.
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international commitments, and this demonstrates the weakness and irrelevance of 
international law. As Jeremy Rabkin argues:
Without a sense that law follows from the national constitution and the 
past understandings of that constitution, “law” can be manipulated into 
anything a judge may like it to be and individual rights are as uncertain or 
as ephemeral as this [international] “law”.34
Therefore, when it comes to the war on terror, these lawyers argue that there cannot 
be any question of international law restricting US actions. The ultimate purpose of 
the state is to protect the inhabitants which reside within -  even if this means violating 
the principles of international law.
To the former group of lawyers, international law is everything. To the New 
Sovereigntists, international law is very little indeed. With starting positions like 
these, both sides ultimately end up talking past each other and there is very little room 
for debate and reflection on the larger issue of the role of law in the war on terror. It 
seems that one is expected to believe that international law is an all or nothing 
phenomenon.
It is a central idea of this work that what has been lost in this debate is an examination 
of the role of politics in law and law in politics. The New Sovereigntists may argue 
that international law really does not matter, but this does not explain why the Bush 
administration has worked hard to justify their policies, legally in the war on terror 
(as well as politically and morally). The international lawyers may argue that the Bush 
and Blair administrations are destroying the fabric of the international legal system -  
but this cannot account for the fact that the Geneva Conventions remain fairly intact 
and continue as the basis four our judgements of military actions in conflicts.
International Relations and International Law
34 Rabkin, Law Without Nations?, p. 268.
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Yet this discussion would be misleading if it did not also point out that the discipline 
of international relations has been inadequate in its treatment of international law. The 
above quote by Carr is indicative of a traditional contempt for the idea that law could 
constrain power. As Christian Reus-Smit argues, neither of the traditional approaches 
of international relations, realism or neo-liberalism/rationalism offer an adequate 
understanding of international law in international politics:
Realist and neoliberal approaches are hamstrung by their underlying 
conceptions of politics and law, conceptions that leave them ill-equipped
o r
to comprehend [legal] issues...”.
He suggests that constructivism implies “analytically more useful conceptions 
of international politics, but these remain underdeveloped.36
Realism, on the one hand does not address the growing body of international law, it 
does not explain how law constrains strong states and has no account for how weak 
states use international law to shape outcomes.37 Neo-liberals, on the other hand, see 
law as functional solutions to manage problems (such as managing the world’s 
oceans) but:
the rationalist image of states strategically negotiating functional rules 
captures but one dimension of the contemporary politics of 
international law. Ignored almost completely is the way which 
international law can serve as a focal point for discursive struggles of
•JO
legitimate political agency and action...
In terms of international law, nowhere is this truer than with respect to the laws of 
war. The law is not only a series of rules, but it can and does confer identities and 
legitimacy. During the negotiations over the Additional Protocols in the 1970s, the 
Non-Aligned movement and Communist nations were able to include within the text
35 Christian Reus-Smit, “The Politics o f International Law” in Christian Reus-Smits, ed. The Politics o f  
International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 24.
36 Reus-Smit, “The Politics o f International Law”, p. 24.
37 Reus-Smit, “The Politics o f International Law”, p. 17.
38 Reus-Smit, “The Politics o f International Law”, p. 20.
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allowances for “peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”.39 
Understanding the reasons for and implications of this decision cannot be done 
through a legal or political analysis alone -  the reasons and results are mixed and 
varied.
It should be noted, however, that in recent times there has been a gradual recognition 
for a need to ‘bridge the gap’ between International Relations and International Legal 
theory.40 Therefore, working on the assumption that there is the theoretical and 
analytical space to look at the interaction of law and politics, this work attempts to do 
just that by looking at the relationship of the world’s only superpower to the laws of 
war. This will be done by looking at the political arguments and the politics of the 
legal arguments put forward by the Bush administration regarding its policies and 
those of its critics. Understanding that there are political nuances to every legal 
argument -  but that legal arguments matter for our political understandings of 
conflicts -  is fundamental to this process. It is the intention of this work that it will 
ultimately give the reader a better understanding of the institutions of war, law and 
diplomacy and their interactions in international politics.
History and the Laws o f  war -  or why a chronological approach?
In looking at the politics of the laws of war, it is the intention here to present an 
accounting of the law that currently exists and the US policy towards it. A full 
explanation, however, can only be made via contextualization. This entails a review
39 Additional Protocol I, Article 1(4).
40 Examples include: Michael Byers, Custom. Power and the Power o f Rules: International Relations 
And Customary International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999; Michael Byers ed., 
The Role o f Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Martti Koskenniemi The Gentle Civilizer o f Nations: The Rise 
and Fall o f International Law 1870-1960 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Martti 
Koskenniemi “The Politics o f International Law”, European Journal o f International Law. Vol. 1, No.
1. 1990; Nicholas Onuf “Do Rules Say What they Do? From Ordinary Language to International Law”, 
Harvard International Law Journal. Vol. 26. No. 2, 1985; Christian Reus-Smit ed., The Politics o f  
International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
“International Law and International Relations Theory: A dual Agenda” American Journal of  
International Law. Vol. 87, No. 2., 1993; Anne-Marie Slaughter and Stepan Wood, “International Law 
and International Relations Theory: A New Generation o f Interdisciplinary Scholarship,” American 
Journal o f International Law. Vo. 92, No. 3, 1998.
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of the history of this relationship to understand why certain decisions were made and 
what the significance of particular actions has been. Therefore, this work will proceed 
in a chronological manner.
Certainly there are other approaches that one could take in presenting this material -  
including ones that put greater emphasis on empirical research methods, thematic 
approaches, or even approaches which emphasized models and modelling. However, 
a chronological presentation of the material is advantageous over other methods, for 
several reasons. First, a quantitative or statistical analysis of the laws of war has 
several drawbacks. It entails the quantification of the laws of war and would probably 
require some kind of measurement which analysed adherence/non-adherence. Is it 
possible to quantify, meaningfully, the principles of the laws of war? How does one 
measure adherence? And even if some kind of statistical correlation could be found or 
discovered, it would reveal nothing about the history, debates and controversies over 
the laws of war. In this sense, a relationship might be demonstrated, but the reader 
would be left knowing little more about it. For a thesis which seeks to understand and 
reveal the reasons behind America’s engagement with the laws of war, a quantitative 
approach does not seem to make much sense.
Another possible approach, a thematic one, would emphasize the ‘themes’ or issues 
which emerge from the relationship of America and the laws of war. Such an 
approach would be advantageous in the sense that it would allow for a close 
examination of the various issues in one chapter. However, as it is a goal of this work 
to look at the trends apparent in American engagement with the laws of war, a 
chronological approach will assist readers in seeing the ‘bigger picture’ which 
emerges. Additionally, the ability to see how these trends interact with one another is 
another definite advantage in terms of promoting a historical understanding and 
contextualization. However, this being said, the conclusion of this work will utilize a 
thematic approach to the issue of America and the laws of war to draw upon common 
trends and influences in each era once they have already been explored in a 
chronological fashion. It is intended that a thematic review will help to reinforce and 
emphasize the factors which have influenced and continue to influence America’s 
relationship with the laws of war.
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Finally, because there is a great deal of history presented which is specific to the 
United States, this work does not purport to offer a model of explanation by which to 
better understand the laws of war in its relations with other countries. Certainly it is 
hoped that the argument here can be used in terms of a comparison or contrast in other 
works, but it certainly does not present a model of development. It is the 
understanding of this thesis that given the role of the United States in world politics 
any suggestion that it should or even could present a model for other countries is 
misguided.
The goal then is to present an argument about the politics of the laws of war which is 
rooted in the American historical experience in its engagement with this law. As 
mentioned above, it is a major assumption of this work that this relationship is sui 
generis. Perhaps this then begs the question as to what purpose this analysis really 
serves. The above arguments have already in part answered this question, noting that 
America’s unique role in the world, especially as the lead nation in the war on terror, 
makes understanding its relationship with the laws of war important for those who are 
interested in how the war on terror is being fought, what the repercussion of these 
actions are, and what the implications are to American’s wider engagement with 
international law. But beyond this, and, again, as mentioned above, there are few 
works that look realistically at how the laws of war actually work and are 
implemented in practice. Legal analyses too often lack context -  and it is the hope that 
a political analysis which reflects on this history, can help improve the general 
understanding of America’s relationship with the laws of war.
Original Contributions
Having looked at what the laws of war is, what it is not, why it constitutes an 
important area of research and outlined the working assumptions of this thesis, this 
final section of the introduction will provide an overview of the work as a whole and 
its original contributions to research.
The central focus of this work is to examine the factors that have influenced the 
relationship between the United States and the laws of war and how these factors help
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to explain the state of the relationship today in the war on terror. Following this 
agenda, the following is a list of contributions to the research in this area:
• The thesis will look at the historical engagements surrounding the 
development and implementation of the laws of war in the United States 
which is typically underspecified in the international law literature.
• The thesis will look at the changes in US military training and the 
development of the concept of ‘operational law’ that came about after the 
experiences of the Vietnam War which has been largely ignored in the 
international relations and international law literature outside of material 
published by the US military. It will then look at how this changed the 
American approach to the laws of war culminating in the strong level of 
adherence to international law in the 1990-1 Gulf War.
• Taking this historical background into account, the thesis will assess the 
relationship of the United States with the laws of war in the two most recent 
conflicts it has fought in the war on terror. In doing so, it will make a 
comparison between these conflicts considered to be within the framework of 
the war on terror and those that came before.
• The thesis will assess the Bush administration’s arguments regarding the 
applicability of laws of war to the war on terror. This will be done through a 
political rather than legal approach.
Having established these goals, the ordering of chapters is as follows:
Chapter 2 will begin with a historical overview of America’s relationship with the 
laws of war from its inception as a nation to the signing of the Geneva Conventions in 
1949. It will demonstrate that although the United States saw itself as an exceptional 
nation, in terms of the laws of war, its approach was very European. This history 
demonstrates the origins of a ‘dualistic approach’ in terms of the laws of war -  the 
rules that applied to the Civil War and the rules that applied to the wars against the 
First Nations people were very different. While the United States was engaged in a 
bloody insurgency in the Philippines it was, at the same time, working with other 
European nations to expand and codify international law and the laws of war at the
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1899 Hague Conference. However, as the chapter will demonstrate, by the middle of 
the 20th Century, it was clear that the United States was taking the laws of war 
seriously in terms of participating in their further expansion after the Second World 
War and in the development of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Chapter 3 will outline the difficulties and disasters experienced by the United States 
in terms of the laws of war in Vietnam. However the focus will be on the lessons US 
military lawyers drew from their experiences in that conflict (and later in Grenada) 
and worked to change its approach to the laws of war to make it a more ‘sellable’ 
package to its commanders and troops. This lead to what may as well be called a 
‘legal revolution’ in terms of the American approach to the laws of war which was 
apparent in the 1990-1991 Gulf War -  referred to by some as the most ‘legalistic’ war 
in history.
Chapter 4 will begin the focus of this work on the relationship of the United States 
and the laws of war in the war on terror. It will seek to explain why, after a policy of 
strict adherence to the laws of war, the political leadership of the United States chose 
not to apply the Geneva Conventions to captured combatants in Afghanistan. In 
looking for answers, the Chapter will look back to the experience of fighting in 
Kosovo -  the difficulties of coalition politics when it comes to the laws of war as well 
as legal battles with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
Additionally, it will look at the rise of the ‘New Sovereigntist’ critique of 
international law in the 1990s. Ultimately, the Chapter will suggest that these factors, 
combined with the political imperative of winning the war on terror and gaining 
intelligence resulted in the Bush administration to denying combatants formal 
recognition as prisoners of war. It will then assess the validity of the claims made in 
light of the threat posed by international terrorism.
In looking at the relationship of the United States and the laws of war in Iraq, Chapter 
5 will look mainly at the scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison but will also focus on other 
controversial issues such as the increasing participation of private military firms 
(PMFs) in military operations. In terms of the scandal at Abu Ghraib, the Chapter will 
look at various explanations as to why the events took place -  whether individual 
soldiers gave in to sadistic tendencies in a chaotic environment with unclear rules, or
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whether the abuse at the prison emerged as a direct result of Bush administration 
policies. The Chapter will look at the implications of generating uncertainty over the 
laws of war over implementing an overall comprehensive approach.
Conclusion
In setting out to look at the United States and the politics of the laws of war, it is 
perhaps interesting to consider Hersh Lauterpacht’s suggestion that “If international 
law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the laws of war is, perhaps even 
more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.”41 The phrase is now 
virtually cliche among those who write on the laws of war. But the question remains 
as to whether the same does holds true for the politics of international law. In looking 
at the history of, international debates over, conflicts engaged in and controversies 
relating to the laws of war, this work seeks to demonstrate that although the power of 
law may be questionable in war, the politics over its implementation remain as 
important and interesting as always.
41 Hersh Lauterpacht, “The Limits o f  the Operation o f the Laws o f War”, British Yearbook of 
International Law. Volume 30, 1953. pp. 206-43
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Chapter 2: A Weapon and Restraint
The United States and the Laws of War 1750-1950
Introduction
Since the founding of the Republic, adherence to the laws of war has been heavily 
supported by American lawyers and policy makers. It was expected of the American 
Revolutionary and the solider in the War of 1812.1 In many ways, just means were seen 
as an important part of the just cause that was key in maintaining popular support 
throughout these campaigns.
Yet at the same time, it is not novel to suggest that America’s adherence to the laws of 
war were heavily qualified. One of America’s foremost scholars on international law, 
Henry Wheaton, wrote in 1866:
Thus, if the progress of an enemy cannot be stopped nor our own frontier 
secured or if the approaches to a town intended to be attacked cannot be 
made with out laying waste the intermediate territory, the extreme case may 
justify a resort to measures not warranted by the ordinary purposes of war...
The whole international code is founded upon reciprocity. The rules it 
prescribes are observed by one nation, in confidence that they will be so by 
others. Where, then, the established means of restraining his excesses, 
retaliation may justly be resorted to observance of the law which he has 
violated.2
This was, of course, the perfect justification for an unrestrained war against the First 
Nations of North America.
1 Of course, this is in a general sense. There were many violations of the normal customs o f war during 
these conflicts, such as the use o f guerrilla tactics and employing First Nations warriors to strike deadly 
blows against the enemy. For example, see Christopher Hibbert, Red Coats and Rebels: The War for 
America 1770-1781. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2001.
2 Henry Wheaton, Elements o f International Law: The Literal Reproduction of the Edition of 1866. Richard 
Henry Dada Jr. Ed. George Grafton Wilson, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936. pp. 368-371.
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This chapter will provide a brief survey of America’s relationship with the laws of war 
from 1750 through to the Korean War. It will be apparent that, like most countries at this 
time, America’s adherence to the laws of war was erratic. Yet what makes America stand 
out was that the new republic saw itself as exceptional among nations. This belief played 
a part in encouraging the newly formed United States to adhere to the traditional laws of 
war, the American imperative to expand its civilizing empire created a dualistic tendency 
in its application of this law. While the United States was crucial to the development of 
the laws of war -  the Lieber Code and its influence on the 1899 Hague Convention were 
key to the development of the laws of war in the latter half of the 19th Century -  it would 
also use those same laws to justify the tactics it employed against non-Westem peoples.
thBy the middle of the 20 Century, the US began to put into place a more coherent and 
doctrinal approach to the laws of war. This approach responded to the need of a growing 
military in a democracy, but also reflected its experience in fighting total wars. It was 
never a straight path, but the US would go from fighting unrestrained wars against its 
native populations to implementing a strong code of military justice and, for the most part, 
a decent respect for the laws of war.
The New Republic and the Laws of War
As the newly formed American Army engaged in war against their British counterparts in 
the War of Independence, the first American Articles of War came into force on 30 June 
1775 when they were adopted by the Second Continental Congress.3 They were directly 
derived from the British Articles of War which themselves had been greatly influenced 
by an almost literal translation of Roman Law.4 John S. Cooke notes that this did lead to
3 During this period the Navy operated under the “Rules and Regulation o f the Navy of the United 
Colonies” which was put in place on 28 November 1775. The name was later changed to the Articles for 
the Government o f the Navy in 1799. See John D. Cooke, “Introduction: Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
Uniform Code o f Military Justice Symposium Edition” Military Law Review. Vol. 165, September 2000, 
pp. 1-20. p. 2-3.
4 Edmund M. Morgan, “The Background o f the Uniform Code o f Military Justice,” Military Law Review.
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a somewhat ironic result -  the British Articles, with their medieval origins rested on a 
particular relationship between leaders and the rank and file that was different from the 
egalitarian principles espoused by revolutionary Americans. Ideological inconsistency 
aside, Cooke notes that such a decision was not that surprising given the urgent need to 
organize and govern the rebelling forces.5
Perhaps more importantly, it appears that the goals of the American and British systems 
were the same -  to instill a command-dominated control to secure obedience. Courts- 
martial were not viewed as independent mechanism for determining justice, but as tools 
to serve the military. As Cooke notes, punishment, or the threat of it was seen as the only 
way to motivate poor, uneducated and newly integrated men on the battlefield.6 In the life 
and death struggle of conflict, not to mention the chaos of the battlefield, discipline was 
crucial for getting an objective accomplished. Writing just over a century later, General 
William T. Sherman (himself a lawyer) wrote:
Civilian lawyers are too apt to charge that Army discipline is tyranny. We 
know better. The discipline of the best armies has been paternal, just and 
impartial. Every general, and every commanding officer, knows that to 
obtain from his command the largest measure of force, and the best results 
he must possess the absolute confidence of his command by his firmness, 
his impartiality, his sense of justice and devotion to his country, not from 
fear. Yet in order to execute the orders of his superiors he must insist on the 
implicit obedience of his command. Without this quality, no army can fulfill 
its office, and every good citizen is as much interested in maintaining this 
quality in the army as any member of it.7
That there were few changes made to the Articles of War until the mid-20th Century
Vol. 28, April 1965, pp. 17-35.
5 Cooke, “Introduction”, p. 4.
6 Cooke, “Introduction”, p. 3.
7 William T. Sherman, Journal of the Military Service Institute o f the United States. Vol. 132, 1880. Cited 
in George S. Prugh, Jr., “Observations on the Uniform Code of Military Justice: 1954 and 2000” Military 
Law Review. Vol. 165, September 2000, pp. 21-41. p. 30.
33
indicates that such a belief was firmly held by military and political leaders.8
Given this emphasis on discipline (even over justice for the American soldier who found 
himself accused), extensive guidelines with regards to humanitarian restraint in warfare 
had not been laid out in the Articles -  though, in view of its European origins, it must be 
said that America was hardly alone in this. Still, the Articles remained the tool through 
which the customary laws of war were enforced.
It was not until the Civil War that the American government realized that it needed an 
explicit code for its soldiers to follow. In some ways, America again looked to Europe -  
or at least to a European -  for advice. Francis Lieber, an old Prussian soldier, was a 
professor at the University of Columbia in 1861 when he gave a series of lectures on the 
laws of war. This he subsequently published as a 16 page paper “of concise, sensible 
notes about the treatment of guerrilla forces, spies, brigands and ‘bushwhackers’.”9 When 
one of Lieber’s audience, General H. W. Halleck, became the General-in-Chief of the 
Union’s armies, he ordered five thousand copies of Lieber’s paper and invited him to 
propose amendments to the few existing army regulations.10 At the outset of the US Civil 
War, it was clear that most of the professional officers in the US armed forces were going 
to be on the Confederate side.11 Clearly this would be a problem in a system that relied 
on custom to prevent atrocities in warfare. The generally less experienced men in charge 
of the Union’s forces would need some kind of instruction as to how to conduct 
themselves in battle and engaging with hostile populations. Therefore, General Orders 
100: Instructions for the Government of Armies in the United States in the Field, was 
published in the Spring of 1863 (six months before the Geneva meeting) and became 
known as the “Lieber Code”.
8 There were changes made in 1786, 1806, 1874, 1917. Future Presidents Thomas Jefferson and John 
Adams were made members o f one o f the first committees set with the task of revising the military code of 
1775 but made no substantial changes. As Morgan notes, even the Articles enacted in 1916 were only a 
rearrangement and a reclassification without much alteration in substance. See Morgan, “The Background 
of the Uniform Code o f Military Justice”, p. 17-18.
9 Caroline Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War. Switzerland and the History o f the Red Cross. London: 
HarperCollins, 1999. 37.
10 Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream, p. 37.
11 Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. p. 41.
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The code covered military discipline, an explanation of the laws of war and their status 
between two opposing armed forces. It strictly adhered to the view that tactics in warfare 
were not unrestricted by the law of nations or natural law. It was a set of guidelines for 
soldiers on the battlefield and offered some innovations. One of Lieber’s main 
contributions was to provide what was then the clearest definition of who a Prisoner of 
War was and what his rights were according to customary international law. According to 
Article 49:
A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the hostile army 
for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the captor, either fighting or 
wounded, on the field or in the hospital, by individual surrender or by 
capitulation.
All soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the rising 
en masse of the hostile country; all those who are attached to the army for its 
efficiency and promote directly the object of the war, except such as are 
hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or officers on the field or 
elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have thrown away their arms and 
ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the 
inconveniences as well as entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war.12
According to Best, so far as POWs are concerned, Lieber’s language indicates both a 
keen awareness that among the law’s classical purposes was the prevention of things 
being done in war which might hinder the return to peace, and an awareness that popular 
passions were actually pressing for the execution of such drastic and severe war measures 
as were sure to do that.13 Additionally, Best argues that this definition was important 
because it clarified the fact that prisoners of war were not to be considered criminals. 
Instead, Lieber made it clear that POWs were to be considered a distinct category of
12 Text found at Yale University’s Avalon project: Documents in Law. History and Diplomacy. Available 
online: http://www.vale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm.
13 Best, Humanity in Warfare, p. 156.
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war’s sufferers or victims and thus deserving of protection like the wounded.14
Ultimately, despite this impressive step, Lieber’s rules were more like guiding principles 
than binding rules -  as they were not adhered to by the Confederate forces they did not 
have to be applied. Yet the Lieber Code had some impact in the field on the behaviour of 
Government troops. Additionally, Lieber’s overall contribution would become very 
influential in the US and Europe, as well as in the future treaties on the laws of war that 
were negotiated in the later half of the 19th Century.
Wars with the First Nations
In the 1860s, the United States simultaneously fought the Sioux Indians in Minnesota and 
Confederate armies in the South -  a comparison of the treatment of these two groups 
opposing the government is telling. Interestingly, neither group was treated as legal 
combatants. As mentioned above, the South was not entitled to the full protection of the 
laws of war (as defined in the Lieber Code) because the Confederate forces did not 
adhere to it. On the other hand, because the First Nations were considered savages, they 
did not have the opportunity to be a part of the shared international law of civilized 
nations. Therefore, the First Nations would find themselves considered hostile, rounded 
up and placed into reservations or killed should they resist the US government. While it 
would be incorrect to suggest that prisoner of war camps housing the southern prisoners 
were luxurious, Confederate soldiers were treated far more fairly and with much more 
dignity than the warriors of the First Nations ever were.
Still, at the time such treatment of ‘natives’ was consistent with the military practices of 
the European powers who fought formal restrained wars against one another and used 
very harsh tactics in their colonial wars.15 Yet, America’s situation was unique -  in the 
words of Peter Maguire:
14 Best, Humanity in Warfare, p. 156.
15 Peter Maguire, Law and War: An American Story. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. p. 5.
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It became increasingly difficult to justify an expansive, essentially
imperialistic foreign policy within the framework of an egalitarian political
ideology.... More than the obvious gap between words and deeds, from the
beginning there was a tension between America’s much-vaunted ethical and
legal principles and its practical policy interests as an emerging world 
16power.
In other words, America by the beginning of the 20th Century simultaneously championed 
rights, law and the rule of law -  but also denied these protections where affording them 
would have clashed with the national interest. This, Maguire calls ‘strategic legalism’: 
“the use of laws or legal arguments to further policy objectives, irrespective of facts or 
laws.”17
Maguire goes so far as to describe the American interpretation of international law at this 
time as “cynical”. Whether one agrees or not with this description, it is certainly possible 
to point to a dualist trend in American thought on international law. First, there was 
America, the idealist who championed rights, and, second, there was the expanding 
empire, first over North America and then overseas. This tension only grew as America 
increasingly developed international interests abroad -  such as in China and Japan.
What is key here is that these policies, and America’s understanding of international law, 
including the laws of war, were increasingly seen through the prism of manifest destiny. 
The messianic overtones which accompanied the founding of the republic argued that 
America was to be the ‘shining city on a hill’ and represent all that was good and possible 
for civilization. However, as the United States grew increasingly expansionist, those 
groups who opposed its influence were increasingly seen as standing in the way of
16 Maguire, Law and War, p. 6. Of course it is possible to overdo the uniqueness o f the American approach. 
The French republican tradition and the British sense o f liberty were also deemed compatible with Empire. 
Additionally, all o f these empires saw themselves as undertaking a civilizing mission in their engagements 
abroad.
17 Maguire, Law and War, p. 9.
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civilization. Civilization, in return, was no longer obliged to provide protections to those 
who were standing in the way of progress.
These sentiments can be seen in American engagements from the Revolutionary War up 
to the First World War. Although one often reads about the strength of the isolationist 
movement in the United States at this time, America fought wars with Britain, Spain, 
Mexico, China and the Philippines (just to name the most prominent). Yet, while the wars 
with the European powers were relatively restrained and adhered to the laws of war as 
they were known, those who were not European, and seen as rejecting the civilizing 
influence of the United States, were treated as savages and outlaws and America’s power 
would come down on them hard. The wars with the First Nations peoples were very 
bloody.
Although many of the founding fathers of the American republic considered the First 
Nations to be barbarians, there were others, such as Thomas Jefferson and Henry Knox 
who wanted to demonstrate the purity of America’s institutions and moral worth of the 
republic’s enterprise in terms of their policies towards the First Nations. They therefore 
placed much emphasis on reasoning and negotiation with the tribes with the eventual goal 
of converting them to ‘civilization’ as Americans.18 This republican idealism can be seen 
in policies which provided the First Nations tribes with gardening implements in the hope 
that they would turn from their nomadic ways and cultivate the land like the American 
settlers.
However, not everyone subscribed to these ‘enlightened’ views: the western settlers had 
no problem with clearing out rather than converting the First Nations. Aside from the fact 
that their uncivilized ways deemed them unworthy to inhabit the land, many First Nations 
tribes had sided with the British in the American Revolutionary War. Therefore, as 
‘losers’ in the conflict, the First Nations forfeited their rights and land claims in the new 
republic.
18 Reginald Horseman, Expansion and American Indian Policy. 1783-1812. Norman: University of 
Okalahoma Press, 1992. p. 83.
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Ultimately, as the perception that there was a need for more land grew, these divergent 
positions were united. The view that the First Nations had no rights to soil that they 
refused to cultivate was ever more being accepted. In this regard, war with the First 
Nations tribes was increasingly seen as a just war.19 This was confounded after the War 
of 1812 where, again, the First Nations tribes sided with the British. Although by this 
time the Supreme Court had defined them as a ‘domestic dependent nation’, the outcome 
of the War had opened the West for American settlement and delegitimized the First 
Nation’s claims even further.20 By 1850s, in the face of the California Gold Rush and a 
general push westward, the land promised to the First Nations, the so-called Permanent 
Indian Frontier, was abandoned and an all out war over settlements began.
Much of the fighting took place right before, during and after the Civil War. As the 
regular army was distracted by the conflict, the forces fighting the First Nations were 
mostly made up of citizen-soldier volunteer armies. Many of the confrontations were 
sparked when civilian-settlers provoked the increasingly frustrated and volatile First 
Nations tribes. As one historian describes it, “In a sense, the Army was left with the dirty 
work by others. It was called in at the last moment, usually, to clean up a mess made by 
civilians.”21 Still, this did not mean that the tactics of the army were restrained. Soldiers 
were known for sparking confrontations with the First Nations during tense moments.
The First Nations, of course, had not been taking the encroaching Americans peacefully. 
By the end of the 18th Century they had incorporated horses and guns into their ways of 
making war -  making them ruthlessly efficient and, in the eyes of American settlers, a 
real threat. Already to Americans and Europeans the style of warfare that the First 
Nations followed was completely foreign, and certainly not within the remit of the 
traditional laws of war. Therefore “because the customary laws of war forbade guerrilla 
warfare, the taking of hostages, and the massacre of civilians, the early colonists and the
19 Horseman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 89.
20 Richard H. Dillon, North American Indian Wars. Wigston: Magna Boods, 1983. p. 64.
21 Dillon, North American Indian Wars, p. 251.
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US government never recognized the legitimacy of the American Indian resistance.”22 So, 
when First Nations warriors were captured in the fighting that occurred throughout the 
19th Century, they were not charged with violations of the customary laws of war because 
the US did not consider them lawful combatants. To grant them such a status would have 
been to recognize a right to wage war.23
As such, the skirmishes with the First Nations tribes quickly became a part of a larger 
war of extermination on both sides. First Nations leaders, tired of the lies and false 
promises of Washington, would attack the encroaching settlements without mercy -  
attacking soldier, civilian, woman and child alike. The American forces responded in 
kind -  attacking anyone and everyone within range of their bullets. Soldiers would boast 
of not taking prisoners -  and those who were taken were often subject to torture and 
abuse. Scalping and desecration of the dead was also rampant on both sides.
War in the Philippines
As the process of settling the west neared completion by the end of the 19th Century, 
America found itself in a war with Spain which, started over Cuba, but resulted in the 
destruction of the Spanish empire and the US in control of Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines. The war was not only one of the first serious military engagements that 
the American Republic had fought overseas, but it also was the first time America had 
colonies within its possession.
The actual war with Spain was over with very quickly on all fronts, although the war in 
the Philippines was more or less a sideshow to the one in Cuba,24 the American fleet had 
destroyed the Spanish fleet and with the help of the local independence movements, 
Spanish soldiers were quickly routed. The laws of war were, for the most part, respected
22 Maguire, Law and War, p. 21.
23 Maguire, Law and War, p. 32.
24 Stanley Kamow, In Our Image: America’s Empire In the Philippines. New York: Random House, 1989.
p. 100.
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and followed by the Americans and the Spanish. The war between the Spanish and the 
native Filipinos who were fighting for independence, however, was brutal. In skirmishes 
before the US intervention, Filipino leader Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy oversaw the rebel 
forces massacre fleeing Spanish soldiers.25 If the Americans were paying any attention, it 
as an ominous sign of things to come.
Almost immediately after the Spanish capitulated and the Americans took over there 
were difficulties with the native Filipinos who, somewhat naively, expected help from the 
Americans to throw off the Spanish yoke and then leave them to form their own 
independent government. The United States had different plans in mind for the islands for 
two reasons. The first was the concern that the collapse of the Spanish in the Philippines 
would result in a vacuum in Asia that would be filled by the Germans, Russians or 
Japanese. Second, although President McKinley had been reluctant to engage in war 
with the Spanish, there were others who believed that now was the time for America to 
bring its enlightened message and civilization to the rest of the world. Said future Senator 
Albert Jeremiah Beveridge to an enthusiastic audience in 1898:
We are a conquering race... American law, American order, American 
civilization and the American flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto 
bloody and benighted, but by those agencies of God henceforth to be made 
beautiful and bright.27
The US saw itself as a different colonizer -  differing from its European counterparts 
because it would apply an ‘enlightened’ colonialism on its new subject-citizens. It would 
build schools, hospitals and roads and help the Filipinos to develop their own society 
based on American principles. However, in return, the US expected unquestioning loyalty 
and compliance. “Their welfare is our welfare,” said McKinley, “but neither their
25 Kamow, In Our Image, p. 75.
26 Kamow, In Our Image, pp. 128-129.
27 Kamow, In Our Image, p. 109. Interestingly, Beveridge would later go on to be an isolationist within the 
Senate. In this speech, he echoed the sentiments of another advocate o f the war with Spain, Theodore 
Roosevelt, who played a large role in pushing for the conflict and who also would go on to advocate an 
isolationist stance for the US.
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aspirations nor ours can be realized until our authority is acknowledged and
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unquestioned.” The Americans would not take lightly the rejection of their attempts to 
bring the benefits of civilization.
Therefore, when war broke out on 4 February 1899, the legitimacy of the resisting 
Filipinos was not acknowledged. The subsequent conflict was termed ‘the Philippine 
Insurrection’. As one historian writes:
...the euphemism contrived to convey the impression that they were 
subduing a rebellion against [the American] lawful authority. For the same 
reason, they later referred to their Filipino enemies as insurgents and rebels, 
and in some instances...bandits. But to the Filipino nationalists, America 
had embarked on a war of conquest against an independence movement that 
had formed a government no less legitimate than the young republic 
founded by the American revolutionaries a century earlier.29
The tense situation that followed had serious results for the ensuing conflict. After some 
disastrous fighting where the Filipinos had tried to take on the Americans in conventional 
style fighting, they switched to guerilla style tactics by end of 1899. Aguinaldo’s new 
strategy was intended to protract the war until either the US Army broke down from 
disease and exhaustion or the American republic demanded a withdrawal.30 Therefore, 
they employed traps such as sharpened bamboo stakes in concealed pits and spears and 
arrows triggered by sudden trip wires. Americans taken prisoner could expect brutal 
treatment -  there were several reports of American POWs found dead, castrated with 
their genitals in their mouths or eaten alive by ants.31 Additionally, The Americans were 
frustrated by the fact that the Filipino militia operated as part-time guerrillas who would 
otherwise continue their normal civilian lives when not out in the field, thus rendering it
28 Kamow, In Our Image, p. 160.
29 Kamow, In Our Image, p. 140.
30 Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgencv in the Philippine War 1899-1902. Chapel 
Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1989. p. 16.
31 Kamow, In Our Image, p. 178.
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difficult to tell friend from foe.32 This resulted in the Americans burning down villages in 
attempts to wipe out the insurgents.
The Americans came down on these new tactics hard. US Chief Administrator (and 
future president) William Howard Taft described the Filipino resistance as “a conspiracy 
of murder and assassination” and proposed that the enemy troops be executed or exiled as 
they were captured. Arthur MacArthur, the US Commander in the Philippines, declared 
in December 1900 that guerrillas would be considered war rebels and traitors and would 
be punished accordingly. Captives unaffiliated with a ‘regularly organized force’ were 
not to be classified as soldiers and were to be denied the rights of prisoners of war. This, 
argued MacArthur, was part of the laws of war as defined by the Lieber Code. 
Unfortunately, this had the effect of delegitimizing virtually all of the Filipino 
participants -  whatever their status.34 Military commissions tried and executed captured 
guerrillas and Army provost courts operating in areas subjected to martial law were given 
a free hand to try and punish suspects without evidence.35
There are many incidents which could illustrate the brutality of the Philippine Insurgency 
but one particularly sad example will be sufficient for our purposes here. In September 
1902, the Filipino forces used deception in carrying out a vicious attack against a US 
Army detachment at Balangiga resulting in the death and mutilation of 48 of the 74 
soldiers stationed there. In planning his retaliation for the attack and out of a sense of 
frustration at the continuing insurgency, Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith ordered his 
officers to turn the island of Samar into a ‘howling wilderness’ and to shoot any males 
over the age of 10. “I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and bum. The more you kill 
and bum, the better you will please me.”36 The men under his command carried out his 
orders perfectly. Smith would later face court-martial for his actions despite the fact that 
no clear laws governing the use of force were in place. Interestingly, or perhaps tellingly,
32 Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency, p. 17.
33 Kamow, In Our Image, p. 172.
34 Kamow, In Our Image, p. 179
35 Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgencv. p. 25.
36 Maguire, Law and War, p. 60.
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Smith was not tried for murder, but for “conduct to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline.” As one commentator describes it, Smith “was tried for making a verbal
•yn
gaffe”. Smith was found guilty of the charge but the punishment for his actions was 
only admonition -  a verbal scolding. This caused many to denounce the sentence as far 
too lenient. To ease the outcry, President Roosevelt, upon the advice of Secretary Root, 
involuntarily retired Smith.
Dualistic Tendencies
During the Civil War, more than 45,000 Union soldiers were confined at the Confederate 
Prison at Andersonville, Georgia. Of these, almost 13,000 died from disease, poor 
sanitation, malnutrition, overcrowding, or exposure to the elements. Pictures of the 
survivors very clearly resemble those of the survivors of modem concentration camps. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, the Union government did not recognize the 
Confederate soldiers as legal combatants because to do so would have implied accepting 
the Southern soldiers were not rebels, but had a right to wage war. Yet, for the most part, 
the Lieber Code was followed by the Union forces. Considering the Southern violations 
against POWs and the attitude of the Union government towards the legitimacy of the 
South’s cause, why were the Confederate soldiers treated humanely and the First Nations 
treated far worse? As one historian writes:
However, given the Confederates’ early battlefield successes, the Union had 
no choice by to grant them de facto recognition by largely observing the 
laws of war on the battlefield. Even though the United States considered the 
Confederates rebels, they were not ‘others’ who stood outside the circle and 
so not considered barbaric. This distinction was reserved for racial and 
cultural others who flouted the military customs of the West. The
37 David L. Fritz, “Before the ‘Howling Wilderness’: The Military Career o f Jacob Hurd Smith, 1862- 
1902”, Military Affairs. Vol. 43, No. 4, December 1979, pp. 186-190.
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Confederates were both white and American.38
A similar situation took place in 1899 as the Americans fought a savage war in the 
Philippines and, at the same time, were sitting down on the other side of the world laying 
out the laws of war with other “civilized” nations. Secretary of State John Hay had 
instructed the Hague delegates that “any practical propositions” based upon ideas to 
protect those hors de combat should receive “earnest support.” Indeed, in his instructions 
he expressed the hope that “The proposed Conference promised to offer an opportunity 
thus far unequaled in the history of the world for initiating a series of negotiations that 
may lead to important practical results.”39
Andrew D. White, head of the American delegation to the Hague Conference recorded in 
his diary the events and, occasionally stressful negotiating process.40 Interestingly, 
according to his and most accounts, the laws of war do not seem to have captured the 
imagination of the participants or the throngs of groups and individuals who sought to 
influence the Conference. Instead most of the hope laid in the idea of ending wars for 
good through the establishment of a mandatory international court for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes -  this was certainly one of White’s main goals. White recalls that 
the American delegation spent a lot of time trying to achieve the international court, and 
convincing a very skeptical German delegation of the need to agree to the final 
documents of the Conference. The correspondence between White and German 
Chancellor von Biilow is an interesting mix of religious-inspired humanitarianism and 
realpolitik41
38 Maguire, Law and War, p. 37.
39 John Hay, “Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Conferences”, as reprinted in: World 
Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series. Vol. Ill No. 4. April 1913. p. 5.
40 Andrew D. White, The First Hague Conference. Boston: The World Peace Foundation, 1912.
41 White, The First Hague Conference, pp. 70-76. In a letter to von Biilow re-printed in the book, White 
refers to the fact that even the Conservative Churches in America are praying for success and in the very 
next paragraph warns von Biilow that failure will play into the hands o f the French Socialists. By the end of 
the Conference von Biilow did ‘come around’ and eventually became proud o f the accomplishments at The 
Hague. Koskenniemi argues that it was Professor Philip Zorn’s influence that convinced von Biilow. (Zorn 
was a member o f the German delegation to the conference who, prior to his attendance, denied that 
international law was real law but instead merely treaties subject to the will o f states.) See The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall o f International Law 1870-1960 Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. p. 8. This would compliment White’s account who claimed to have debated with Zorn and
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Therefore, by the beginning of the 20 Century, what the situation came down to was this: 
although the Americans claimed that their republic differed from European nations in 
terms of its policies and in its attempts to spread civilization, it very well matched the 
Europeans in its treatment of non-Westem peoples. The Lieber Code, which in turn had 
greatly influenced subsequent international treaties, was based on European thinking on 
the laws of war. The different treatment handed out to captured First Nations warriors 
and Confederate soldiers (even though both had violated the Lieber principles) was not at 
all inconsistent in American eyes.
Actually, the effect of the Lieber Code went even further than that: it was on several 
occasions specifically invoked by the Americans to justify their actions. MacArthur 
invoked it to severely punish civilians thought to be aiding the guerillas and to distinguish 
between regular organized forces and “war rebels”.42 Major Littleton Waller, brought 
before a military court in Manila in March of 1902 for war crimes had planned to defend 
himself using the Lieber Code which authorized reprisals and described them as “the 
sternest feature of war”.43 Major General Smith, who had ordered the attack on Samar, 
made a similar argument and claimed that his actions were totally justified under the 
Lieber Code.44 Specifically, he invoked Article 24 which states:
The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to be with 
barbarous armies, that the private individual of the hostile country is 
destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection and every 
disruption of family ties. Protection was, and still is with uncivilized people,
“seemed to impress him”. Zorn then returned to Berlin with a member o f the American delegation who 
then helped to change the Chancellor’s mind. According to Koskenniemi, von Biilow would claim that the 
intital German skepticism had been caused by the inflated expectations o f the Conference. Gentle Civilizer 
ofNations. p. 212.
42 Kamow, In Our Image, p. 179.
43 Maguire, Law and War, p. 63. Waller admitted to the killings, claiming that they were justified by 
General Smith’s orders and the laws o f war. Waller was found not guilty and sentenced only to a loss of 
pay. Maguire argues that Secretary Root wanted to use Waller as a scapegoat but Waller was able to 
successfully to defend himself by producing Smith’s written orders and witnesses. Waller was thus able to 
implicate Smith. See the discussion o f the rather sensational trial pp. 62-66. The courts-martials o f Waller 
and Smith are also discussed in Fritz, “Before the ‘Howling Wilderness’.
44 Maguire, Law and War, p. 63.
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the exception.
The laws of war themselves were therefore invoked to excuse brutal conduct. As one 
historian explains, the main purpose of McArthur’s invoking of the Lieber Code’s in the 
Philippines:
...was to educate Filipinos on their violations of the laws of war and the 
punishments that awaited transgressors. As a statement of policy, it provided 
little guidance and there was much debate and confusion over what punitive 
measures were sanctioned.45
Therefore, the major contribution of MacArthur’s proclamation that invoked the Lieber 
Code was to “provide official sanction for some of the more stringent policies either 
advocated or already applied in the field.”46 So while one writer may argue that “it was 
ironic that the new international humanitarian laws came at a time when America’s 
Indian wars were entering their most brutal phase,”47 it is perhaps less so when put in the 
context of the way America sought to legitimize these policies of dealing with the First 
Nations and the Filipinos. Tough political justifications and questions of ‘dirty hands’ 
could be avoid by invoking a Code more or less seen as neutral and customary by 
Western powers.
Walter Russell Mead offers one further explanation as to why this was the case in his 
examination of the ‘traditions’ of American foreign policy.48 He uses four schools of 
thought named for Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson and 
Andrew Jackson to explain approaches to American foreign policy. Jeffersonianism, 
Hamiltionianism, Wilsonianism represent emphasis on maintaining a democratic system, 
the protection of commerce, and the promotion of moral principle respectively. In terms
45 Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgencv. p, 24.
46 Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgencv. p. 24.
47 Maguire, Law and War, p. 42.
48 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001.
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of international law and the rule of war, Jacksonianism differs from these three traditions 
in its emphasis on populist values and military power. As Mead describes it: 
“Jacksonianism is less an intellectual or political movement than it is an expression of the 
social, cultural and religious values of a large portion of the American public.”49
Therefore:
Jacksonians are more likely to tax political leaders with a failure to employ 
vigorous measures than to worry about the niceties of international law. Of 
all the major currents in American society, Jacksonians have the least 
regard for international law and international practice. In general 
Jacksonians prefer the rule of custom to the written law, and that is as true 
in the international sphere as it is in personal relations at home. 
Jacksonians believe that there is an honour code in international life... and 
those who live by the code will be treated under it. But those who violate 
the code, who commit terrorist acts against innocent civilians in peacetime, 
for example, forfeit its protection and deserve no more consideration than 
rats.50
Mead argues that while the Jacksonian notion of national honour prohibits America from 
carrying out some military activities, it also often spurs America on to some of its 
bloodiest battles.51 The notion of honour also carries on to the battle field. Jacksonians, 
according to Mead, recognize two kinds of enemy and two kinds of fighting. Honourable 
enemies fight in a clean fight and are entitled to be opposed in the same way;
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dishonourable enemies fight dirty wars and in that case rules do not apply. This then 
helps to explain the dualistic tendencies -  why Civil War soldiers, seen as honourable 
fighters, were treated well and the First Nations warriors were often not:
49 Mead, Special Providence, p. 226.
50 Mead, Special Providence, p. 246.
51 Mead, Special Providence, p. 246.
52 Mead, Special Providence, p. 252.
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In Jacksonian terms, Indian war tactics comprised a dishonourable, 
unscrupulous, and cowardly form of combat. Anger at such tactics led 
Jacksonians to abandon the restraints imposed by their own war codes, and 
the ugly conflicts along the frontier spiraled into a series of genocidal 
conflicts in which each side felt the other was violating every standard of 
humane conduct.53
Therefore, a Jacksonian point of view, (“whose influence in American history has been, 
and remains, enormous”54) does acknowledge a set of international laws governing 
conflict -  but prefers to think about such “laws” as customary rules. These rules apply as 
long as both sides in the conflict agree to abide by them. However, where these rules 
have been violated, there is little mercy provided to perpetrators. Since foreign evil-doers 
have forced America into war, whatever casualties the other side suffers are self- 
evidently the fault of their own leaders rather than of the United States. Therefore 
Jacksonian opinion takes a broad view of the permissible targets in war and view 
targeting civilian morale as legitimate.55
Mead’s argument is a persuasive one and helps to explain the dualistic tendency in 
American Foreign policy towards the laws of war. Interestingly, he points out that all 
sides believe that there are norms governing conflict, but suggests that the influential 
Jacksonians are willing to ‘take the gloves o ff should those rules be violated or should 
the need arise.
However, such influence can only be said to go so far. By 1900, the terrible fighting and 
harsh policies in the Philippines would provoke outrage among many Americans. East 
coast papers would occasionally speak out against the mass-execution of First Nations 
POWs and there was much outrage at the actions of American troops at Samar. The 
headline of the New York Journal on April 8 1902 read “KILL ALL: MAJOR WALLER
53 Mead, Special Providence, p. 252. And the same could be said as to why the Germans were seen as 
honourable and the Japanese were not.
54 Mead, Special Providence, p. 259.
55 Mead, Special Providence, p. 255.
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ORDERED TO MASSACRE THE FILIPINOS” and the media vilified the perpetrators 
of the action.56 While it is true that outrage over the actions against the First Nations 
peoples was more muted, the public anger over policies in the Philippines had a 
significant impact on that war. In fact, after 1902, the war dramatically lost popularity in 
the United States and became more a source of embarrassment than anything else. The 
brutality of the conflict (on both sides) greatly tarnished the perception of the just cause 
the Americans claimed. While they could approve of the civilizing missions abroad, 
especially when contextualized as combating threats to the Republic, Americans were 
becoming less inclined to tolerate massacres and collective punishments in order to 
obtain their goals.
America and the Laws of War 1900-1952
xt_ i L
The 18 and 19 Centuries provided the framework for how the US would cope with 
total war at the beginning of the 20th. As we have seen, the results of the previous 130 
years had been somewhat mixed -  and the new republic’s ideological foundations had 
played a complicated role in this. Americans wanted to demonstrate that they were 
different from other nations, yet relied on the European laws of war (and implemented 
them -  or not -  accordingly). The impetus to continue with its civilizing mission also 
played a role in promoting a dualistic tendency with regards to the implementation of the 
laws of war. Clearly, the US record was not perfect -  but then again, the same could be 
said for most, if not all nations. Great Britain, Germany, Belgium and France were 
certainly not known for compassion in warfare. Perhaps the only thing exceptional about 
America in this regard was that it saw itself as an exception -  albeit one that followed the 
traditional laws of nations.
While the dualistic tendencies would continue into the 20th Century, US policy towards 
the laws of war, including its own system of military justice, was becoming increasingly
56 Maguire, Law and War, p. 63. Then again Mead also points out that Jacksonianism held less sway over 
New York and East Coast populations than the more populist and “folk” oriented populations in other parts 
of the country. See Mead’s discussion Special Providence, p. 226-7.
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standardized into a more cohesive doctrine. In World War I and World War II, America 
sent massive armies, comprised mostly of civilians, to fight in Europe and the South 
Pacific. In these large-scale military actions, the US was not really exceptional for either 
adherence or non-adherence to the laws of war, at least in terms of conventional fighting. 
The biggest controversies can reasonably be said to surround the massive aerial 
bombardments or fire bombing which took place in the later stages of the war against 
both Germany and Japan, which caused large numbers of civilian casualties. The decision 
to drop the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 will also always 
remain a point of debate and discussion between those who believe it was an act of 
necessity which brought the conflict to a quick end and those who see these actions as 
unjustifiable, war crimes.
Yet, perhaps the greatest effect upon the Americans was the growing belief that the Allies 
should put not only the leaders of the Axis powers but also those who had committed 
battlefield war crimes on trial. This impetus only increased as the sheer horror of the 
Japanese treatment of prisoners of war and the Holocaust became known. Supported by 
the International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development, and the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission, the Allies announced that German and Japanese 
soldiers would be prosecuted for obeying improper orders and would not be allowed the 
defense of superior orders.57
Prisoners o f War at the End ofWWIIand Repatriation
There were other challenges for the Americans after the end of the war: the millions of 
POWs stranded in the countries in which they had been held. For the Allies (particularly 
the US but also the UK), the issue of repatriation posed two problems -  mostly stemming 
from the fact that both countries were exhausted from the war and wanted to deal with 
this humanitarian issue as quickly as possible. In the first instance, 400,000 German
57 Gary Solis, “Obedience to Orders: History and Abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison”, Journal o f International 
Criminal Justice. Vol. 2. No. 4, 2004. pp. 988-998. p. 991. Solis notes, the International Military Tribunals 
concluded that the true test was not whether or not there was the existence o f the manifestly illegal order, 
but whether moral choice was in fact possible.
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POWs held by the Americans were handed over to the French en masse in the summer of 
1945. The Germans, who were kept in POW camps and then sent to work throughout 
France in post-war reconstruction projects, fared far worse than they had under the 
Americans. Thousands died from what one critic of the policy called “the politics of 
vengeance”: POWs were poorly treated, forced to work long hours and, not infrequently 
forced to clear minefields.58
On the other hand, there were those who did not want to go back. Throughout the Second 
World War, the Nazis had deported millions of Russian slave labourers to Germany and 
throughout their occupied territory. Repatriation accords were concluded at Yalta in 
February 1945 and an agreement in Halle in May 1945 formalized this policy. Therefore, 
the US and the UK adopted a policy where all claimants to Soviet nationality were to be 
released to the Soviet government irrespective of their wishes. Once repatriated to the 
Soviet Union, most of the Russian prisoners vanished in the Gulag system.59
The problem lay with the legislation as it was written. Article 65 of the Hague 
Convention specified that repatriation would take place ‘with the least possible delay’ 
after the end of hostilities, even in the absence of a formal treaty.60 There was no 
provisions made for prisoners who wanted to claim asylum from their home country -  if 
anything, their journey home had been made quicker by the legislation.61
58 Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream, pp. 530-8.
59 Eva-Maria Stolberg, “Yalta Conference”, in Encyclopedia o f Prisoners o f War and Internment, ed. 
Jonathan F. Vance, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2000. pp. 345-5. See also Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A 
History of the Soviet Camps. London: Penguin Books Limited, 2004. Rafael Zagovec notes, o f the 
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years of forced labour for ‘aiding the enemy’. Almost all o f the other former POWs experienced hostility 
enabled by Josef Stalin’s infamous Order 270 which labeled all Red Army soldiers who allowed 
themselves to be captured alive as ‘traitors to the motherland’. “World War II -  Eastern Front” in 
Encyclopedia o f Prisoners of War and Internment, ed. Jonathan F. Vance, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2000. 
pp. 329-333.
60 Richard D. Wiggers, “Forcible Repatriation” in Encyclopedia o f Prisoners o f War and Internment. Ed. 
Jonathan F. Vance, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2000. pp 100-102.
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However, there were other reasons that the Western nations, (especially the US), were 
willing to trade the reluctant Soviets home: blackmail. In December 1944, after several 
POW camps had been liberated by the Russians, Foreign Affairs Commissar Vyzcheslav 
Molotov refused the US access to its POWs and went so far as to accuse it of mistreating 
Soviet prisoners.62 There have been several reasons given for this policy. First, the US 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman speculated that the Soviets had 
implemented this policy to keep Western observers out of Poland until the pro-Soviet 
Lublin regime was established. Second, it has been suggested that in addition to 
protecting interests in Poland, the Soviets may have been embarrassed over the presence 
among their POWs liberated in the West of thousands captured in German uniform.64
Repeated demands for access to the American POWs were met with continued refusals, 
assurances that the Americans were being treated well and recurring charges that the 
Americans were the ones who were really abusing the Soviet prisoners. Given the fact 
that the Russians were still holding thousands of American POWs, the Americans were 
understandably nervous about returning the only bargaining chips they had to ensure they 
got their soldiers back, however, as both sides gradually came around after some 
diplomatic wrangling, the exchange process was speeded up.
For what it is worth, as Cathal J. Nolan points out, the decision to repatriate the Soviet 
prisoners was not as clear-cut as it seems to us now in hindsight. Aside from the 
confounding factors of blackmail listed above, the Soviet Union had been an ally in the 
war and some of the Soviets caught in German uniforms had actually inflicted casualties 
on Allied soldiers, while others willingly collaborated with the Nazis.65 Still, for those 
caught up in this process, the result was tragic. In one camp in Austria, 134 Russians 
, committed suicide in June, after which the British authorities forced the remaining 30,000
62 Nolan, “Americans in the Gulag”, p. 526.
63 This view was backed by the senior American military officer in Russia, Major General John R. Deane 
Nolan, “Americans in the Gulag”, pp. 526-7.
64 Nolan cites Russell Buhite, “Soviet/American Relations and the Repatriation o f Priosner o f War, 1945”, 
Historian, May 1973, 385-386. “Americans in the Gulag”, p. 527 and note 15, p. 542.
65 Nolan, “Americans in the Gulag”, p. 530.
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on the train to Moscow.66 It was only in mid-1947 that Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall decided that not even those who had collaborated with Nazi Germany should be 
repatriated to Soviet bloc countries against their will, declaring that forced repatriation 
went against the American tradition of granting political asylum.67
Geneva Conventions o f  1949
Despite these difficulties, at the end of the war, the Americans were willing to help 
codify and draft a new version of the Geneva Convention in 1949 which would greatly 
expand and codify the laws of war and extend it to cover civilians in occupied territory. 
Best notes that, despite the increasing hostility between the US and the Soviet Union, the
/ 'O
Americans took a relatively relaxed approach to Soviet participation in the conference.
However, this does not mean the Diplomatic Conference was free of controversy -  or 
hostility between the new superpowers. As Best argues, “From the moment that Soviet 
participation became known ...an infusion of politics was to be expected.”69 The first of 
these issues was indiscriminate bombings. To the clauses protecting civilians, the Soviet 
delegation proposed banning “all other means of exterminating the civilian population” 
causing “extensive destruction of the [civilian] property.”70 It was clear that the Soviets 
were aiming to ban the atomic bomb. This put the Western delegations in the unfortunate 
position of having to vote down the Soviet proposal and looking as if they were somehow 
supporting indiscriminate bombing. Although they looked for a better way out of the 
situation, the Soviet proposal was voted down on 6 July 1949.
Prisoners of war were another hotly contested issue during the course of the Diplomatic 
Conference. The point in dispute was the text that would eventually form Article 85 of 
the Third Geneva Convention. The 1929 Convention dealing with prisoners of war
® Nolan, “Americans in the Gulag”, p. 531.
67 Nolan, “Americans in the Gulag”, p. 534.
a Best, War and Law Since 1945. pp 89-91
9 Best, War and Law Since 1945. p. 109.
75 Best, War and Law Since 1945. p. 110-111
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contained no provision concerning the punishment of crimes committed by POWs prior 
to their capture. Those provisions which did deal with offenses and punishment only 
referred to the acts committed during captivity.71 With an increase in the number of 
special tribunals for War Crimes, the ICRC became increasingly concerned that POWs 
would be tried based on special ad hoc legislation rather than tribunals based on 
international legal principles. Therefore, it was proposed that POWs should continue to 
receive all of the benefits of the Convention until their guilt was definitively proven. The 
suggestion, however, received only limited support -  the Anglo-Saxon powers were 
particularly hostile.
Perhaps it was the chilling of the Cold War and the increased likelihood that Western 
soldiers would soon be fighting against communist nations, but the Anglo-Saxon nations 
had changed their mind on the issue by 1949 and now agreed with the ICRC position. In 
fact, they even went further -  that POWs should continue to enjoy those benefits of the 
Convention even after they had been judged. Article 85 was therefore submitted to read: 
“Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed 
prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.”
The objection now came from the Soviet Union who argued for the original proposal -  
that POWs were only protected under the convention until after they had been convicted. 
The Soviet delegation argued that there was no reason why prisoners of war convicted of 
such crimes should not be treated in the same way as persons serving sentence for a 
criminal offence in the territory of the detaining power.72
Best points out that it was the Soviets who had consistency on their side. Beyond that, 
“they could also plausibly claim to represent the general opinion of mankind. That POWs 
accused of perhaps terrible crimes should enjoy the benefits of the Convention through 
the period of arrest and trial, was not unreasonable, and the USSR was not proposing 
anything else; but that such lavish benefits should continue after conviction was
71 Jean S. Pictet, ed. Commentary: III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners of War. 
Geneva: International Committee o f the Red Cross, 1960. p. 413.
72 Pictet, Commentary, p. 415.
55
incredible.”73
The Article was voted on and passed as written above. The Soviet Union, maintaining its 
position, insisted upon a reservation to the Article:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by 
the obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend the application of 
the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law 
of the Detaining Power, in accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg 
trial, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it being understood that 
persons convicted of such crimes must be subject to the conditions obtaining 
in the country in question for those who undergo their punishment.74
The other Socialist-bloc countries expressed similar reservations upon their ratification as 
well.75
Aside from the (fairly successful) attempt at putting the West in a no-win situation 
regarding a prohibition on the use of atomic weapons, the political role of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions were rather mild. For the most part, the Conventions and the 
humanitarian goals behind them were supported within the US government. However, the 
impact of the Conventions, including the Soviet Bloc’s reservation to Article 85, would 
play a major role in the fate of POWs throughout the Cold War. This was especially so as 
international wars became less frequent and the wars of decolonization -  conflicts with a 
very ambiguous status -  became the norm rather than the exception.
The Uniform Code o f Military Justice
73 Best, War and Law since 1945. pp. 137-8.
74 Text found in Pictet, Commentary, p. 423.
75 Other countries who made similar reservations include: Albania, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, the People's Republic of China, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, 
Hungary, the Democratic People's Republic o f Korea, Poland, Rumania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic and the People's Republic o f Vietnam. List found in Pictet, Commentary, p. 423.
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The Articles of War -  the American legislation used to try soldiers for military 
infractions and war crimes had come under significant pressure for reform by the late 
1940s. First, the experiences of millions of civilians of the rather uneven and often harsh 
system of military justice lead to calls for reform. Nearly one in eight American men and 
women served in the armed forces during World War II and with over two million courts- 
martial many of those who had been exposed to this system and were not pleased with 
what they experienced. As Cooke notes:
The system appeared harsh and arbitrary, with too few protections for the 
individual and too much power for the commander. To Americans who were 
drafted or who enlisted to defend their own freedoms and protect those of 
others around the world, this was unacceptable and complaints and 
criticisms became widespread.76
There had been a similar push for change after World War I and during the 1920s, but 
such attempts had not succeeded.77
However, there were several other several important reasons for reform by this point, 
including new developments in international law. As Solis notes, the Allied position 
regarding the negation of the defence of obedience to superior orders to the charge of war 
crimes at the post-war International Military Tribunals mandated a re-evaluation of US 
policy of allowing its own soldiers to employ such a strategy as an automatic and 
complete defense.78 Additionally, with the threat of communism spreading, it was 
becoming clear that the size of the peacetime armed forces would be unprecedented.79 A
76 Cooke, “Introduction”, p. 7.
77 For an account o f the attempts at reform at the beginning o f the 20th Century, see Morgan, “The 
Background o f the Uniform Code of Military Justice”. Morgan was the protege o f one of the main voices 
for reform, General Samuel T. Ansell. Morgan recounts how Ansell’s push for reform was rejected by a 
hostel military establishment.
78 Solis, “Obedience to Orders”, p. 991. Solis notes that this had actually been the US policy until the 1914 
manual on the laws o f war was published which “ignored previous military and civilian case law o f the 
previous 110 years.” The 1944 version of the Field Manual reversed the 1914 Manual, pp. 990-1.
9 Cooke, “Introduction”, p. 7.
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larger army would not tolerate such an uneven and, arguably, unfair system of justice.
A major push came from the first Secretary of Defense James F. Forrestal who took 
office in September 1947. The War Department had been abolished, which had the effect 
of bringing all of the service branches under the newly formed Department of Defense.80 
Forrestall wanted to have one system of military justice applicable to all of the services.81 
On 1 June 1951 the new Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) came into force along 
with a new Manual for Courts-Martial which further outlines and expands upon the 
military law in the UCMJ. The UCMJ is federal law and sought to make the courts- 
martial system more fair. However, under Article 18, the UCMJ also incorporates war 
crimes into military law and meets America’s obligations under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.82
Although the full implications of the new UCMJ were still unknown when it was passed 
into law in June 1950, it had not been anticipated that it would take effect during the 
height of the Korean War.83
Korea
During the Korean War, America (and its allies in the United Nations Command) 
confronted an enemy who employed western military tactics and technology but not the 
laws of war. The result for prisoners of war caught by the North Koreans was disastrous 
as Cold War politics came to dominate the way they were cared for. Wounds were left 
untreated and prisoners were given an insufficient diet, especially in the first year of the
80 It was at first named the National Military Establishment in 1947, but this was changed in 1949 -  
apparently due to the unfortunate acronym of “NME”.
81 Gary Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial bv Fire. Washington DC: History and Museums 
Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989. p. 6. It should also be pointed out that the 1948 Elson Act 
to amend the Articles o f war in a way that answered a lot o f the criticism o f the US system o f military 
justice. However Forrestal saw that a continued system of separated branches o f law for the different 
services was contrary to the unification o f the armed services. Also see Cooke, “Introduction”, p. 7.
82 Solis, “Obedience to Orders”, p. 994.
83 This, notes Cooke, proved to be a formidable task for the judge advocates o f the day. “Introduction”, p. 8.
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war. POW camps were left unmarked and several were accidentally attacked by the UN 
Command forces. This made the implications of Soviet reservations to Article 85 very 
clear. It was also a foreshadowing of the unfortunate events to come. This would not be 
the last time that the Americans would face problems with ensuring reciprocal respect for 
the laws of war in a conflict in the 20th Century, especially as the number of wars of 
national self-liberation was on the increase, including in Vietnam.
For now, the implication of the Korean war was that the American approach to the laws 
of war began to emphasize heavily the rights of American soldiers who were captured. 
Concern over the 21 Americans who chose to stay in North Korea after having spent 
years there as POWs (most of whom had collaborated with their captors) prompted 
President Dwight Eisenhower to establish the Military Code of Conduct.84 The Code was 
applicable to all soldiers and geared towards providing them with a standard of behaviour 
expected of them, especially if they were captured. Many Americans were shocked at the 
idea that Americans would betray their country while in Communist captivity and 
allegations that their troops had surrendered too easily did not sit well with the American 
government or its people. In some ways the text of the Code reads as a way to maintain 
the honour of the armed forces and or the individual soldier if he is captured. However, 
the Code of Conduct reflected another American realization/assumption about future 
conflicts; that soldiers were not likely to be treated according the standards of the Geneva 
Convention. Principles like “I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my 
ability” seem to assume that American POWs would be pressed to answer questions with
84 The six articles o f the Code o f Conduct are: (1) I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my 
country and our way o f life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense. (2) I will never surrender o f my 
own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the 
means to resist. (3) If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort 
to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy. (4) If I 
become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part 
in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will 
obey the lawful orders o f those appointed over me, and will back them up in every way. (5) When 
questioned, should I become a prisoner o f war, I am required to give only name, rank, service number, and 
date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost o f my ability. I will make no oral or 
written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause. (6) I will never forget that 
I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which 
made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States o f America.
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tactics that went above and beyond those practices allowed by the laws of war.85
Conclusion
Many have written on the tendency of the United States to see itself as an exceptional 
nation from its very founding. Yet in its approach to the laws of war, the young republic 
remained very European. This resulted in what Peter Maguire calls a “dualistic 
tendency” in the American implementation of the laws of war. At the same time the US 
applied the laws of war to the Confederate Army, (albeit not in a strictly legal sense), it 
did not do the same for the rebelling First Nations. The US could go to the Hague and 
play a major role in strengthening the laws of war while at the same time engaging in 
fairly brutal tactics and torture in the Philippines.
Despite what we would see as the two-facedness of these policies today, it somehow 
seems wrong to suggest that they were deliberately hypocritical in the full meaning of the 
word. American policies were based on the European or “civilized” understandings of the 
time. It seemed perfectly sensible to apply the laws of war to rebel Confederate forces 
and not the natives who shared neither the same legal or military traditions as the white 
American settlers did.
In this way, the policies were just that -  two-faced -  operating on different legal pages, 
with two separate lists of means, weapons and restraint permitted. Those who stood in the
85 However, it is important to remember that the laws of war does allow for detaining powers to ask and 
question their prisoners, but restricts their ability to bribe and, more importantly for the welfare of POWs, 
torture is forbidden. As A. P.V. Rogers has argued, "There seems to be a popular misconception... that you 
cannot interrogate prisoners o f war. This is not so. Prisoners o f war are often a valuable source o f military 
intelligence and there is nothing in the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention that prohibits questioning them. 
However, under Article 17, they are not obliged to answer questions (only to give their name, rank and date 
of birth) and no torture, coercion, threats, insults, or unpleasant disadvantageous treatment may be used to 
secure information from them. The situation is no different in the case of people classified as illegal 
combatants. They can be questioned but if  they refuse to answer question, basic human rights standards 
prevent torture, inhuman or degrading treatment." Letter published in the Independent published 31 
January, 2002. Found in Rogers, A.P.V. Law on the Battlefield, second edition. Manchester: 
Jurispublishing, Manchester University Press, 2004. p. 55-6. Also see Article 17 o f the Geneva Convention 
relative to the treatment o f Prisoners o f War.
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way of manifest destiny, civilization and progress would not be considered a legitimate 
combatant or an object of sympathy in the eyes of many Americans. The nature of the 
conflicts could then take upon a brutal character on both sides.
Yet, as we can see by the end of this chapter, there had been significant changes in 
American armed forces by the time of the Korean War. These changes had been 
prompted by growth in the military, the development of international tribunals which 
began to regard violations of the laws of war as punishable crimes on the global stage, 
and the creation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The new Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, which came into effect during the Korean conflict, embodied many of these 
changes. Despite the tactics of an opposing side, increased protection was increasingly 
provided for America’s enemies by the rules of engagement that American soldiers lived 
and died by -  especially when compared to the wars that had been fought just 50 years 
previous.
Yet, as the next 25 years would show, these rules were based on a way of warfare that 
was rapidly disappearing and being replaced by guerrilla tactics. The latter was a mode of 
warfare that would prove to be especially frustrating for American troops and very 
confusing under their rules of engagement and the laws of war. In this way, the “dualistic 
tendencies” of the American approach had, for the most part, ended, but a difficult period 
involving violations of and frustrations with the laws of war was just beginning. This is 
the subject of the next chapter.
61
Chapter 3: Legal Revolution 
America and the Laws of War After Vietnam
Introduction
Having signed and ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as having developed the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, the United States looked well placed for its future 
military engagements in terms of the law of war. In Korea the US had demonstrated that 
it took the issue seriously -  although they certainly had used the law to their advantage 
where they could. Still, on balance, the US commitment to the law of war looked fairly 
certain to remain stable for the immediate future.
Of course, what did not remain stable was the nature of conflicts in the Cold War. In 
many ways, Korea was to be the last ‘classic’ war the United States would fight for 
nearly 40 years. Replacing this paradigm of state-to-state warfare were third world 
insurgencies, involving non-traditional, non-Westem tactics and guerilla warfare. This 
emerging pattern of warfare did not fit well with the conception of war implicit in the 
Geneva Conventions or in the mindset of Americans as to how the law of war could be 
applied to conflicts.
As is well known, the result was disaster. Writing of his experience interviewing the 
mother of a Vietnam War veteran who was accused of committing war crimes at My Lai, 
Seymour M. Hersh wrote:
She told me that when he came home, “He looked like he had just been 
whipped...” And then she said with a look I wish those who send young 
men and women off to war could see, “I gave them a good boy and they 
made him a murderer.”1
1 Seymour M. Hersh, Chain o f Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2005.
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Hersh broke the My Lai massacre story on 14 November 1969 in newspapers across 
America. The story prompted widespread domestic and international condemnation and 
gave powerful ammunition to the anti-war movement. Combined with the new and 
powerful media images being broadcast in American homes each night of villagers 
fleeing napalm attacks or prisoners being executed, the Vietnam War, to many people, 
became and remains synonymous with American war crimes and brutality.
Yet the Vietnam War did not occur in a legal vacuum. There were lawyers on the ground, 
rules of engagement were drafted and disseminated and superior orders which demanded 
respect for the laws of war were issued. The question after the war was then “how did this 
happen?” and, perhaps more crucially for the US military, how to ensure ‘never again’. 
The tragedies at My Lai and Son Thang, as well as the experience of military lawyers in 
Vietnam, would prompt a major re-think in the way the US military regarded the laws of 
war, and how it implemented them.
By the 1990-1 Gulf War, what could reasonably be described as a military legal 
revolution had taken place within the Department of Defense. “Activist lawyers” 
lobbying for reform brought about revised rules, strengthened training and developed the 
concept of “operational law” as a powerful tool that the US could use in war and peace 
time. At the close of the First Gulf War the American Bar Association Journal described 
the conflict as “a lawyer’s war”2 and one judge advocate who served as a General H. 
Norman Schwarzkopfs legal advisor described it as “the most legalist war [the United 
States] ever fought.”3
This chapter will follow the path from the confusion, mistakes and crimes of Vietnam to 
the legal sophistication of First Gulf War. In doing so, it will look at what went wrong in 
Vietnam and how the disasters there prompted change in the US military’s attitude to, 
and implementation of, the laws of war.
2 Steven Keeva, “Lawyers in the War Room” American Bar Association Journal. December 1991. pp. 52- 
59. p. 52.
3 Keeva, “Lawyers in the War Room”, p. 52.
63
Vietnam
There can be little doubt that its experience in South-East Asia from the early-1960s until 
1973 left a major impression, if not a painful scar, upon America and its military. The 
conflict influenced a generation of soldiers who, having served their country in this 
controversial war, sought to ensure that the lessons learned from the experience were not 
forgotten. This group of soldiers includes the military lawyers who saw significant room 
for improvement not only in the role of the military lawyer, but in the way the whole 
defense establishment thought about the laws of war and how the military was trained in 
them.
In terms of thinking about the conflict’s relationship with the laws of war, Vietnam’s 
record is often automatically linked to the massacres at My Lai and Son Thang, images of 
terrified villagers fleeing attacks by US forces, and the speeches of anti-war organizations 
such as Veterans Against the War describing alleged US war crimes in Vietnam. 
Certainly this is one side of the story. But there was also a great deal of concern among 
lawyers and the defense establishment that the US should adhere to the laws of war to the 
very best of its ability. Often, this was the result of individual initiatives in a difficult 
environment. The first section of this chapter will look at America’s relationship with the 
laws of war after Vietnam, but particularly the conflict’s role in planting seeds for reform 
that would come in the mid-1970s through to the mid-1980s.
Challenges - Jurisdiction
One of the first challenges that the US faced was related to the problem of jurisdiction. 
Although it is a basic tenet of international law that the courts of a country have 
jurisdiction to try all cases arising out of wrongful acts committed in that country, the US 
wished to retain the greatest possible measure of jurisdiction over its own forces in 
Vietnam.4 While normally, in peace time, matters of jurisdiction are sorted through a
4 Gary Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire. Washington DC: History and Museums 
Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989. p. 14. As George Prugh notes, “The United States has
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Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), in the case of Vietnam, the Agreement for Mutual 
Defense Assistance in Indochina (commonly referred to as the Pentalateral Agreement) 
solved the issue for the US forces. The Agreement, signed on 23 December 1950 by the 
United States, France, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, governed the legal status, rights and 
obligations of American personnel in Vietnam. All American forces entering Indochina 
were to be considered members of the US diplomatic mission. As military lawyer and 
historian Gary Solis notes, “Few Marine riflemen in Vietnam knew that in terms of legal 
jurisdiction they were considered to be diplomatic mission clerks.”5 The agreement was 
brief (less than six pages long) and its terms were broad and generous. This provided a 
minimal but adequate framework and the generality of its provision allowed for a 
flexibility that would leave many legal questions to be solved on a case-by-cases basis 
but also happened to meet the many legal complications that were to arise.6 As George 
Prugh, who served as the Staff Judge Advocate from 1964 through 1966, notes: “It is 
unlikely that the diplomats who signed the Pentalateral Agreement in 1950 ever imagined 
that its simple provisions would govern the legal status and activities of almost 600,000 
Americans in Vietnam.”7 However, he adds that the South Vietnamese had good reasons 
for maintaining this broad document -  all pragmatic. Distracted by protracted military 
crises and political turbulence, the government did not desire to enter into a long and 
detailed negotiation with the US on the matter.8 In this way Vietnam had neither criminal 
nor civil jurisdiction over American personnel -  prosecution for crimes, including war 
crimes, were exercised exclusively under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
There was one complicating issue, however -  how was misconduct by US civilians 
connected with the war effort, who by the late 1960s numbered over 6000, to be dealt 
with? Such misconduct fell into three categories: disorderly conduct, abuse of military
never relinquished jurisdiction over its armed forces during combat; to do so in Vietnam would have been 
as unprecedented as it would have been impractical. During World War II, for example, the United States 
kept jurisdiction over U.S. troops in the United Kingdom.” Law at War: Vietnam 1964-1973. Washington 
DC: Department o f the Army, 1975. p. 89.
5 Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam, p. 14.
6 Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam, p. 14.
7 Prugh, Law at War, p. 87.
8 Prugh, Law at War, pp. 89-90.
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privileges and black market activities and currency manipulation.9 In April 1966 the 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) staff judge advocate prepared a study 
on the problem. It was determined that the ambassador could issue police regulations for 
all US citizens in Vietnam, or punishments could be meted out through administrative 
measures (such as the withdrawal of military privileges and the loss of employment.)10 
Yet the seriousness of crimes being committed by US civilians soon made criminal 
prosecutions more appropriate -  but the question then became, by whom? The problem 
was never adequately solved. While employment could be terminated, prosecution either 
had to be carried out by Vietnamese civilian authorities (who were either unable or 
unwilling to prosecute Americans) or the US military under the UCMJ -  whose authority 
over civilians in Vietnam was tenuous at best.11 While Staff Judge Advocate Prugh did 
recommend that the most effective remedy would be a trial in a Vietnamese court, the 
MACV eventually decided upon a policy to try civilians, when absolutely necessary, 
through courts-martial.12
This policy proved to be ineffective -  a total of four US civilians were tried by military 
courts-martial during the Vietnam war. When one of those convicted under the UCMJ 
appealed his conviction to the US Court of Military Appeals, the highest court in the 
military system, the court ruled on 30 April 1970 that the military had no jurisdiction 
over civilians in Vietnam. In the Court’s opinion, Article 2(10) of the UCMJ was 
applicable only in time of a declared war. Thus, the question of whether, as a matter of
9 Frederic L. Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam to 
Haiti. Washington DC: Office o f the Judge Advocate General and Center o f Military History United States 
Army, 2001. pp. 22-3. Also see Prugh, Law at War, pp. 109-110.
10 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, p. 23.
11 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, p. 23. As Borch notes, Article 2 o f the UCMJ permits the courts- 
martial o f civilians “accompanying an armed force in the field.” However, that provision applied only in 
“time of war,” and it was unclear as to whether the fighting in Vietnam even constituted a war.
t2 Solis, Marines and Military Law, pp. 99-100. Solis cites a letter from then Major General George S. 
Prugh to Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons dated 29 December 1988. Available in the comment folder 
of the Marines and Military Law in Vietnam file at the Marine Corps Historical Division. Solis also notes 
that there were many in the US embassy who felt that it was “politically unacceptable” to have Americans 
prosecuted by the Vietnamese. Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam, p. 99.
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policy, the military should try civilians in Vietnam was rendered moot -  the services no 
longer had jurisdiction over civilians in Vietnam and no further cases were tried.13
As mentioned above, most crimes committed by civilians were related to black market 
activities rather than violation of the laws of war. Still, the discussion here is important as 
it marks one of the first instances where the military found itself having to deal with the 
problem of jurisdiction over civilian contractors. The failure to solve the problem in 
Vietnam or afterwards would have repercussions for the military as it would face the 
same problem in many of its future conflicts, especially as the number of civilian 
contractors and private military firms would exponentially increase by the year 2000 -  
and alleged wrong doing would include violation of the laws of war.14
Challenges -  Classifying Vietnam under international law
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 by the US Congress resulted in an increased US 
presence in Vietnam by 1965. While the conflict had assumed an international character 
by this point, in terms of the issue of jurisdiction under the laws of war, classifying the 
conflict as a war was problematic. Quite simply, under international law and the laws of 
war, Vietnam was a conflict with an identity crisis. This became readily apparent when 
the conflict was broken down into separate components. While the conflict between 
North and South Vietnam and the conflict between North Vietnam and the US were 
clearly interstate conflicts as envisioned by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the conflicts 
between South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the US and the 
NLF were not. The former could be considered a civil war of international character, with 
the second being an international -  but not interstate -  conflict. The issue was 
complicated as the South did not necessarily want to recognize that it was engaged in an 
international or interstate war with the North.
13 Prugh, Law at War, pp. 109-10
54 The case o f problems over jurisdiction regarding private military firms is discussed in Chapter 5.
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The issue may seem to be one of semantics -  perhaps not least to the American soldier 
who faced the reality of a guerilla-warfare struggle for survival in the jungle against the 
Vietcong -  but it was important. Prugh accurately summed up the problem:
The battlefield was nowhere and everywhere, with no identifiable front lines, 
and no safe rear areas. Fighting occurred over the length and breadth of 
South Vietnam, on the seas, into Laos and Cambodia, and in the air over 
North Vietnam. It involved combatants and civilians from a dozen different 
nations. Politically, militarily, and in terms of international law, the Vietnam 
conflict posed problems of deep complexity. The inherent difficulty of 
attempting to apply traditional principles of international law to such a 
legally confusing conflict is well illustrated by the issue of prisoners of 
war.15
In short, a determination of the type of conflict that was being waged was crucial for 
determining how the law of war applied, especially as to what was to be done with 
prisoners caught in military operations and how US forces should conduct operations 
against combatants in the field.
Yet the very nature of the conflict rendered carrying out operations in accordance with 
the laws of war exceptionally difficult. The problem related to the fact that the laws of 
war had traditionally presumed two kinds of warfare: interstate warfare and civil war. Yet, 
it was clear that since the end of the Second World War internationalized civil wars were 
rapidly becoming the principle form of conflict. The US now found itself engaged in one 
such conflict where it was confronted by a guerilla force that did not adhere to the laws of 
war.16
15 Prugh, Law at War, p. 62.
16 It was the position o f the International Committee o f the Red Cross (ICRC) that the NLF was bound to 
the Geneva Conventions (or at least the customary law listed under Common Article 3) as it was comprised 
of nationals o f a state whose governments have ratified the Conventions. However, the NLF argued that it 
was not bound by the Conventions because it had not taken part in their negotiations. See Geoffrey Best, 
Law and War Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. p. 364. A legal justification o f this 
argument was put forward in an anonymous note in the Harvard Law Review, “The Geneva Convention
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In order to ensure that operations were conducted in a controlled manner, a determination 
of the status of the conflict was going to have to be made by the MACV. Eventually the 
official position adopted by the US, stated by 1965, was that the hostilities constituted an 
armed international conflict, that North Vietnam was a belligerent, that the Viet Cong 
were agents of the government of North Vietnam, and that the Geneva Conventions 
applied in lull.17 Therefore, on 6 March 1966 Directive 381-11 was enacted which 
provided POW treatment to any Viet Cong taken in combat.18 To deal with situations 
where uncertainty still remained, a separate directive, MACV Directive 20-5 (1968), 
established procedures for convening tribunals consistent with Article 5 of the Third 
Geneva Convention in order to determine the status of any captured combatant.19 As 
South Vietnam was severely lacking in the proper facilities to deal with an influx of 
POWs, a POW program was established which called for the construction of five POW 
camps, administration and management of the camps, labour and educational programs, 
and managing visits from the ICRC.
There were several reasons why this decision was made. The first of these was that Prugh 
and his staff were aware that such a move might be good for public relations in at least 
three ways. First, Prugh writes that it was part of the campaign to win over the “hearts 
and minds” of those who had been taken prisoner.20 Second, such a move might help to 
ease domestic and international criticism of the conduct of the war.21 Finally, there was 
the hope that if the US provided good treatment for POWs, North Vietnam and the NLF 
would reciprocate towards the prisoners that they had taken. The Viet Cong were very 
harsh in their treatment of their captives. South Vietnamese soldiers were executed as a
and the Treatment o f Prisoners of War in Vietnam”, in Richard Falk (ed), The Vietnam War and 
International Law. Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. pp. 398-415.
17 Prugh.Law at War, p. 63.
18 William Hays Parks, “The Law o f War Advisor”, JAG Journal. Vol. 31 Summer 1980, pp. 1-52. p. 13-17.
19 Parks, “The Law o f War Advisor”, p. 14. According to Parks, tribunals consisted o f three officers who, 
insofar as practical, were familiar with the Geneva Conventions. At least one member o f the tribunal was to 
be a judge advocated.
20 Prugh, Law at War, p. 62.
21 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, p. 11.
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matter of routine and although US personnel were initially spared, several were killed in 
retribution for the execution of Viet Cong agents in South Vietnam.
In the absence of a statement whereby the Viet Cong acknowledged that they were bound 
by international law and/or the Geneva Conventions, the US sought to ensure better 
treatment for its captured personnel. After the reciprocal killings had taken place against 
US captives, it was concluded by Prugh and his staff that the Viet Cong might also 
reciprocate with better treatment for American POWs if they could convince the South 
Vietnamese to provide better treatment for Viet Cong POWs. The South Vietnamese 
often killed guerillas outright as they were seen as “Communist rebel combat captives” 
who deserved summary treatment as illegitimate insurgents.22 It had been the position of 
the South Vietnamese that the Viet Cong were not POWs as South Vietnam was engaged 
in a civil conflict and not an international armed conflict.23
An effort was made to convince Colonel Nguyen Monh Bich, the Director of Military 
Justice, that it was in South Vietnam’s best interest to improve conditions for enemy 
POWs and the US as ultimately successful in its efforts to persuade the South Vietnamese 
(at least officially).24 Sadly, however, the North Vietnamese were not moved to improve 
treatment for the “war criminals” that they had captured. Prisoners taken by the NLF or 
the North Vietnamese, for the remainder of the war, would exist on starvation diets of 
rice and water, and suffer beatings and torture in filthy prisons.25
Implementing the Law of War
In accounts of the military lawyers who went to Vietnam -  often written by the lawyers 
themselves -  it is clear that Vietnam presented huge challenges to their “traditional” role.
22 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, p. 11.
23 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, p. 11. Borch and Prugh note that this resulted in Viet Cong captives 
often being placed in the same prisons as common criminals and political prisoners. Prugh, Law at War, p. 
64.
24 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat p. 12.
25 There are several good accounts o f the treatment received by Americans held in Vietnam. One o f the best 
is written by perhaps the most famous o f the American POWs, US Senator John McCain, Faith of Mv 
Fathers. New York: Random House, 1999.
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Many accounts describe the first lawyers as arriving with little more than a Manual for 
Courts-Martial, a JAG Manual and a yellow legal pad.26 As lawyers began to arrive in the 
early 1960s, their mission was unclear and overseas communication was difficult, 
creating a situation where judge advocates were pretty much on their own.27
Traditional duties of judge advocates basically involved providing legal services to the 
command and ordinary soldiers. This included assisting with wills and power of attorney, 
tax assistance, advice on domestic relations, civil suits, and the filing of claims for 
damaged property. Yet, as the war escalated, military lawyers saw room for expansion in 
terms of the potential for contribution to the overall mission. In surveying his 
surroundings, Colonel Prugh identified three major areas that went beyond the traditional 
judge advocate role. The first, (as seen from above) concerned the status and treatment of 
captured enemy personnel. The second was to develop an official policy on the reporting 
and investigation of war crimes. Originally, Prugh’s Directive 20-4 Inspection and 
Investigations o f  War Crimes, only dealt with the investigation of war crimes committed 
against US forces, but by mid-1965, MACV judge advocates were advising, assisting and 
reviewing all war crimes investigations in Vietnam, including those committed by US 
forces. (A third area, of less concern for our purposes here, involved the control of South 
Vietnamese resources and material and preventing them from getting into enemy hands.28) 
In order to encourage adherence to the laws of war, military lawyers also promoted 
programs to help increase respect for the rule of law in South Vietnam and to help bring
OQalong improvements to its system of military justice.
By 1966, in order to deal with the new challenges emerging out of the escalation of the 
war, the MACV transferred some responsibilities for the judge advocates (such as claims 
adjudication) elsewhere and the legal office had a “slimmed-down” organizational 
structure which involved a Civil Law and Military Affairs Division, a Criminal and
26 For example, see Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam, p. 2.
27 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, pp. 5-6.
28 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, pp. 10-13.
29 See Prugh, Law at War -  especially chapters 2 and 3 for detail on the advice given to South Vietnam and 
attempts to improve respect for the rule of law, pp. 15-39.
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International Law Division and an Advisory Division.30 In terms of war crimes, criminal 
and disciplinary matters, the Criminal and International Law Division gave out advice on 
the Geneva Conventions, handled investigations and developed policies in these areas.
Soldiers first received their training in the laws of war and the Geneva Convention during 
basic training.31 Ideally, further training was incorporated with other subjects and 
principles during field training and commanders were instructed to continually 
incorporate the Geneva Conventions into their training programs.32 Further actions taken 
to promote teaching on the law of war included the development of instructional films 
and, in October 1965, the issuing of 3x5 yellow cards to both American and Vietnamese 
forces outlining the basic requirements of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of 
prisoners of war. The card, titled “The Enemy in Your Hands” included Vietnamese 
translations and reminded military personnel that they were to adhere to the Geneva 
Conventions and not to humiliate or degrade their prisoner or refuse him/her medical 
treatment if needed.33 The basic principles of this training were repeated in a MACV 
bulletin issued in October 1966 which emphasized that the Geneva Conventions applied 
to the conflict despite the absence of a formal declaration of war. Additionally, it was 
emphasized that the United States was applying not only the letter of the law, but also the 
spirit of the Geneva Conventions, which were designed to protect the individual who 
could no longer protect himself.34
War Crimes
Thus, there was a lot of effort put towards implementing and enforcing the laws of war in 
Vietnam by the MACV and its judge advocates. Yet, as mentioned in the introduction of 
this section, Vietnam has often been linked with war crimes in the popular media and the 
popular imagination. Most likely this has something to do with the politics of the war and
30 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, p. 16.
31 Prugh notes “The soldier's first introduction to the Geneva Conventions was during basic training, where 
he received two hours of formal instruction, followed by a test, the results o f which were noted on his 
record.” Law at War, p. 74.
32 Prugh, Law at War, p. 75.
33 Card found in Appendix H o f Prugh. Law at War.
34 Prugh, Law at War, pp. 75-76.
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the campaigns of the anti-war movement. Certainly there had been war crimes committed 
in previous wars -  but never before had American citizens been so aware of what was 
actually going on overseas. The rapid development of media communications enabled 
television networks to air unedited footage of the US military campaigns into American 
living rooms. War crimes could easily be edited out of newsreel footage in the Second 
World War, but television had brought the gory reality of war home to a shocked viewing 
public.
However, it is clearly the case that awful crimes were committed by US forces in a 
deliberate matter despite the efforts put forward by MACV. Military leaders often voiced 
their concern for the treatment of POWs as reports of abuse meted out by US soldiers 
came in. In September 1965, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 
Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, contacted Major General Walt, saying:
I am anxious that all of our people are made fully aware of their 
obligations, under the Geneva Convention, as to the treatment of Prisoners.
This point acquires particular importance now that the flow of 
replacements will bring you a large group of new and uninitiated people 
each month.35
He made a similar point only two months later to Walt: “Ensure that every officer in the 
chain of command knows the rules, the reasons for the rules and the penalties for their 
violation, and then accept no compromise at all.”36
But the problem was not going away. Prugh states that between 1965 and 1975 there 
were 241 cases in which Americans were alleged to have committed war crimes, of 
which 160 were found to be unsubstantiated. 36 war crimes incidents resulted in trials by 
courts-martial on charges including premeditated murder, rape, assault with intent to 
commit murder or rape, involuntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, and the mutilation
35 Message cited in Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam, p. 34.
36 Message cited in Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam, p. 34.
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of enemy dead.37 16 trials involving 30 men resulted in not guilty verdicts or were 
dismissed after arraignment, while twenty cases involving thirty-one soldiers resulted in 
conviction. Yet these numbers do not tell the whole story. The infamous case of My Lai, 
not included in Prugh’s accounting, illustrates this point.39 14 officers were charged with 
covering up information related to the massacre, but most charges were eventually 
dropped. 26 men were charged with taking part in the massacre, but only Lieutenant 
William Calley was convicted.40 Additionally, there were at least several cases on the 
record of the mistreatment and torture of prisoners to extract information. In some cases 
American personnel were present at, or participated in, the abuse of prisoners by South 
Vietnamese personnel, and in others they were directly responsible for acts of torture 
themselves.41
Given the fact that American soldiers had been given training, and that there seemed to 
be a genuine concern for implementing the laws of war at senior levels, why were these 
war crimes taking place? At some level it probably came down to the very nature of the 
conflict that was being fought. As Parks notes, “For the first time in a half-century, U.S. 
military forces in Vietnam were confronted with guerrillas who failed to comply with the 
traditional requirements for classification as a prisoner of war.”42 The very nature of the 
insurgency and fighting in the jungles in Vietnam against combatants who were farmers 
by day and guerillas by night was an exceptionally frustrating and dangerous experience
37 Prugh, Law at War, p. 74
38 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, p. 22.
39 There have been several books on the massacre at My Lai already published and so the argument will not 
go into the details o f the event. For an account o f the incident by the reporter who broke the story, see 
Seymour M. Hersh, Cover-Up: The Army’s Secret Investigation o f the Massacre at Mv Lai 4. New York: 
Random House, 1972. See also Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, Four Hours in Mv Lai: a war crime and its 
aftermath. London: Viking, 1992.
40 Famously, despite receiving a life sentence for the massacre, Calley was released from jail by Nixon and 
only served 3Vz years o f house arrest. But it must be said that military justice seems to have been 
exceptionally difficult in Vietnam. Aside from a lack o f resources, the situation was one o f constant 
turnover of military personnel. Witnesses often had been sent back to the US before they were called to 
testify. Additionally, in cases involving Vietnamese there were many difficulties with locating witnesses, 
and arranging translation. Moreover, the fact that the US military justice system was a very foreign and 
intimidating prospect for Vietnamese villagers. For this reason trials could indeed be a trying endeavour for 
prosecutors. See Prugh, Law at War, pp. 99-102 for a discussion o f these difficulties as well as Solis, 
Marines and Military Law in Vietnam, pp. 48-51.
41 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. pp. 328-9.
42 Parks, “The Law o f War Advisor”, pp. 13-14.
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for soldiers on the front lines. Confronted with booby traps and ambushes rather than 
traditional forces was a confusing experience. As Gunther Lewy argues:
In trying to understand why [warcrimes] took place, one must again 
remember the overall Vietnam environment -  the frustrations from fighting 
an often unseen enemy, the resentments created by casualties from booby 
traps frequently set by villagers, the decline in discipline during the years of 
disengagement. None of these factors justify the atrocities, but they help 
provide explanations for them.43
Yet there were clearly more factors than difficult circumstances at work here. The 
demoralization and breakdown in military discipline that occurred in the US military 
worldwide, but especially in Vietnam was a key factor. Theft, insubordination, black 
market activities and drugs were rampant in the US forces in Vietnam (according to 
Prugh during 1970 there were 11,058 arrests of which 1,146 involved hard narcotics such 
as heroin.)44 “Fragging” -  the murder of officers by their own men -  became a serious 
problem reflecting this sense of malaise as well as serious racial tension between black 
and white troops. In this environment, enforcing basic military discipline was a major 
challenge, let alone enforcing the laws of war.
One of the factors aggravating this problem was “Project 100,000” implemented by 
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. The “Project” required the armed services to 
accept men that had previously been rejected -  mostly because they had failed to meet 
intelligence standards. All of the services were forced to lower drastically their standards 
to accept an additional 100,000 men into their ranks. Solis argues that the influx of lower 
standard recruits had an immediate negative effect on discipline -  and remained a 
significant problem for commanders and military lawyers until the enlisted “Project
43 Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 234.
44 Prugh, Law at War, p. 107.
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100,000” recruits were phased out of the armed services in the mid-1970s.45 As Parks 
notes, the average marine or soldier involved in a serious incident or charge had less than 
10 years of formal education, was socially disadvantaged and of below average 
intelligence.46 A lower quality of recruit also had an effect on leadership. Lewy argues 
that weak leadership was the “the most important single element, present in almost all 
incidents”.47 Ineffective leadership, he argues, lead to weak discipline. Additionally, it 
also meant “inadequate planning of operations and loosely issued orders.”48 The Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) handed out to forces in the field were not consistently observed or 
implemented.
Peers Report
Many of these problems were revealed in the aftermath of My Lai. As the tragedy 
became public, the Chief of Staff of the Army began formal investigation as to how the 
incident occurred, and its findings were published in the “Report of the Department of the 
Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident” (otherwise 
known as the “Peers Report” after the general ordered to investigate the incident, General 
William R. Peers). As well as providing a very critical account of what occurred, the 
Report provided a list of findings and recommendations to be implemented.
Crucially, the Peers Report looked at the issue of training. The Report made it clear that 
part of the problem stemmed from the fact that the soldiers in the brigade taking part in 
the My Lai incident were inadequately trained in “their responsibilities regarding 
obedience to orders received from their superiors which they considered palpably illegal”, 
“their responsibilities concerning the procedures for the reporting of war crimes”, and
45 On “Project 100,000” and its effects, see Solis, Marines and Military Law. - especially pp. 73-4. Also 
Kelly M. Greenhill, “Don't Dumb Down the Army” New York Times, February 17, 2006, p. A23; Lewy 
discusses the matter in his book, America in Vietnam, p. 331.
46 W. Hays Parks, “Crimes in Hostilities”, Marine Corps Gazette LX, no. 9 (September 1976), pp. 38-9. p. 
38.
47 Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 330.
48 Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 330.
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“the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the handling and treatment of prisoners of 
war, and the treatment and safeguarding of noncombatants”.49
Certainly this a grim verdict on the military’s efforts to promote the law of war in 
Vietnam. Yet it is clear that the criticism reflected some underlying problems that were 
going to have to be taken seriously if the military wanted to prevent another My Lai. It 
was acknowledged by high-level MACV officials that laws of war instruction provided 
by the judge advocates had tended to be “abstract and academic, rather than concrete and 
practical.50 Beyond this, despite efforts to emphasize duties towards enemy POWs, 
training in the law of war had tended to placed more emphasis on the rights of an 
American soldier when captured than on his or her obligations towards others, or on 
compliance with the law of war.51 As Parks notes, the nature of the counterinsurgency 
operations in Vietnam required increased training on the protection of civilians -  but the 
attempts to provide such training was not always effective or consistent:
The effort was uneven and often personally driven. If a commander believed 
in the law of war, and in the importance of a disciplined military force, law 
of war training was emphasized, as was the investigation and prosecution of 
incidents when they occurred...Without positive command enforcement, 
and adequate realistic training, a law of war program is not likely to succeed.
Where law of war training occurred in Vietnam, it occasionally left much to 
be desired.52
Where commanders believed in the laws of war, it would usually be enforced and 
followed. Where leadership was weak, or belief and the desire to enforce the law was 
lacking, it was not. Troops would not necessarily follow the law on their own, without
49 Department o f the Army, “Report o f the Department of the Army Review o f the Preliminary 
Investigations into the My Lai Incident”, Washington: Department o f the Army, 1970. (Herein referred to 
as the “Peers Report”.) See “Findings and Recommendations”
50 See Hersh, Cover-Up p. 42. Hersh cites correspondence between General Bruce Palmer and General 
Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff in May 1968.
51 W. Hays Parks, “The United States Military and the Law of War: Inculcating an Ethos”, Social Research. 
Vol. 69. No 4 (Winter 2002) pp. 981-1015. p. 984.
52 Parks, “The United States Military”, p. 984.
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guidance or leadership. Rather than a comprehensive or a systematic approach, the 
implementation of the laws therefore depended very much on the personalities on the 
ground. Poor leadership, weak discipline and inadequate training in a hostile and 
frustrating environment clearly created a recipe for disaster.
Still, Prugh argues in the introduction to his book on military law in Vietnam, that the 
legacy of My Lai “beclouds the record of the many well-led-and legally conducted- 
military operations.” This is not a surprising claim coming from someone who 
dedicated most of his career to improving the law of war, and who personally worked 
very hard in Vietnam to improve legal services there. While Prugh’s claim has its basis in 
fact, it was also clear that there was a need for change in the way the US taught and 
implemented the law of war. In Vietnam there had been many mistakes made in terms of 
training and implementing the law. Changes were to come in the post-Vietnam period.
America and the Laws of War After Vietnam
The Vietnam years demonstrated that there was an immediate need for change in the way 
that the US taught and implemented the laws of war in its armed forces. Guenter Lewy 
writes that although the ROE were republished every six months to insure maximum 
visibility to all US personnel, the distribution of the rules to the lower levels was often 
inadequate.54 Only the Air Force made a systematic effort to test the actual knowledge of 
the ROE by its personnel. In other services familiarity with the ROE was inconsistent or 
lacking entirely.55 Many officers had therefore relied on ‘common sense’ rather than 
training.
The shock of My Lai and the apparent sense of crisis regarding discipline in the armed 
forces prompted some immediate changes. Effort was put into improving the training of 
military personnel in the field. The improved training revealed flagrant disregard of the 
ROE in some units, thus indicating what kinds of corrective action could and should have
53 Prugh, Law at War, p. v.
54 Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 234.
55 Lewy, America, p. 234.
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been taken years earlier.”56 The military was trying to make up for years of lost time. As 
Lewy notes:
An inspection of US Army Vietnam in May-June 1969 noted that about 50 
percent of all personnel had not received their required annual training in the 
Geneva and Hague Conventions. At that time, the pressure for body count 
and the free use of heavy weapons in populated areas probably made this 
kind of instruction rather academic and irrelevant.57
By May 1970, the amount of time required for training in the laws of war was increased. 
In the revamped training there was greater emphasis placed on dealing with illegal orders 
and the responsibility to disobey them. In terms of leadership, there was also a new 
section on command responsibility.
However, as Lewy argues:
All these reforms probably came too late to have much of an impact on the 
final years of the American combat in Vietnam. The failure to implement 
and enforce proper training in the humanitarian conventions of the law of 
war until a major incident like My Lai revealed the inadequate training 
prevailing until then must be considered the responsibility of MACV and of 
the military and civilian chiefs of the military services.58
56 Lewy, America, p. 268.
57 Lewy, America, p. 366. “Body count” refers to a measure o f ‘success’ o f US forces in Vietnam. As 
confusion over the goals o f the war grew, body counts -  the number o f individuals (presumably enemy 
forces) killed in an encounter -  was presented to the public to demonstrate progress in the conflict. 
Unfortunately, or perhaps, predictably, anyone killed in a skirmish, whether it be a member o f the Viet 
Cong, NLF or a civilian was reported as part o f this body count. See Scott Sigmund Gartner and Marissa 
Edson Myers, “Body Counts and ‘Success’ in the Vietnam and Korean Wars”, Journal o f Interdisciplinary 
History. Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter 1995. pp. 377-395. Interestingly, Gartner and Myers argue that ‘body 
counts’ were also used in Korea, although the term is normally associated with the Vietnam War.
58 Lewy, America, p. 369.
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While the US military had taken efforts to increase training time and to revise the rules to 
make them clearer and stronger, the underlying causes of disaster in Vietnam outlined 
above would require more measures than this to prevent another My Lai.
In certain ways, some of the problems in Vietnam solved themselves -  or were solved 
institutionally -  outside of the system of military justice and regardless of concern for the 
laws of war. With the end of the “draft” in 1973 (as well as “Project 100,000”), those 
who did not wish to be enlisted in military service, or for that matter, those who would 
not have regularly qualified finished their time in the military and were discharged. 
Teaching the laws of war to an all-volunteer force that could meet certain standards of 
intelligence would, in many ways, be a much simpler task for US military lawyers than 
that they had encountered in Vietnam.
In terms of improving implementation of the laws of war, one of the first steps taken in 
this direction was the 1974 Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5100.77. This was 
the DoD’s first overall law of war directive which set out the specific duties and 
responsibilities for law of war training for military personnel and the reporting of 
suspected violations of the law of war committed by US personnel.59 As Parks describes 
it, the Directive contained four key points:
It assigned responsibilities within the Department of Defense for law of war 
implementation. It assigned primary responsibility for training and 
compliance to each unit commander. It required reporting of war crimes for 
timely and proper investigation and appropriate disposition. Finally it 
established a training requirement, mandating training for each member of 
the military ‘commensurate with his duties and responsibilities.’60
The Directive was implemented in the Army in 1975, the Navy in 1976 and the Air force 
in 1976 with the expectation that each service would meet the standard established by the
59 W. Hays Parks, “The Gulf War: A Practitioner’s View”, Dickinson Journal o f International Law. Vol. 10 
No. 3, 1991-2. pp. 393-423, pp. 396-7.
60 Parks, “The United States Military”, pp. 985-6. See also Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 8 and n. 29.
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DoD. Military lawyers were also assigned the task of providing specific law of war 
training programs for the services, as well as providing reference and training materials.61
“Activist” Lawyers and “OperationalLaw”: 1975-198962
In the face of incontrovertible evidence that the US military had serious problems 
regarding the laws of war, several immediate steps were taken to improve compliance 
and implementation by the Department of Defense. Yet, bringing about change was not 
that simple -  and by the late 1970s, still did not go very far in changing the culture of 
military operations -  at least in a legal sense. As Borch argues, successful 
implementation of the Law of War Program would require that military lawyers would be 
able to communicate directly with commanders and their staff principals throughout the 
operational planning process, identifying issues of both a legal and a nonlegal nature.”63
61 Parks, “The Gulf War”, pp. 8-9.
62 The sources of this section are heavily dependent on books and articles written by individuals in or 
formally in the military. It would seem that there has not been much research done on the development o f 
operational law from a non-military perspective. One exception might be the work o f critical legal scholars 
who claim that international legal institutions are molded to serve the interests o f dominant states such as 
Thomas W. Smith, “The New Law o f War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence”
International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 46, 2002. pp. 355-374. See also Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand, 
“The Legitimation o f Violence: A Critical History o f the Laws o f War”, Harvard International Law Journal. 
Vol. 35 No. 1, 1994. pp. 49-95; and Roger Normand and Chris af Jochnick “The Legitimation o f Violence: 
A Critical Analysis o f the Gulf War.” Harvard International Law Journal. Vo. 35, No. 2, 1994. pp. 387-416. 
Smith argues that operational law, or the “new law o f war” serves to merely legitimize violence rather than 
restrain it. “The new law o f war burnishes hi-tech campaigns and boots public relations, even as it 
undercuts customary limits on the use of force and erodes distinctions between soldiers and civilians.” p. 
356. Naturally, these arguments are very controversial and not typically accepted among law o f war 
scholars who tend to work on the assumption that the law operates on the basis o f protecting lives rather 
than serving state interests, af Jochnick and Normand do present a compelling case for arguing that the law 
of war has typically been the servant of state interests. However, it only seems to make sense that states 
would only sign on to those international agreements that were in some way compatible with their long 
term interests, given that states rarely act out of purely altruistic motives. In this sense, the argument 
presented by af Jochnick and Normand may be original -  but ultimately o f questionable use in terms of 
understanding the politics o f the law o f war. While the critical argument may make more sense when 
applied to targeting issues, its line of reasoning does not seem to adequately explain US attempts to 
implement the law o f  war in Korea or Vietnam in terms of policies towards prisoners o f war. Therefore the 
critique o f the critical legal scholars will not be given much attention in this work -  especially as the focus 
o f this work is not on the legitimation of violence.
63 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat p. 51.
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While the changes that had been made went beyond the purely cosmetic, there was still a 
lot more that could be done at the command level to ensure that the mistakes of Vietnam 
would not repeat themselves. Again, as Borch notes:
Institutionally, the [JAG] Corps failed to view its years in Vietnam as a 
basis for engaging in any substantial modification of the way in which it had 
traditionally practiced military law. With the exception of an extensive 
effort to incorporate Vietnam lessons learned into both the Law of War 
training materials prepared and provided by the Judge Advocate General’s 
School, little was done to capture the unique aspects of the Corp’s Vietnam 
experience.64
It was not that the judge advocates were entirely unaware of the potential for change. By 
the early 1980s, JAGs had become involved in the detailed review of operational plans, 
pursuant to DoD Directive 5100.77, for nine years and “were far more aware of the 
potential for encountering legal issues impacting on the conduct of an operation.”65 Yet, 
as Parks notes, lawyers serving as law of war instructors in the late 1970s found 
themselves “confronted with hostile clients. Lawyers and the law of war were blamed for 
restrictions placed upon the use of military force during Vietnam.”66
Change would come about on two fronts -  the creation of a new way of looking at the 
implementation of the laws of war in military operations, called “operational law” and the 
emergence of “activist lawyers” to implement i t67 The former of these two factors came 
about as an attempt to rethink and reintroduce the law of war as it related to military 
operations. In the late 1970s, the term “law affecting military operations” was developed
64 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, p. 51. It should be noted here that Borch is referring specifically to 
the Army JAGs, but it would be fare to say that this went for the entire Corps.
65 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, p. 62.
66 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 397. Parks notes that many of the restrictions were put in place not because of 
the law, but because o f political decisions or because o f a mistaken belief that certain actions would violate 
the laws o f war. Parks expands on this argument in W. H. Parks, “Rolling Thunder and the Law o f War”
Air University Review. Vol XXXIII No. 2, 1982 and “Linebacker and the Law o f War”, Air University 
Law Review. XXXIV No. 2, 1983.
67 The term “activist lawyers” is borrowed from Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 400.
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to indicate that there were a myriad of facets of the law that affected both war and peace 
operations. The concept brought together all of the areas that, as the name indicates, 
affected military operations in war and peace. While the basis of operational law remains 
the laws of war, it also includes US domestic law, such as laws and directives relating to 
security assistance, foreign military sales, intelligence oversight, contracts for goods and 
services overseas, foreign claims, and authority to negotiate agreements on behalf of the 
United States.68 This also included aspects of public international law, such as base rights 
agreements, status of forces agreements, and questions of sovereignty.
Therefore, rather than presenting the law as a set of restrictions, emphasis was placed on 
the use of this law as a planning tool that not only dictated responsibilities but also set out 
the legal rights of the military.69 Additionally, the use of the phrase, (quickly shortened to 
“operational law” or OPLAW70), temporarily minimalized the use of the term “law of 
war” which had pejorative connotation in the aftermath of Vietnam.71 In this way, 
military lawyers tried to present operational law as a positive tool rather than a set of 
bureaucratic restrictions.72
However, implementation of operational law required lawyers to be in the war room and 
this required that the rapport between lawyers and commanders would have to be 
improved. While it would be wrong to suggest that all doors were shut to military lawyers, 
it was clear that they would have to present a case to their services and for the idea of 
operational law. Military lawyers needed to convince their commanders that they would 
be helpful to the conduct of military operations, and not meddlesome. In other words, it 
was imperative for lawyers to overcome their Vietnam-stereotype whether it was
68 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 394. On operational law see, David E. Graham, “Operational Law (OPLAW)
-  A Concept Comes o f Age” The Army Lawyer. July 1987, pp. 9-10. Graham and Parks define the concept 
in very similar terms.
69 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 398.
70 Graham, “Operational Law” p. 9.
71 Although Parks notes that the law o f war remained the foundation for the operational law program. “The 
Gulf War”, p. 398.
72 William Eckhardt argues that an approach which teaches the law of war as a set o f ‘positives’ instead of 
‘negatives’ is more effective. Therefore, instead of instructing troops “Do not kill civilians”, lawyers would 
tell troops “Marines fight only enemy combatants.” See William George Eckhardt, “Lawyering for Uncle 
Sam When He Draws His Sword”, Chicago Journal o f International Law. Vol. 4, 2003. pp. 431-444; 
especially note 23, p. 440.
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deserved or not. This, in turn, required getting the military lawyer and his or her 
commander talking to improve understanding.
“Activist lawyers” therefore emerged in the Department of Defense to make the case for 
their presence in the war room. As Borch notes, the increase in individual initiative had 
its roots in the fact that the unconventional nature of the war in Vietnam required non- 
traditional thinking and this was brought back by many lawyers who went to Vietnam. 
Additionally, by the late 1970s there were more lawyers in the military than ever before -  
and these were better educated. 73 Individual lawyers would approach individual 
commanders to convince them that military lawyers could provide a “package of total 
legal services” from the planning stages through to withdraw.74 As Parks describes it, 
“The idea was to make the client aware of the many politico-legal facets of the lawyers 
work, in peace and war” while also educating the lawyer on the work of his superiors.75 
This was done through a series of symposiums, the first of which took place at The Judge 
Advocates General’s School, U.S. Army, in 1982 -  and was found to be sufficiently 
useful as to ensure that it has been held annually ever since.76 Additionally, military 
lawyers worked to get security clearance to perform their job in the war room as 
operations were actually carried out.77
American Military Operations in the 1980s
By the time of the 1983 intervention into Grenada in Operation Urgent Fury, there had 
been substantial improvements in the way that military lawyers conceived and sought to 
implement the laws of war in US military operations. However, there were still some 
problems -  operational law, in its infancy, had not been completely implemented. 
Additionally, while commanders had certainly warmed to the idea of military lawyers in 
the war room by this point, it was clear that they were still not involved in the planning 
process. Few military lawyers had little knowledge of Urgent Fury until a few days
73 Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat, p. 318.
74 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 400.
75 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 398.
76 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 399.
77 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 399.
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before it began. The first judge advocate on the ground in Grenada had little more than 
twelve hours notice of his deployment.78 Additionally, the Army still only expected 
lawyers to focus on specific issues such as those related to the status and treatment of
70prisoners of war and detainees.
Although Operation Urgent Fury was short, and, arguably, relatively well conducted, it 
indicated that there was still room for improvement regarding the role of military lawyers 
and operational law.80 Military commanders reached the decision that judge advocates 
must be included in the planning of contingency operations from the beginning. The lack 
of notice given military lawyers hindered preparation for potential legal problems, 
especially as giving correct and complete legal advice depends on having a full
O 1
understanding of the nature and purpose of the deployment. Additionally, it was clear 
that military lawyers would have to be prepared to solve or advise on quasi-legal issues 
and unanticipated legal matters. As Marc Warren argues, the task for lawyers was to 
facilitate operations, and this called for versatility as well as the ability to serve as a 
“honest broker” or “sounding board” in matters other than those involving law and other 
regulations.82 For example, Army lawyers in Grenada were involved in setting up of a 
graves registration system.83 As Borch argues, “Both the nature and the tempo of the 
deployment to Grenada presented novel legal challenges for the twelve or so judge 
advocates who served there from 25 October to 15 December.”84
78 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, pp. 62-3.
79 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, p. 62. Incidentally, in Urgent Fury, Army Lawyers determined 
that the Geneva Conventions applied and that all persons captured should be treated as prisoners of war. p. 
66.
80 Most o f the law o f the conflict’s legalities surrounded three issues. First, the confusing legal status o f the 
conflict. This was important for whether or not the Geneva Conventions would apply. (The Army lawyers 
determined that it did regardless.) Second, a mental hospital was bombed in the course o f the campaign 
(which was unmarked and therefore the Army judge advocate determined that there was not law of war 
violation). Third, the treatment o f Cuban diplomats caught in the conflict.
81 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, p. 68.
82 Marc L. Warren, “Operational Law -  A Concept Matures”, Military Law Review. Vol. 152, 1996, pp. 
33-73. See pp. 37-40.
83 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, pp. 68-9.
84 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, p. 81.
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In this way, Borch sees Grenada as more of a “wake-up call” than Vietnam was for the 
Judge Advocates Corps in that, unlike Vietnam, there was an “institutional recognition” 
that military lawyers had a greater role to play:
[The] experiences of judge advocates in Grenada resulted in the Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps’ formal acknowledgement, as an institution, that 
judge advocates must be trained and resourced to provide timely advice on a 
broad range of legal issues associated with the conduct of military 
operations.85
By 1986 there was a renewed effort to impress the importance operational law in the war 
room. This was facilitated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 which dramatically 
increased the authority and responsibility of legal advisors.86 By the time that Operation 
Just Cause began in Panama in 1989, the scale of the transformation becomes readily 
apparent. First, unlike Operation Urgent Fury, Army lawyers began planning almost a 
year in a half in advance of the deployment of US troops. In this way the ROE could be 
tailored to the operation and to ensure that they strictly adhered to the laws of war.87 
Additionally, by the time the Operation Just Cause was underway, the revised ROE was 
fully in place. To military lawyers, Operation Just Cause, demonstrated that the 
Department of Defense were taking the laws of war seriously and this enabled them to 
implement a comprehensive operational law program. Eckhardt argues the changes 
signified that:
85 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, p. 81.
86 Eckhardt, “Lawyering for Uncle Sam”, pp. 433-4. See also the Goldwater-Nichols Department of  
Defense Reorganization Act o f 1986. Pub L. No. 99-433
87 Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, pp. 95-6. Borch outlines five major concerns that were dealt with 
in advance. First, the issue o f armed civilians accompanying the Panama Defense Forces; second, the 
circumstances under which civilian aircraft could be targeted; third, indirect fire in populated areas, fourth, 
the regulation o f air-to-ground attacks in populated areas and finally, the treatment o f individuals captured 
or detained during hostilities. (Again it was determined that under the ROE that all o f those detained would 
be treated as Prisoners o f War.). See Borch, “Judge Advocates in Combat”, pp. 96-7.
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the profession of arms reclaimed the rules of its own profession. The law of 
war came out of the library and off lawyers’ desks and once again became 
the province of the practical profession of arms.88
America and the Laws of War on the Internationa] Stage
The mistakes made in Vietnam and the pressures of operations in the 1980s prompted the 
US military to reform itself and the way it implemented the laws of war. As we have seen, 
these changes were largely brought about by domestic developments (such as the notion 
of operational law) and even individual “activist” lawyers pushing for reform. Yet, 
internationally, these developments did not occur in a vacuum. In order to generate a 
fuller picture of what is going on, it is necessary to take a look at international 
developments with regards to the laws of war and the US reaction to them. It was going 
to be a bumpy road ahead.
Law and Politics: The Geneva Diplomatic Conference 1974-77
By the end of the Vietnam War, it was becoming very clear that the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, if not falling out of date, were not well designed to deal with the increasing 
numbers of wars of national self-liberation occurring across the globe.89 Naturally, this 
did not escape the notice of humanitarians who grew concerned over the lack of law 
governing conflicts that fell between civil wars and interstate categories. In such cases, 
invoking Common Article 3 of the Conventions could ensure a bare minimum of 
regulation in the conflict, yet this was far removed from the protections of the full
88 Eckhardt, “Lawyering for Uncle Sam”, p. 440. However, one cannot help but wonder if  this is an 
overstatement o f the case. Given the history so far explored in this work it is clear that the military appears 
to have claimed rather than reclaimed the law of war in terms of its implementation.
89 This section draws on material previously written by the author. See Stephanie Carvin, “Caught in the 
Cold: International Humanitarian Law and Prisoners o f War During the Cold War”, Journal o f Conflict and 
Security Law. Vol. 11, No. 1, 2006. pp. 67-92.
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Conventions properly carried out.90 Convincing governments or rebels to adhere to even 
these basic standards was more often than not an impossible task. The truth of the matter 
was that the states gathered in 1949 did not truly take wars of national liberation into 
consideration or believe in the possibility that liberation movements could become a 
contracting party to the Conventions or be bound by them.91 However, conflicts like 
Korea and Vietnam had demonstrated the deadly danger of this gap in the laws of war.
In response, the ICRC and humanitarian-minded countries (especially Sweden and 
Switzerland) began to press for the strengthening of the laws of war in this regard. The 
issue had been raised by the ICRC at the 1957 International Red Cross Conference in 
New Delhi but had met with an adverse reaction from the major powers. Yet, clearly the 
US was beginning to warm to the idea when it sought support to apply the Geneva 
Conventions to the war in Vietnam at the Vienna International Red Cross Conference in 
1965. However, it was not until the 1969 International Red Cross Conference in Istanbul 
that a resolution was passed to support an ICRC mandate to convene a diplomatic 
conference to move forward with its efforts to further codify the laws applicable in armed 
conflicts. This lead to the 1971 and 1972 preparatory conferences where two draft
90 Common Article 3 States: In the case o f armed conflict not o f an international character occurring in the 
territory o f one o f the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members o f armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or 
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder o f all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) Taking o f hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing o f sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by 
a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee o f the Red Cross, may offer its 
services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means o f special agreements, all 
or part o f the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application o f the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status o f  the Parties to the conflict.
91 Ingrid Detter, The Law o f War. Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 199- 
202. Detter notes that extending the Convention to internal wars could be done through a “literary 
interpretation construed regardless o f the intention of the drafters” to consolidated resistance movements 
and to guerillas.
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proposals were drawn up that would later serve as the basis for negotiations at the 1974 
Geneva Diplomatic Conference.
The Geneva Diplomatic Conference and the 1977 Additional Protocols
While the Western nations, including the US went along with the idea of further 
developing the laws of war, the socialist states and the non-aligned movement saw the 
Convention as an opportunity to make political stands (particularly against the US and 
the west), to score points in the international arena and, in some cases, to secure 
recognition for particular political struggles and objectives throughout the world. 
Additionally, there were several national liberation movements invited to ensure “broad 
representation”.92
What eventually emerged out of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, were 
two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The first was the Protocol 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and 
the second Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II). But while the Diplomatic Conference, which was to occur for three 
negotiating periods over three years, did succeed in expanding the laws of war, the end 
result was so controversial that many states would not ratify until decades after it was 
signed, or in the case of the US, refuse to ratify it altogether.
Partially because of the presence of the national-1 iberation movements, it was almost 
guaranteed from the beginning that Cold War politics and the politics of the Non-Aligned
92 The participation o f the national liberation groups in the full deliberations marked a major difference in 
the Conference from the others that had taken place. Various international organizations were also 
represented in an observer status. See Adam Roberts and Richard GuelfF, Documents on the Laws o f War. 
Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 419. Such groups included the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization and the African National Congress who, aside from international recognition, also 
demanded full POW status for their captured personnel due to, what they felt to be, the justness of their 
cause.
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Movement would play a major role in shaping the Diplomatic Conference.93 This resulted 
in several controversial provisions in Protocol I. Perhaps the most familiar of these was 
the success of the Third World and Socialist Countries to have the first session of the 
Conference elevate three categories of wars of self-determination to the status of 
international armed conflicts: “peoples fighting colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”. Such a 
stipulation would guarantee forces fighting in these conflicts the status of POWs should 
they be captured. Not only did this guarantee a certain standard of treatment, but also 
afforded a respectable international status which was valuable in wars for “hearts and 
minds”. This provision, which eventually fell under Article 1 Paragraph 4, was opposed 
by the United States and other Western states but was passed by a vote of 70 in favour, 
21 against and 13 abstaining. Interestingly enough, Western opposition to the provision 
gradually diminished during the Conference, so much so that when it was finally voted 
upon in the final draft of 1977, a general agreement emerged and it was passed 87 in 
favour, 1 against with 11 abstentions.94
The purpose of Protocol II was much narrower than Protocol I as it sought to apply 
humanitarian standards to internal conflicts not covered by Protocol I. Yet it is clear that 
the issues covered in Protocol II were subject to the same Cold War/political pressures 
and controversies that affected Protocol I. Important here is the scope of Protocol II itself. 
An ambitious plan to adopt an extensive, detailed set of rules for governing internal 
conflict which are not liberation wars as defined in Protocol I was rejected due to the 
intervention of Third World states lead by Pakistan.95 Pakistan indicated that it was 
concerned that any such plan would inevitably impinge on state sovereignty and other 
Third World states were quick to agree. It was argued that while wars against imperialism 
and racism could be placed under the rules laid out in the Geneva Conventions, any 
regulation of internal conflicts, including how captured prisoners were treated inside
93 For a critical look at what happened at the Diplomatic Conference, including the politics involved in the 
negotiations, see W. Hays Parks, “Air War and the Law of War”, Air Force Law Review. Vol 32. No. 1, 
1990. pp. 1-225. While the focus o f the article is on Air War and targeting, there are quite lengthy sections 
on the history o f the laws o f war, the Diplomatic Conference, the US Review of the 1977 Protocols and 
reasons for the US ultimately rejecting them.
94 Israel voted against for reasons that are, perhaps, fairly obvious.
95 Detter, The Law of War, p. 202.
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national territories, would infringe rights of sovereignty and self-determination.96 Those 
who revolted against their own regime were to be considered criminals and as traitors 
who did not deserve the rights and protections afforded POWs.
As Forsythe argues:
Because of the nature of its origins, [the Diplomatic Conference and the 
Additional Protocols] was to be concerned as much with realpoltik as with 
war victims. The ICRC might see IHL as a means to regularize improved 
humanitarian protection for victims of war, but states might very well see 
IHL as another policy instrument to advance their primary policy concerns -  
concerns that might not prioritize the well-being of victims.97
The American rejection o f the 1977 Additional Protocols
However, it was not just international Cold War politics that would have an effect on the 
fate of the Additional Protocols. In the US, a new domestic factor was in play with the 
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. As the new administration came into office, it was 
clear that it was taking a hard line stance to combat Communism, which did not blend 
well with the new protections for those engaged in wars of national liberation in the 
Additional Protocols.
The US delegation to the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference had felt that the legislation 
represented progress in terms of the laws of war. The Head of the US Delegation, 
Ambassador George Aldrich argued in a series of articles that the Protocols represented a 
“new life for the laws of war”98 and “a major accomplishment for international law and
96 Detter, The Law o f War, p. 202.
97 David P. Forsythe, The Humanitarians. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp. 92-93.
98 George H. Aldrich, “New Life for the Laws o f War”, American Journal o f International Law. Vol. 75 No. 
4 October 1981, pp. 764-783.
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for human rights”.99 One of the main arguments Aldrich put forward for ratification was 
improved protections for Prisoners of War. Aldrich had actually worked on the problem 
of treatment of American POWs in Vietnam for the State Department during that conflict 
and felt he, as well as America, had a vested interest in strengthening guarantees for 
captured personnel.100 Additional Protocol I, Article 5 stipulated that each side of the 
conflict must designate and accept a protection power that would ensure that prisoners of 
war were not being abused and Aldrich argued that this provision would have been very 
valuable in Vietnam.101 Additionally, Aldrich argued that the Protocols drafted a single, 
non-discriminatory set of rules which were applicable to all combatants.102 Exceptions to 
the rules, which Communist forces had argued in the past, were made as narrow as 
possible and provided presumptions and procedures to prevent abuse of the exceptions.
Yet some would later argue that the US delegation suffered from the fact that the actual 
negotiation of the Protocols was left in the hands of international lawyers, “not all of 
whom were entirely conversant with either the law of war” or Pentagon priorities.103 
Although the military was certainly involved in helping to develop guidance, the 
participation of military lawyers in crucial negotiations was minimal. Military lawyers, 
commanders and Department of Defense personnel came together to review the 1977 
Protocols in December of that year. In this way, for the first time, the documents were 
reviewed by those who would live or die by the rules set forth in the Protocols.104 The 
review process looked at the provisions, whether or not they were acceptable and if not, 
why not, and whether or not it could be fixed.105
99 George H. Aldrich, “Some reflections on the origins of the 1977 Geneva Protocols”, in Christophe 
Swinarski, ed. Studies and essays on international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles in honour o f 
Jean Pictet. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984. pp. 129-137.
100 Aldrich, “Some reflections” pp. 130-2 and Aldrich, “New Life for the Laws o f War”, p. 766.
101 Aldrich, “New Life for the Laws o f War” p. 768.
102 Aldrich, “New Life for the Laws o f War” p. 770. O f course, as Aldrich points out, there were exceptions 
made for spies, mercenaries and guerillas who take advantage of their apparent civilian status and conceal 
their weapons heading into an attack.
103 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 398.
104 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 398.
105 Parks, “The Gulf War”, p. 399.
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In this way, the review process marked a drastic change in how the DoD looked at the 
laws of war, considered their effects on the military, and how they would be implemented. 
Yet, the legal review -  whatever its verdict was going to be -  was going to be overruled 
by the new ideological considerations of the Reagan administration. While Aldrich 
certainly believed that the Protocols marked progress for the laws of war and was 
concurrent with the US position, the White House made it clear that it disagreed.
In particular Douglas Feith, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Negotiations 
Policy from 1984-1986, had deep concerns regarding US ratification and spoke out 
critically against ratification while he was in that position. In particular, he spoke out 
against the politicized negotiations process, provisions that would sheild “terrorists” and 
render protections to their illegal tactics.106 Feith, who is often associated with the 
neoconservative wing of the Republican Party, was clearly going to have ideological 
opposition to the Additional Protocols whether they were found workable or not.107
In 1987 it was announced by President Reagan that while the US would sign and ratify 
Protocol II, Protocol I was fundamentally flawed and would not be sent to the Senate. In 
an address to the Senate Regan argued:
[Protocol I] would give special status to “wars of national liberation,” an ill- 
defined concept expressed in vague, subjective, politicized terminology. 
Another provision would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if 
they do not satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population and otherwise comply with the laws of war.
106 Douglas J. Feith, “Law in the Service of Terror - The Strange Case o f the Additional Protocol”, National 
Interest. N o.l 1985; Douglas J. Feith, “'International responses', in Uri Ra'anan et al eds. Hydra of Carnage. 
International Linkages o f Terrorism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1986; and Douglas Feith, “Protocol 
I: Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards”, Akron Law Review. Vol. 19, pp. 531-5.
107 How far Feith was able to influence the eventual decision is not entirely clear. Speaking confidentially, 
one Department o f Defense employee who participated in the process indicated that the legal review 
concluded would have put the US in a position to ratify both Protocols (with the proper reservations put in 
place). However, Feith, upon taking his position in the DoD indicated to the lawyers that the US would not 
be signing the Protocols -  period. This, apparently, put an end to finding ways to make ratification possible 
and the military lawyers overseeing the process felt free to criticize Protocol I as much as they could. That 
Feith was the Under Secretary for Defense in the first George W. Bush Administration 2001-05, makes his 
views particularly interesting for this thesis.
93
This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars 
attempt to conceal themselves. These problems are so fundamental in 
character that they cannot be remedied through reservations, and I therefore 
have decided not to submit the Protocol to the Senate in any form...
It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected. We would have preferred 
to ratify such a convention, which as I said contains certain sound elements. 
But we cannot allow other nations of the world, however numerous, to 
impose upon us and our allies and friends an unacceptable and thoroughly 
distasteful price for joining a convention drawn to advance the laws of war. 
In fact, we must not, and need not, give recognition and protection to 
terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.108
This, while the US committed itself to accepting those parts of Protocol I that are 
considered customary, it refused to sign the Protocol I and is not likely to do so in the 
near future.109 While Protocol II was transmitted to the Senate for ratification, the US 
Senate has taken no action on the treaty.
The Most Legal War in History: The US and the 1990-1 Gulf War
108 “Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions” 29 January, 1987. 
The speech is available online at the website o f the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/012987B.HTM.
109 The US position was considered to have been summed up in Michael J. Matheson, “The United States 
Position on the Relation o f Customary Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Conventions” in 
American University Journal o f International Law and Policy. 1987 pp. 419-431. However, this was 
subsequently withdrawn by the US in 2005. Apparently there was some confusion as to whether or not 
Matheson was speaking in an official capacity. It is the position o f the Department o f Defense that he was 
not. Aldrich’s disappointment with the decision is made clear in a follow up to his “Some reflections” 
article where he states: “Looking back from 1997,1 deeply regret that 20 years ago I did not press, within 
the executive branch o f my government, for prompt submission of the Protocols to the Senate o f the United 
States for advice and consent for their ratification. All but a very few provisions had been adopted in 
Geneva with the complete support o f both the U.S. State and Defense Departments, and I believe President 
Carter and Secretary Vance would have endorsed them. I failed to realize that, with the passage o f time, 
those in both Departments who had negotiated and supported the Protocols would be replaced by skeptics 
and individuals with a different political agenda.” George H. Aldrich, “Comments on the Geneva 
Conventions” International Review of the Red Cross. No 320, October 1997. p.508-510
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Certainly the rejection of Additional Protocol I, especially in such strict ideological terms, 
was controversial for the United States internationally and for those lawyers at home who 
wished to see the US as a model global citizen. Still, despite its rejection, it was clear 
going in to the First Gulf War that the US military had a vastly different approach and 
attitude to the laws of war than it did in Vietnam -  with or without ratification of the 
Protocols. This new approach represented the culmination of the efforts of “activist 
lawyers” in the Department of Defense who realized that a better appreciation of the law 
did not only mean complex restrictions, but also that law-guided policy could help 
operations to run smoother. The result, as has been described at the beginning of this 
chapter, was the materialization of the most legalistic war fought in the history of the 
United States.
Yet, the US still faced the prospect of issues regarding Protocol I. At the outset of the 
conflict, there had been the very real threat of “legal-interoperability”110 The Allies in the 
Gulf all subscribed to different laws of war treaties, including Protocol I, and each had 
their own separate reservations and interpretations. In some ways this was, of course, 
somewhat of a moot point as Iraq had not signed or ratified the Protocols and they were 
therefore not binding on any of the parties. Still, even in its refusal to adhere to the 
Additional Protocols, the US had declared on several occasions that it would adhere to 
those provisions of the Additional Protocols that were considered customary.111 There 
was good reason to do so. As Christopher Greenwood argues:
The nature of the hostilities, which involved, for example, the heaviest aerial 
bombardments since the Second World War, meant that many of the 
provisions of Protocol 1 were potentially of great importance.112
Legal issues in the Gulf
110 The term is borrowed from Fran?oise J. Hampson, “Means and methods o f warfare in the conflict in the 
Gulf’, in The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law, ed. Peter Rowe. London: Routledge,
1993. pp. 108-110. p. 108.
111 Christopher Greenwood, “Customary international law and the First Geneva Protocol o f 1977 in the 
Gulf Conflict” in The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law, ed. Peter Rowe. London: 
Routledge, 1993. pp. 63-88., p. 64.
112 Greenwood, “Customary international law”, p. 65.
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In terms of war crimes or violation of the laws of war, most of the debate was over the 
targeting policy employed by the United States. In particular, the bombing of the Amiriya 
bunker was the subject of much controversy.113 However, like most of the wars that the 
United States engaged in the 20th Century, POWs were again a major issue. By the time 
the ceasefire was declared in February 1991, there were approximately 86,000 Iraqi and 
47 coalition forces captured.114 While it had been anticipated that large numbers of 
prisoners of war would be taken; it was probably not foreseen that they would amount to 
over eighty thousand.115
There were several problems that the sheer numbers of surrendering Iraqis produced. 
POWs had to be issued with gas masks and evacuated from the battlefield.116 In terms of 
fighting, the bombing had to be conducted in such a way as to provide a lull from time to 
time, to enable the Iraqi forces to come forward and surrender.117 Additionally, like the 
Second World War and Korea in particular, the Gulf War again brought about problems 
of repatriation. There were concerns that large numbers of prisoners of war would resist 
repatriation -  and this indeed was the case. Many countries in the Coalition, including the 
US and the UK, having had negative experiences in Korea agreed that no prisoner should 
be forcibly repatriated. The problem was then where to send the POWs who did not wish
113 On 13 February 1991, there was an attack on the Amiriya bunker which resulted in 400 civilian deaths. 
The United States Air Force commanders who ordered the attack argued that the bunker had previously 
been used in the Iran-Iraq war for military purposes and that they did not suspect that this had changed.
The Americans maintained that the structure housed a command and control center, from which military 
radio communications had been monitored for two or three weeks. Some information here from Greenwood, 
“Customary international law”.
114 The focus here will be on the 86,000 Iraqis who were taken prisoners. By virtually all accounts, the 47 
Coalition forces members taken prisoner were treated in a very bad way -  not even coming close to the 
Geneva Convention’s requirements. Many were beaten and tortured and often they were used as human 
shields. The Iraqis also refused to allow the ICRC to visit. For more information, see Peter Rowe 
“Prisoners o f War in the Gulf Arena” in The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law, ed. Peter 
Rowe. London: Routledge, 1993. pp. 188-204. (The numbers of POWs captured comes from this source.) 
Also see Frank Smyth “The Gulf War” in Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know eds. Roy Gutman 
and David Rieff, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999. pp. 162-168.
115 Rowe, “Prisoners o f War in the Gulf Arena” p. 197. In all likelihood, this was probably due to the 
impression that the air war had had on the Iraqi military and the propaganda campaign that the coalition 
had launched. This included the dropping o f thousands of leaflets which warned o f massive attacks and 
advising soldiers to flee.
116 Rowe, “Prisoners of War in the Gulf Arena” p. 198.
117 Peter Rowe, “Prisoners o f War in the Gulf Arena”, p. 197.
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to return to Iraq. The issue was largely resolved when King Fahd of Saudi Arabia offered 
to take in 50,000 Iraqi refugees and prisoners of war including army deserters.118
Why, then, can we regard the 1990-91 Gulf War as a success story in terms of the law of
war? The numbers alone tell part of the story. The ratio of American legal advisors sent
to the Gulf Region in comparison to the other allies by one estimate was 70:l .119 Yet
these numbers are ultimately meaningless unless there are actions to suggest that the level
of legal influence was substantial. However, to demonstrate this, it is possible to look at
the judgments and statements of officials, journalists and NGOs in reflection on the
conflict. Colin Powell, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated in an
interview for the American Bar Association Journal that “Decisions were impacted by
legal considerations at every level... Lawyers proved invaluable in the decision making 
»120process.
Steven Keeva adds in the article:
Lawyers were everywhere during the Gulf War. They worked out of the 
headquarters of Central Command... and they slept in the sand alongside 
troops in the field. They negotiated host-nations agreements and advised 
commanders on the legal implications of targeting decisions and weapons 
use...121
Additionally, given the genuinely unprecedented legal oversight of the operations, 
Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace concluded that the US generally “behaved in 
accordance with provisions of the Geneva Protocol”.122
118 Peter Rowe, “Prisoners o f War in the Gulf Arena”, p. 203.
119 David Garratt, “The role of legal advisors in the armed forces,” in The Gulf War 1990-91 in 
International and English Law, ed. Peter Rowe. London: Routledge, 1993. p. 59. Garratt notes that this was 
partially due to the wider responsibilities o f US legal advisors.
120 Keeva, “Lawyers in the War Room”, p. 52.
121 Keeva, “Lawyers in the War Room”, pp. 52-3.
122 Cited in af Jochnick and Normand, “A Critical Analysis o f the Gulf War”, p. 409. It should be pointed 
out that both organizations remained critical over certain aspects o f the bombing campaign.
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Of course these efforts did not and could not prevent any law of war violations from 
taking place; mishaps are bound to happen in war as are controversial actions.123 
Expecting an accident free-conflict or bloodless war is unrealistic. However, the 
American Military’s policy of following the law of war clearly lead to a smoother 
operation than might otherwise might have occurred. Warren argues that the purpose of a 
law of war advisor “is to lawfully facilitate mission accomplishment, thereby enhancing 
the versatility of already capable units to meet diverse mission requirements.”124 If we 
evaluate the implementation of the law of war on these grounds, it is then possible to 
agree with the assertion that law played a significant role in the 1990-1 Gulf War.
America and the Laws of War in the 20th Century
To look back at the course of the 20th Century, comparing the US in the Philippines at the 
beginning with the US in the First Gulf War at the end, we can see a clear difference in 
the way the US considered, enacted and taught the laws of war. It is worth examining 
why is this the case. As we have seen, there are several reasons one can point to that seem 
to have played a role in what as well might be called the ‘legal revolution’ in the 
American military. The first goes back to an idea that even Clausewitz recognized in On 
War:
Any unnecessary expenditure of time, every unnecessary detour, is a waste 
of strength and thus abhorrent to strategic thought... Thus theory demands 
the shortest roads to the goal.125
The concept that Clausewitz is referring to is the idea of the ‘economy of force’. Simply 
put, it is the idea that armies should attempt to achieve their goals as fast, efficiently and 
effectively as possible. While this may sound like an invitation to trample on the laws of
123 Of course, the word “violation” seems to suggest a deliberate plan to infringe upon the law of war. 
However, the term is here used to also encompass accidents which may happen in the fog of war where no 
one is necessarily to blame.
124 Warren, “Operational Law” p. 35.
125 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976. p.624.
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war in the name of ‘efficiency’ (and on numerous occasions throughout history it has 
been invoked to do just that) -  in fact, the notion of economy of force has had quite the 
opposite effect. For example, in so far as precision guided missiles (PGMs) have replaced 
carpet bombing as a means of warfare, this may be considered an illustration of the 
economy of force. New possibilities for discrimination thus become possible when you 
have a bomb that can find its target within a one meter radius, versus the relative 
indiscriminate damage caused by traditional “dumb” bombs that required far more 
firepower to ensure that a target was hit.
But the idea has wider implications and this point was driven home by the massacres in 
Vietnam; namely that major violations of the laws of war are quite costly in terms of 
resources, manpower and reputation. The US missions in Mai Lai and Son Thang were 
not just brutal in their attacks -  they were quite useless. Aside from the sufferings of 
those who were there, it cost the Americans in terms of resources, but also heavily in 
terms of international reputation. Going out of one’s way to commit atrocities is a direct 
violation of the principle of ‘economy of force’ and over the course of the 20th Century 
this became increasingly recognized by western armies throughout the world, including 
the United States. If the good will of civilians and prisoners of war will help you achieve 
your goal easier and faster, then you have every incentive to treat them well. If 
international support crucial to your cause and support for particular military endeavours 
is damaged by violations of the laws of war, then armies have every incentive to ensure 
that they do not happen. Troops out of control are indicative of an inefficient force and 
therefore commanders have every reason to ensure that their troops do not run ‘amuck’. 
As the US Department of Defence report on the First Gulf War argued:
...no Iraqi action leading to or resulting in a violation of the law of war 
gained Iraq any military advantage. This ‘negative gain from negative 
actions’ in essence reinforces the validity of the law of war.126
126 US Department o f Defence, “Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress”, Washington: 
Department o f Defence, April 1992. p.624. Interestingly, the Report was authored under the supervision of  
now Vice President Richard Cheney, who was the Sectary o f Defense during the First Gulf War.
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Thus, the US military redrafted and re-wrote its rules of engagement (ROE) and drafted 
its operational law to combine policy with tactics, methods and means and the laws of 
war.
Another crucial factor was the improvements made in the teaching of the laws of war. As 
Parks argues “it is likely that some see the [laws of war] training as ‘checking the
197 •box’”. The difficulty, as he describes it, is the common notion that American military 
personnel are automatically going to do the right thing in the field. “It is sometimes 
difficult for our soldiers to see the necessity for repeated law of war training, because 
they do not believe this to be an American problem.”128 Yet, My Lai and Son Thang 
showed that this was clearly not the case -  and demonstrated that if training was not 
revamped, revised and made mandatory, then mistakes would happen again. The new 
approach which sought to increase the amount of training, to rely on a simplicity of 
principles to keep rules straight forward and to take a positive approach which 
emphasized rights as well as responsibility helped to make this the case.
In short, by the 1990s, law seemed to be fully integrated into US military operations. As 
the decade progressed, the focus turned to those areas where circumstances and the law 
were not so clear cut. Increasingly the United States found itself involved in situations 
like Somalia and Haiti where the role between combatants, civilians and criminals was 
blurred. Engaging in such dangerous environments proved to be a legal nightmare. Thus, 
a lot of the efforts regarding the law of war within the US military in the 1990s looked at 
how the law applied to “operations other than war”. Increasingly, the law of war was 
applied to issues such as police training, and rules of engagement were drafted to fit with 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations (which typically emphasized self- 
defence and restraint). 129 In Panama, Somalia and Haiti, the decision was made to treat
127 Parks, “The United States military and the law o f war”, p. 7.
128 Parks, “The United States military and the law of war”, p. 7.
129 For a discussion on operations other than war, see Warren, “Operational Law”, especially pp. 41-48, and
pp. 51-57. Also, for a slightly partial look at the law in operations other than war, see the chapters on Haiti
and Somalia in Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat. In his efforts to praise the efforts o f judge advocates, 
Borch tends to paint a picture that must be a little rosier than what the case was in both operations. For 
example, in his Somalia chapter Borch barely mentions the Battle o f Mogadishu which took place on 3-4
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captured persons -  termed “detainees” -  according to the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention although persons captured may not have qualified or often fell between 
categories. Each detainee was visited by a “detainee judge advocate” within 72 hours of 
detention and, through an interpreter, explained the reasons for detainment and given an 
opportunity to communicate with his or her captors.130
Although such operations would often prove frustrating, if not deadly, to US troops, the 
US military continued to say that it would under all circumstances abide by the law of 
war. While serving as the Commanding General of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, 
Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni argued:
Operational law is going to become as significant to the commander as 
maneuver, as fire support, and as logistics. It will be a principal battlefield 
activity... Operational law and international law are the future.131
Conclusion
On May 4, 2000, US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues David J. Scheffer 
addressed the US Army First Corps at Fort Lewis Washington on US adherence to the 
laws of war:
The US military leads the world in the art of integrating legal advice into the 
process of planning and executing operations.... The Army leadership is 
committed to reinforcing legal principles in the real world of military 
practice because the laws of armed conflict do not simply exist as some 
ethereal smoke in the ozone. They are not some ethereal smoke in the ozone.
They are not some rigid code of unrealistic regulation imposed upon you by
October 1994, which saw 18 US military personnel killed as well as hundreds o f Somali dead and 
thousands wounded. The situation was certainly a mess -  politically if  not legally.
130 Warren, “Operational Law”, pp. 58-61.
131 Anthony Zinni, “The SJA in Future Operations” Marine Corps Gazzette. February 1996, pp. 15-17.
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a disinterested chain of command.... [Violations of the laws of war] are the 
acts of criminals and the law recognizes that brand of conduct as criminal 
even in the context of conflict.132
The sentiments expressed in this statement reflect the attitude of the United States by the
tliend of the 20 Century towards the laws of war, but as discussed in the last two chapters, 
in many ways it also rings true with the sentiments expressed at the beginning. The US, 
in its idealism and belief in the rule of law, had committed itself to improving the laws of 
war. Yet, where ideology and interest conflicted with the desire to fight wars humanely, 
the US, like the European countries, would find legal reasons why the law did not and 
could not apply. Such decisions were not realpoltik, but based on standards of western 
civilization and normative assumptions as to who qualified for rights under the laws of 
war and under what circumstances.
This had changed by 1945, but especially so with the drafting of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and creation of the UCMJ. Increasingly it was harder to justify not affording 
prisoners rights and punitive targeting policies. However, if this was the case, why does 
Vietnam remain powerfully linked to the idea of American war crimes?
As this chapter has tried to argue, there were several important factors involved -  first, 
the nature of the conflict which, conceptually, did not lend itself very well to the idea of 
international law or the laws of war. However, and second, problems in the US military 
regarding discipline and weak leadership created the space for violations of the laws of 
war to take place. Orders were not properly handed down, the rules of engagement were 
ignored, training was lacking, frustration and agitation were allowed to flourish and weak 
leadership only served to aggravate these problems.
While the military walked away from Vietnam in a mood to forget rather than implement 
any lessons learned, “activist lawyers” and the concept of “operational law” began the
132 Cited in Sean D. Murphy ed., United States Practice in International Law: Volume 1: 1999-2001. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 369.
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process of reform in terms of how the laws of war were implemented in the American 
armed forces. Talking to commanders and advocating the usefulness of the law as a tool 
rather than as a restraint gradually lead to a process where law took on a greater 
importance than ever before. By the time of the 1990-1 Gulf War, the law had seemed to 
become a major consideration in the carrying out of military operations. It is possible to 
regard some of these activist lawyers as the largely un-sung champions of the laws of war 
in terms of US military policy. While certainly the Department of Defense was going to 
have to change the way it implemented the law regardless, “activist lawyers” in the 1970s 
and 1980s played a major role in bringing about a ‘legal revolution’ by speaking with 
commanders and making the case for the laws of war.
The other lesson to be drawn from the Vietnam and post-Vietnam experience is that the 
implementation of the laws of war requires constant effort and diligence on behalf of not 
only lawyers, but commanders in operational centres and on the ground. Where war 
crimes occur, it is virtually almost always possible to point to a lack of vigilance, 
discipline or willingness to implement the law. My Lai and Son Thang demonstrated that 
regardless of the respect for the laws of war in one’s own country, in the fog of war a 
nation cannot assume that its soldiers will always do the right thing. Improved training in 
the laws of war and a belief in its effectiveness by commanders played a major role in the 
improvements of the military operations of the 1990-1 Gulf War over Vietnam.
By the end of the Gulf War, it seemed to many that the future lay with “operations other 
than war” -  peacekeeping, peace-enforcement operations as well as the delivery of aid. 
Throughout the operations of the 1990s (including the difficult missions in Somalia) the 
US maintained this position, policy and procedures regarding the laws of war that had 
been in place during the 1990-1 conflict. The post-Vietnam “operational law” regime 
looked to remain in place for some time. Yet, the attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing war on 
terror posed a massive challenge to the policies that had been put in place -  and many 
began to question whether they should have been put there to begin with. This will be the 
focus of the next section of the thesis.
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Chapter 4: Just cause and Just Means?
Linking the purpose and tactics of war after 9/11
Introduction
In terms of the laws of war, the US began the 1990s with what has been quite reasonably 
called the most legalistic war in history. Many acclaimed the first Gulf War as an 
indication of what could be accomplished with a proper military ethos, implementation of 
the laws of war, precision guided weaponry and a coalition of like-minded states -  a 
relatively humane war with relatively minimal loss of civilian life.
The reaction to 9/11 would seem to mark a reversal in this regard. Within five months of 
the start of the “war on terror” and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan , pictures 
of prisoners, blindfolded and chained, appeared prompting worldwide allegations of US 
torture, and serious violations of the laws of war. Why, within a 10 year period was the 
US openly refuting what many considered some of the key principles of the laws of war? 
Where many had once praised the United States for its efforts to institutionalize laws of 
war training in its military doctrine and its careful implementation when it came to 
targeting issues, now its actions received almost universal condemnation from friend and 
foe alike.
The answer to why this apparent about-face occurred is complex -  and the issues 
involved not as black and white as many international lawyers and commentators often 
argue. In looking for the answer, this chapter will briefly look at the issues facing the 
laws of war in the 1990s and the response of the United States, including its reaction to 
Kosovo’s “war by committee”. It will also look at the impact of what has been called the 
“New Sovereigntist Critique” of international law in America. In doing so, the chapter 
will examine the reasons why, as events unfolded, the United States ultimately 
downplayed the significance of the laws of war, specifically the Geneva Conventions, in 
the war on terror. Rooted in an increasing suspicion of the direction of international law, 
frustration with formally organized coalition warfare, and, crucially, a belief that the rules
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of the game had changed after 9/11, the United States argued that its right to self-defence 
trumped its international “obligations” and that the war on terror would be fought on its 
own terms.
America and International Law in the 1990s
It is the purpose of this section to demonstrate that the decisions made regarding the laws 
of war in the war on terror did not come from out of the blue. Rather, they partially 
reflect an increasing frustration with and suspicion of international law, including the 
laws of war, in the 1990s. In particular it will look at the creation of the International 
Criminal Court, and at the implications of NATO’s Kosovo campaign in the spring of 
1999.
The “new ” human rights agenda and the ICC
As is now well known, the end of the Cold War brought about in many countries a new 
faith in international institutions, not only for maintaining or even establishing peace, but 
also for the protection of human rights. This could be seen with the establishment by the 
UN General Assembly of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) in 1993. As Julie A. Mertus argues, “Decades of human rights standard-setting 
had at last given way to a new age of human rights implementation and enforcement.... 
When the Cold War ended, anything seemed possible.”1 Hundreds, if not thousands of 
NGOs claiming some interest in human rights emerged in the 1990s and many states, 
such as South Africa and Chile, began to confront human rights violations that occurred 
during their dark Cold War years.
1 Julie A. Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights: A guide for a new era. London: Routledge, 2005.
p. 8.
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At the same time, the end of the Cold War resulted in a surge of internal and intra­
national state conflicts now outside of superpower control and usually involving some 
kind of ethnic hatred. The failure of the international community, if not Western 
countries, to respond appropriately to these crises resulted in a bloody, protracted war in 
the Former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda. To address some of the wrongs 
committed during these conflicts, criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) were set up under international auspices to try those accused of war crimes and/or 
crimes against humanity. These efforts lent force to the movement already pushing for a 
permanent international criminal court. In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago persuaded the UN 
General Assembly to instruct the International Law Commission to prepare a draft statute 
which was to be submitted back to the UN General assembly by 1994. After the text of 
the Statute was finalized by a three year Preparation Committee, the ICC Statute was 
adopted by the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference, and came into force on 1 July 2002.2
While many heralded the agreement as the hallmark of a new era in the protection of 
human rights and prosecution of war criminals, the ICC was greeted with suspicion in the 
United States. Some of the specific reasons for this caution will be dealt with below. For 
now it is sufficient to say that US leaders and military officials were concerned about 
over-enthusiastic, independent prosecutors who would not be accountable to any national 
or international authority. They also had a concern that the Court would be used more as 
a political tool to wield against the US than as a harbinger of justice.
2 For more on the ICC, see Antonio Cassese, International Law. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005; Antonio Cassese, ed. The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. The American Journal o f International Law has 
published many articles on the Court. See The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 93, No. 1, Jan., 
1999; and The American Journal o f International Law. Vol. 99, No. 2, Apr., 2005 for a survey o f recent 
developments. Documentation on the ICC can be found at http://www.un.org/law/icc/: A valuable resource 
can also be found at the website for the Coalition for the International Criminal Court: 
http://www.iccnow.org/ - although it should be noted that the site’s original and continued stated purpose is 
to promote universal ratification. Literature that is more critical o f the Court is discussed below.
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Additionally, it was becoming clear that there were many who did not agree with the 
direction that human rights were taking in the 1990s -  in so far it related to warfare. 
Human rights advocates argued that international human rights law should be applied in 
conflict situations. Although the laws of war and international human rights law have 
developed separately, there are many who would argue that they are increasingly 
intertwined. As Cassese argues:
...the human rights doctrine has operated as a potent leaven, contributing to 
shift the world community from a reciprocity-based bundle of legal relations, 
geared to the ‘private’ pursuit of self-interest, and ultimately blind to 
collective needs, to a community hinging on a core of fundamental values, 
strengthened by the emergence of community obligations and community 
rights and the gradual shaping of the public interest.3
Therefore, “humanitarian law has become less geared to military necessity and 
increasingly impregnated with human rights values.”4
3 Cassese, International Law, p. 396.
4 Cassese, International Law, p. 404. Cassese notes that this point o f view can be supported by the Tadic 
(Decision on Interlocutory Appeal) decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia which noted “the impetuous development and propagation in the international community of 
human rights doctrines... had brought about significant changes in international law ...” Cited in Cassese, 
404, note 2. The International Court o f Justice made a similar decision in the Nuclear Weapons case, 
arguing that the protection o f human rights does not cease in times o f war, except for some provisions may 
be derogated from in a time o f national emergency as defined under Article 4 o f the International Covenant 
of Civil and Political Rights). Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law. Volume 1: Rules, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 301.
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There was and (continues to be) a great deal of apprehension about this situation.5 As the 
laws of war and human rights law are brought together, there is a concern that this 
convergence extends and overcomplicates the law further than what states are willing to 
tolerate. In disseminating information about the laws of war to ordinary soldiers, any 
blurring of the laws by adding human rights considerations may only serve to complicate 
matters. Militaries seek to ensure that the law is kept as simple as it possibly can be, so 
that, to the highest degree possible, it is obvious to soldiers which law is applicable and 
when. A blending of the two legal regimes only serves to complicate matters, and to 
insist upon it on the battlefield will only serve to make decision making more 
complicated for military commanders.
However, by the end of the 1990s, some states, and many NGOs, were increasingly 
willing to subject military actions, especially those by Western armies, to international 
human rights tribunals such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and the ICTY. This was certainly the case during the Kosovo 
conflict -  to which we will now turn our attention.
5 For a critique o f merging the laws o f war with human rights law, see Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct o f 
Hostilities under the Law o f International Armed Conflict Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; 
Additionally, Rene Provost illustrates the problems o f merging the two areas o f law in Rene Provost, 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in International and 
Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002. For a look at the issue in the wake o f allegations 
after the exposure o f the Hadithah incident, see Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Men@War: Hadithah in 
context”, National Review Online. 30 May 2006.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MGFiZGFhZGJiYWM0NTJlM2IzMiAxM2I4NDEwYWM5NWI: 
There has also been much discussion about this issue in the UK where the line between human rights and 
the laws o f war has been even further blurred. See Michael Smith. “Iraq battle stress worse than WWII”
The Sunday Times. November 6, 2005; and Thomas Harding, “Britain's Armed Forces 'under legal siege'” 
Daily Telegraph. 15 July 2005.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.ihtml:isessionid=UCOBOHAGBOMNPQFIQMFCM5WAVCBOYJ 
VC?xml=/news/2005/07/l 5/nforcesl 5.xml.
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The impact o f Kosovo I -  Targeting6
With the goal of stopping Milosevic’s forces from massacring Albanian civilians in 
Kosovo, NATO began an 11 week bombing campaign against (what was then) the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which lasted from 24 March to 11 June, 1999. As the 
alliance did not have any formal approval from the UN Security Council (due to the 
inevitability of a veto from Russia, if not from China), the issue was politically divisive 
and, according to many international lawyers, legally dubious. Although the campaign 
took 77 days, it is generally accepted that NATO’s intervention did indeed stop Milosevic 
-  leading to a period of relative stability in Kosovo.7
Still, despite this outcome, the NATO campaign left a bitter taste in the mouths of many 
within the Atlantic Alliance, including the United States. Two issues in particular, the 
impact of coalition warfare, and the laws of war and the ICTY’s actions during and after 
the campaign are noteworthy here. First, the impact of coalition warfare, what was later 
referred to as “war by committee” by General Wesley Clark and other American military 
officials, certainly seems to have tested American patience.8 NATO, an alliance that 
relies on consensus when it makes decisions, needed to be unanimous in its agreement 
when selecting targets. Therefore, each target was subject to up to 19 different
6 The discussion o f legal issues here is brief. Much has been written on the legal aspects o f the Kosovo 
campaign. Some useful sources include: Adam Roberts, “Nato’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo” 
Survival. Vol. 41. No. 3, 1999, pp. 102-23; Andru E. Wall, Legal and Ethical Lessons o f NATO’s Kosovo 
Campaign. International Law Studies Volume 78, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002; Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, “Chapter 8: The Kosovo Bombing Campaign” in Christian Reus-Smit ed. The Politics of 
International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Also see the series o f articles published 
in the American Journal o f International Law. Vol. 93, No. 4, Oct., 1999; the special section in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol. 49, no. 4, 2000, including Vaughan Lowe, “Legal 
Issues Arising in the Kosovo Crisis”; International Review o f the Red Cross. “Special issue: The Kosovo 
crisis and international humanitarian law”, International Review o f the Red Cross. No. 837, March 2000.
7 On the Kosovo War in general see Ken Booth, The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimension. 
London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000; Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia. Kosovo and the 
Future o f Conflict. Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Uglv: 
NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000; Michael Ignatieff, Virtual 
War: Kosovo and Beyond. Toronto: Viking, 2000; Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge New Haven: 
Yale Nota Bene, 2000; Michael Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure” Foreign Affairs Vo. 98, No. 5,1999.
8 See, for example “NATO grapples with ‘war by committee’, CNN, 19 April 1999, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9904/19/war.by.committee/ and “Nato leadership splits revealed”, BBC News, 9 
March 2000, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/671420.stm.
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interpretations of the laws of war. This in particular became an issue over “dual-use” 
targets, objects which may have both civilian and military uses, in the later and 
intensified part of the campaign.9 The Americans, who have traditionally taken a much 
wider view of what constitutes a legitimate target, frequently disputed with nations, such 
as France, who adhered to a much stricter interpretation of the applicable targeting law.10 
According to Lieutenant General Michael Short, the NATO Air Commander during the 
campaign, planes were often sent up in the air on a mission, only to have that mission 
recalled at the last moment when one nation indicated that it could not support the 
targeting of a particular object.11 As one of the commanders in the campaign, he argued:
Unfortunately, because NATO was an alliance of 19 nations, you get the 
lowest common denominator. All those folks have to agree on something... 
Targeting was not mine to decide. Targeting decisions were made in the 
White House, at Number Ten Downing Street, and in Paris, Rome and 
Berlin... We did our best to target those things that we thought would have 
the effect of bringing Milosevic to the table. Instead, because those targets 
were not picked by professional soldiers and professional sailors and 
professional airmen, we bombed targets that were quite frankly 
inappropriate for bringing Milosevic to the table. I would say to you that in 
terms of targeting this was a victory by happenstance more than victory by 
design.12
It was argued that an overly strict interpretation of the applicable law dragged out the 
campaign by hindering its effectiveness. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon argued 
that it was not until the NATO Commanders were able to persuade the political
9 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 118.
10 For a discussion o f this, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Kosovo bombing campaign” in Christian Reus- 
Smit ed. The Politics o f International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 189-216. 
Wheeler points out that “What makes this dispute so fascinating is that there was agreement on the legal 
rules that should be applied, but disagreement over the correct application o f the rules.” p. 191.
11 Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF (Retired), “Operation Allied Force from the Perspective of the 
NATO Air Commander” pp. 19-26 in Andru E. Wall, Legal and Ethical Lessons o f NATO’s Kosovo 
Campaign. International Law Studies Volume 78, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002. p. 25.
12 Short, “Operation Allied Force”, p. 20.
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leadership to authorize a much wider range of targets in Belgrade and elsewhere in late 
May that the campaign became truly effective. By early June, Serbia was reeling as its 
electrical grids were severely damaged and water distribution was adversely affected in 
all major cities.13
Many NATO officials, and certain members of the Clinton administration, have argued 
that the United States would have conducted a much more vigorous bombing campaign 
from the outset of the war if only the other NATO members had allowed it to do so. 
However, as Daalder and O’Hanlon argue, while France did exercise some restraining 
power on NATO planners, particularly after the first couple of weeks of the war, the net 
effect was generally to push back the bombing of some specific targets by, at most, a few 
days. Additionally, France was not the only country to scrutinize the target sets in detail -  
it is apparent that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to request permission on a daily basis from 
the White House to strike certain targets.14
Still, it is clear that the impression that the Americans were left with after Allied Force 
was that their allies’ overly strict interpretation of the laws of war prevented them from 
conducting an effective campaign in the first stages of the war. Again, as Short has 
argued:
[The United States] wants to fight as part of the coalition. We want to be 
with our allies... However, as a professional soldier, I would tell you I 
prefer to be a member of a coalition of the willing as we had in the Gulf War.
In 1991 if you chose to throw in your forces with us... you were welcome, 
but you came under our terms. We explained to you how we were going to 
make war and that if you did not like that explanation, or if you could not 
sign up for those terms, then you did not need to be part of our coalition.
13 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Uelv: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington: 
Brookings Institute Press, 2000. p. 4. This raises issues relating to discrimination which will be discussed 
below.
14 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 105-6. See also James E. Baker “Judging Kosovo: The Legal 
Process, the Law o f Armed Conflict and the Commander in Chief’, pp. 7-26 in Wall, Legal and Ethical 
Lessons of NATO’s Kosovo Campaign. Baker servers as the Special Assistant to the President and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council during Operation Allied Force.
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However, in 1999 it was NATO, not a coalition of the willing. All nations 
had to agree, and so we ended up with the lowest common denominator.
This is how it was that a nation that was providing less than 10% of the total 
effort could say to the most powerful nation on the face of the earth “you 
cannot bomb that target.”
The United States of America lost its leverage on the first night. On the first 
night of the war we lost any leverage we had, and we ended up being 
leveraged.15
General Wesley Clark, who recounts the war in his memoir, Waging Modem War, seems 
to agree conditionally:
As for NATO, political approval from each member nation has been 
necessary before any military plans can be developed, and the general 
political resistance in the West to signal readiness to use force means that 
the Alliance’s military planning will almost inevitably be too slow.16
He adds:
In the American channel there were constant temptations to ignore Allied 
reservations and attack the targets we wanted to strike. It was always the 
Americans who pushed for the escalation to new, more sensitive targets... 
and always some of the Allies who expressed doubts and reservations. For a 
US administration anxious to finish the operation and avoid the problems of 
a ground intervention, these Allied reservations were, no doubt, 
exasperating.
15 Short, “Operation Allied Force”, p. 24.
16 Clark, Waging Modem War, p. 426. However, Clark goes on to add “We paid a price in operational 
effectiveness by having to constrain the nature o f the operation to fit within the political and legal concerns 
of NATO member nations, but the price brought significant strategic benefits that future political and 
military leaders must recognize.” p. 430. Clark was also a fairly strong advocate for a NATO role in 
Afghanistan, claiming that US political and military leaders had learned the wrong lesson from the Kosovo 
campaign and his book. See Gen. Wesley Clark “An Army o f One?” Washington Monthly. September 
2002. Available online: http://www.washingtonmonthlv.com/features/2001/02Q9.clark.html.
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But though there was discussion in U.S. channels about striking unilaterally, 
we never did. We always maintained that no single target or set of targets 
was more important than NATO cohesion. This was the most crucial 
decision of the campaign, and one of its most important lessons, for it 
preserved Allied unity and gave to each member of NATO an unavoidable 
responsibility for the outcome. This made it a true Allied operation -  a 
pattern for the future.17
Clark may have felt this way, but the comments of Short above make it clear that not 
everyone was eager to make this a model for future warfare.
The impact o f Kosovo I I -  The ICTY’s Report to the Prosecutor
But if the US government felt uncomfortable with the outcome and the implications of 
Kosovo, in their eyes the ICTY was about to add insult to injury. On 14 May, 1999, while 
hostilities were still ongoing over Kosovo, the ICTY Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, 
established a committee to investigate possible war crimes committed by NATO in its 
conduct of Operation Allied Force. The news was not taken well within NATO or the 
United States. As Adam Roberts remarks,
In 1999 the United States, having been campaigning diplomatically against 
the projected International Criminal Court for the previous six months on 
the grounds that the actions of US forces should not be the subject to a 
foreign prosecutor and tribunal, chose to wage war in the one part of the 
world where ongoing war was subject to such a tribunal.18
Although the ICTY eventually recommended that “neither an in-depth investigation 
related to the bombing campaign as a whole nor investigations related to specific
17 Clark, Waging Modem War, p. 434.
18 Adam Roberts, “The Law o f War After Kosovo”, in Wall, Legal and Ethical Lessons o f NATO’s Kosovo 
Campaign, pp. 401-432. p. 420.
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incidents are justified” (due either to insufficient evidence or to the fact that the law in a 
particular area remained too unclear)19 -  there was a sense of outrage by many in the 
United States. As the Americans saw it, it was they who put their money and soldiers on 
the line during a conflict to stop genocide. Any attempt to prosecute NATO officials was 
politically and unjustly motivated. Judith A. Miller, who served as General Counsel for 
the US Department of Defense during Operation Allied Force, argued that while she was 
gratified that the Report to the Prosecutor warranted that there should be no further 
investigation, the manner in which the committee reached its conclusions was “deeply 
disturbing”:
To have twenty-twenty hindsight scrutiny, done at leisure, of decisions and 
determinations made in the fog of war... based on allegations by those who 
do not hold Western nations in very high regard, is a chilling and frightening 
prospect. I fear that the reservations of the United States with respect to the 
International Criminal Court are well-founded, based on the aftermath of the 
Kosovo Conflict.20
David B. Rivkin and Lee A. Casey gave a similar note of caution:
Significantly, while no prosecutions against NATO officials are currently 
planned, even the relatively tame Yugoslav tribunal did not give the alliance 
a clean bill of health. Future outcomes in the permanent ICC, a court that 
will be less dependent upon U.S. and NATO largesse than is the Yugoslav 
tribunal, may be very different21
19 Text o f the Final Report to the Prosecutor bv the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is available at 
http://wvAv.un.org/ictv/pressreal/nato061300.htm.
20 Judith A. Miller, “Commentary”, in Wall, Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO’s Kosovo Campaign, pp. 
107-112. p. 111-2.
21 David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “The Rocky Shoals of International Law” National Interest. 
Winter 2000/2001.
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The significance of the ICTY’s actions was also not lost on the American Congress. 
Controversial, yet influential American Senator, Jesse Helms, while he was Chair of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, argued:
Most recently, we learned that the chief prosecutor of the Yugoslav war 
crimes tribunal... conducted an eleven month investigation of alleged 
NATO war crimes during the Kosovo campaign... the very fact that she 
entertained the idea brings to light all that is wrong with the UN’s 
conception of global justice, which proposes a system in which independent 
prosecutors and judges, answering to no state or institution, wield unfettered 
power to sit in judgement of the foreign policy decisions of Western 
democracies.22
The ICTY’s actions reinforced the suspicions emerging within the US towards the ICC 
but also the idea of international normative standards and international law. It was, after 
all, at this time that John Bolton argued that “while treaties may be politically or even 
morally binding, they are not legally obligatory. They are just not ‘law’ as we apprehend 
the term.”23
American Exceptionalism and the “New Sovereigntists”
That the United States often sees itself as a “shining city upon a hill” is nothing new in its 
history. From the founding of the republic, Americans have often viewed their country as 
a good and great nation, divinely inspired to lead the world by example at home or 
activism abroad to promote individual freedom.24 As such, the US has often viewed itself,
22 Jesse Helms, “American Sovereignty and the UN”, National Interest Winter 2000/2001.
23 John Bolton, “The Global Prosecutors: Hunting War Criminals in the Name o f Utopia”, Foreign Affairs. 
Vol. 78 No 1, 1999. pp 157-164. pp. 158-159. For his critique o f the ICC, see John R. Bolton, “Courting 
Danger: What’s Wrong with the International Criminal Court”, The National Interest. Winter 1998/1999.
24 David P. Forsythe, “The United States and International Criminal Justice”, Human Rights Quarterly. 24 
(2002) pp. 974-991. p. 975.
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its Constitution and Bill of Rights as exceptional among nations. So, to the American 
Exceptionalists, US law was not to be trumped by any international law to the contrary.25
While American Exceptionalism was very prominent during the Reagan administration, 
its impact on thinking about international law began to be strongly felt in the 1990s. 
Many of those who were to become key figures in the administration of George W. Bush 
began to question the legitimacy, sources and even existence of international law. They 
were united in their critique of an “unaccountable” and “vague” international human 
rights agenda or any attempt, as they saw it, to limit the US Constitution.
In an article in Foreign Affairs. Peter J. Spiro referred to the application of American 
Exceptionalist thinking to international agreements as a “New Sovereigntist” vision of 
international law and proceeded to critique i t26 In making his argument, Spiro outlines 
three New Sovereigntist lines of attack. The first is that the content of the emerging 
international legal order is vague and illegitimately intrusive on domestic affairs. The 
second condemns the international law making process as unaccountable and its results as 
unenforceable. Finally, New Sovereigntists argue that the US can opt out of any 
international legal regime as a matter of power, legal right and constitutional duty.27
Given the name “New Sovereigntists”, it should come as no surprise that the key to these 
arguments is the idea of sovereignty which, according to this line of reasoning, protects 
the American Constitution that embodies the rights and way of life that Americans have 
chosen for themselves. Striking out against those who argue that sovereignty is 
constructed or “organized hypocrisy” (the idea that sovereignty does not really exist but 
happens to remain an organizing feature of the international system 28 ), New
25 Forsythe, “The United States and International Criminal Justice”, p. 975. For some o f the exceptionalist 
critics o f international law, the only law that could or should matter is treaty law which is acknowledged as 
part of US law in the Constitution. For others, any form o f international law is necessarily vague, fuzzy and, 
because it lacks any form o f enforcement, is not real law.
26 Peter J. Spiro, “The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets”, Foreign 
Affairs. Vol. 79 No 6, November/December 2000 pp 9-15.
27 Spiro, “The New Sovereigntists”
28 In particular, New Sovereigntists argue with post-modern thinkers on sovereignty and realists such as 
Stephen Krasner (and his book Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999).
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Sovereigntists lay out a moral defence of sovereignty as a doctrine underlying the social 
contract which determines how a particular people will let themselves be governed.29 As 
Jeremy Rabkin argues “Sovereignty is at the heart of all [social] compromises, because it 
supplies the idea of a political authority which can accommodate differences...and yet 
still demand (and sustain) ultimate political allegiance.”30 In other words, rights are best 
protected from within a sovereign community rather than by fuzzy international standards 
which international bureaucrats may wish to impose from above. Thus, any surrendering 
of sovereignty to international regimes or international courts is a threat to the American 
people. Naturally this poses problems for the application of international law.
New Sovereigntists are reluctant to admit that international law even is “law”. In their 
book, The Limits of International Law. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner conclude:
International law is a real phenomenon, but international law scholars 
exaggerate its power and significance... [T]he best explanation for when and 
why states comply with law is not that states have internalized law, or have a 
habit of complying with it, or are drawn by its moral pull, but simply that states 
act out of self-interest....
More often, international legal rhetoric is used to mask or rationalize behaviour 
driven by self-interested factors that have nothing to do with international law.31
In a controversial article, Robert Bork argued in 1989 “There can be no authentic rule of 
law among nations until nations have a common political morality or are under a 
common sovereignty.”32 In 2000, John Bolton, who had worked in the Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush administrations, argued, “there is no reason to consider treaties as 
‘legally’ binding internationally, and certainly not as law in themselves... There is no 
legal mechanism -  no coherent structure -  that exists today on a global level to enforce
29 Jeremy Rabkin, Law Without Nations: Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. p. 68
30 Rabkin, Law Without Nations, p. 255.
31 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits o f International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005. Also see the collection o f essays, “The New York University-University o f Virginia Conference on 
Exploring the Limits o f International Law” Virginia Journal o f International Law. Vol. 44 No. 1 Fall 2003.
32 Robert Bork, “The Limits o f International Law”, The National Interest. Winter 1989/1990. pp. 1-10.
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compliance with treaties, a fact that international law advocates flatly ignore.” 33 
Combined with the fact that there are no agreed upon sources for international law, it 
follows that treaties are mere “promises” and international law is reduced to a political 
obligation for states to follow if it is in accordance with their national interest.
Thus, as the 1990s came to a close, there was a serious, significant and relatively 
powerful critique of international law that was attracting notice by sympathizers and 
detractors alike. Significantly, as already pointed out, many of these individuals would 
later assume influential positions within the George W. Bush administration, where their 
arguments have been applied to the standing issues of the day.
Reconsidering the relationship between ends and means in the laws of war
There is one more argument along these lines that merits attention. At a conference in 
early August 2001 titled “Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO’s Kosovo Campaign” (the 
proceedings of which were later published into a book of the same name)34 Professor 
Ruth Wedgwood, who has since been appointed by US Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, to the Defence Policy Board, argued for a change of thinking about the laws of 
war after Kosovo:
It is commonly believed that the tactics of war must be judged independently 
of the purpose of a war... But this asserted independence of the two regimes 
may be no more than a fiction...Whether one’s framework is utilitarian or 
pure principle, it is possible to admit that the merits of a war make a 
difference in our tolerance for methods of war fighting. This teleological view 
can be incorporated, albeit awkwardly, in the metric for “military advantage” 
in judging proportionality, for surely we do not value military objectives for
33 John Bolton, “Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?”, Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems. Vol. 10 No 1,2000. pp 1-48. pp.4-5.
34 Andru Wall, Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO’s Kosovo Campaign. Newport RI: Naval War College, 
2002.
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their own sake. But it may be better to be forthright, even at the cost of 
questioning homilies... Democratic leaders and publics may believe that there 
is an important link between the legitimate purpose of a war and its allowable 
tactics -  at least within the limits of basic humanity and the protection of 
civilian lives.35
In short, although she acknowledges that the “divorce of purpose and tactics is designed 
to allow agreement on humanitarian limits even when there is no consensus on the merits 
of the underlying dispute,”36 Wedgwood is basically making the argument that noble 
ends justify almost any means.37 This line of thinking is certainly a challenge to the laws 
of war as they have been written for at least the past 100 years. Concerned that such 
thinking may result in a blood bath of self-righteousness, proponents of the laws of war 
have argued that guilt, motives and moral standing should not influence the application of 
the relevant laws of war as such views are inherently political. Yet using World War II as 
an example, Wedgwood argues, “Defeating Nazism, for example, required measures that 
are now seen as harsh and even punitive. Even where their legality is conceded under the 
earlier standards of air war, it is commonly taught in American military curricula that 
their repetition would now be illegal.”38 However, because the Allies had been fighting 
“radical evil represented by Nazism -  an ideology posing the ultimate threat to human 
welfare”, we can still see these actions as justified, if not legal.39 Therefore, according to
35 Ruth Wedgwood, “Propositions on the Law o f War after the Kosovo Campaign” pp. 433-441 in Wall, 
Legal and Ethical Lessons o f NATO’s Kosovo Campaign, pp. 434-5.
36 Wedgwood, “Propositions on the Law o f War” p. 434.
37 Where Wedgwood would draw the line is not exactly clear as she does not specify a limit in her 
argument, other than to mention “the limits o f basic humanity” mentioned in the cited quotation. 
Wedgwood, “Propositions on the Law o f War”, p. 434.
38 Wedgwood, “Propositions on the Law o f War”pp.434-5.
39 For discussions about the ethics o f fighting the “supreme emergency” faced by Great Britain in 1940, see 
one o f the most famous arguments by Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with 
Historical Illustrations. Third Edition, New York: Basic Books, 2000. See especially the chapter on 
“Supreme Emergency” pp. 251-268. It is interesting to consider the implications for the discussion here. 
Walzer is clear that he is writing about a threat that poses an imminent danger and a nature that can be seen 
as “as evil objectified in the world” and how this may defend the adoption o f extreme measures. He is clear 
that “the danger must be o f an unusual and horrifying kind”, which although a common enough description 
in wartime, refers to a situation whereby a country is fighting for national survival. Although it would be 
wrong to downplay the significance o f the 9/11 attacks, asserting that the United States is (or was) in a war 
o f national survival o f the kind that Walzer is describing is problematic. In this way, the argument here has 
chosen not to look at Walzer’s ‘supreme emergency’ doctrine. However, for an interesting discussion o f
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Wedgwood, a quiet linkage between jus ad bellum and the jus in bello often exists 
politically, if not explicitly legally.
The outcome of these arguments was a substantial and influential critique of international 
law within the United States by the late 1990s. This can be seen through a number of 
developments; critiques questioning the validity of international human rights ‘norms’ 
and international institutions that seek to hold states (and individuals) accountable for 
their actions beyond domestic authority; anger over the difficulties encountered in the 
Kosovo campaign as related to the pro-international criminal justice movement and allied 
warfare; and the emergence of a challenge to the traditional dichotomy between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. These arguments had all contributed to the creation of a strong 
skepticism among many academics and policy makers towards international law, 
including the laws of war. As Wade Mansell argues “there is a great deal of evidence 
which suggests that a reconsideration of international law and the use of force has been 
under way in the United States at least since the end of the Cold War.”40
Yet it is important to point out that this was not necessarily a universal attitude within the 
government of the United States.41 It is clear, that despite the difficulties encountered in
Walzer’s arguments in light o f the war on terror, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Dying for Enduring Freedom: 
Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in the War against Terrorism” International Relations. Vol. 
16, No. 2, 2002. pp. 205-225.
40 Wade Mansell, “Goodbye to All That? The Rule o f Law, International Law, the United States and the 
Use of Force”, Journal o f Law and Society. Vol. 31 No 4, December 2004. pp. 433-56. p. 437.
41 This is a point that should certainly not be overlooked. A chorus of opposition has come from both sides 
of the political fence with democrats such as Dianne Feinstein and Patrick Leahy and Republicans such as 
Senator John McCain, Senator John Warner and Senator Chuck Hagel would all raise concerns over US 
detainee policy. See the Floor Statement o f Senator Patrick Leahy "Guantanamo Bay Has Become A Blot 
And A Black Hole" 13 June 2005. Available online: http://leahv.senate.gov/press/200506/0613Q5.html and 
“McCain Statement on Detainee Amendments” 5 October 2005. Available online: 
http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=NewsCenter. ViewPressRelease&Content id= l611 for a 
summary o f the arguments against Guantanamo on both political sides. Former Clinton official have also 
spoken out against the treatment o f detainees. For example, David J. Scheffer, who was the former U.S. 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues in the Clinton administration has spoken out against the Bush 
administration’s arguments. See his letter in Foreign Affairs. “Court Order” November/December 2001, 
and comments made in Neil A. Lewis, “Broad Use of Harsh Tactics is Described at Cuba Base”, New York 
Times. 17 October 2004. Available online at:
http://www.nvtimes.eom/2004/10/17/politics/l 7gitmo.html?ex=1255665600&en=r67208a988fb44907&ei= 
5090&partner=kmarx and his criticism of the Bush administration’s policies regarding the military 
commissions at Guantanamo: David Scheffer, “Why Hamdan is Right about Conspiracy Liability” Jurist: 
Legal News and Research. 30 March 2006. Available online:
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the military operations of the 1990s, many still considered the laws of war as alive and 
well, and very relevant to modem warfare. As James E. Baker, who served as the Special 
Assistant to the President and Legal Advisor to the National Security Council during the 
Kosovo campaign argued:
...the law of armed conflict is hard law. It is US criminal law. Increasingly, 
it will also serve as an international measure by which the United States is 
judged. The law of armed conflict addresses the noblest objective of the law 
-  the protection of innocent life. And the United States should be second to 
none in compliance, as was the case with Kosovo.42
Yet, political fallout from 9/11 clearly lent support to the arguments of the New 
Sovereigntists, (many of whom had now found themselves in a role as advisors to the 
George W. Bush administration) when international law and the need for security seemed 
to collide.
“Unlawful Combatants” and “Quaint” Conventions43
http://iurist.law.pitt.edu/forumv/2006/03/whv-hamdan-is-right-about-conspiracv.php. Additionally, former 
Secretary o f State Madeline Albright has questioned the policies regarding Guantanamo Bay. See William 
Douglas, “President Bush meets ex-secretaries o f state, defense to discuss Iraq” Knight Ridder/Tribune 
Information Services, 12 May 2006 and Suzanne Goldenberg, “Guantamo's day o f reckoning in supreme 
court”, The Guardian. 29 March 2006. Available online:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/storv/Q..l 741825.00.html. Human Rights First has compiled a list 
o f quotes from leaders speaking out against Guantanamo available online:
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us law/etn/misc/call commish.asp. American lead NGOs, especially 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch who have both set up special monitoring sections on their 
website and have repeatedly condemned Bush administration policies. See Amnesty’s site at: 
http://web.amnestv.org/pages/guantanamobav-index-eng and Human Rights Watch’s site at: 
http://hrw.org/doc/?t=usa gitmo.
42 James E. Baker, “Judging Kosovo”, p. 18.
43 As o f July 2006 there are currently 450 detainees from roughly 40 countries speaking about 17 different 
languages at Camp Delta. (However, it should be remembered that the US is also holding prisoners in 
Afghanistan -  approximately 560 in Bagram).43 Additionally, the US and some o f her allies are holding an 
unknown number o f individuals in undisclosed locations throughout the world. Human Rights Watch has 
produced a list o f 11 such detainees. See the ICRC “Operational Update”, May 2006.. Human Rights 
Watch provided a list o f 11 detainees in an October 2004 briefing paper, “The United States’ ‘Disappeared’: 
The CIA’s Long-Term ‘Ghost Detainees’” http://www.hrw.Org/backgrounder/usa/usl004/7.htm. 
Additionally there have been charges that the United States has been holding detainees in secret prisons in
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The purpose of this section is not to provide a detailed history or description of 
Guantanamo Bay. Rather, it is to provide a brief overview of the events post-9/11 in 
terms of legal developments and in changes to national security policy to enable a 
discussion of the issues and arguments made for and against US policies affecting 
detainees in the war on terror. The Geneva Conventions, typically not a mainstream 
media issue, were thrust into the spotlight 11 January 2002 when US Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the detainees in Afghanistan “will be handled 
not as prisoners of wars, because they're not, but as unlawful combatants. The -  as I 
understand it, technically unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the Geneva 
Convention.”44 But what was the background to this decision and how was it defended?
Defending the Detainee Policy
This chapter has tried to suggest that by 9/11 there existed a significant moral, political 
and legal critique of international law. As many of those who subscribed to these views 
(such as Bolton, Wedgwood and Yoo) held posts in the Bush administration, it should
Eastern Europe. See “Human Rights Watch Statement on U.S. Secret Detention Facilities in Europe” 1 
December 2005 http://hrw.Org/english/docs/2005/l 1/07/usintl 1995.htm; and “Questions and Answers:
U.S. Detainees Disappeared into Secret Prisons: Illegal under Domestic and International Law” 9 
December 2005 http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/usl205/index.htm. For news stories on the alleged prisons, 
see Dana Priest “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate Is Growing Within Agency About 
Legality and Morality o f Overseas System Set Up After 9/11” Washington Post. 2 November 2005, Page 
A l. Available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dvn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html: Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, “Sources Tell 
ABC News Top Al Qaeda Figures Held in Secret CIA Prisons: 10 Out o f 11 High-Value Terror Leaders 
Subjected to ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’”, ABC News, 5 December 2005. Available online at: 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1375123: Jon Boyle, “Europe ‘actively participated’ 
with CIA prisons” Reuters UK, 7 June 2006, Available online at: 
http://todav.reuters.co.uk/news/news Article.aspx?tvpe=:topNews&storvID=2006-06- 
07T100214Z 01 L07492816 RTRUKOC 0 UK-SECURITY-CIA-PRISONS.xml. All governments 
involved have denied the charges. However, the true amount of detainees remains unknown.
44 “DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers”, 11 January 2002. Available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01112002 tOl 1 lsd.html. It should be noted that the term 
‘unlawful combatant’, although not in the Geneva and Hague Conventions have been used for at least a 
century. Some critics suggest that that any use o f the term is purposefully and deliberately vague so as to 
escape international legal obligations. Cassese argues that this category can only be accepted for descriptive 
purposes: “it cannot be admitted as an intermediate category between combatants and civilians. In 
particular, it would be contrary to the law o f war to hold that this category embraces persons who may be 
considered neither as legitimate belligerents nor as civilians... and are therefore deprived o f any rights.” 
Cassese, International Law, p. 409.
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come as little surprise that the administration’s arguments regarding its detainee policies 
reflected in large part the views of the New Sovereigntists.45 These policies were 
defended on the basis of a complex mix of moral, political and legal opinions and an 
examination of the legal logic will be presented in this next section of the chapter. In 
order to fully flesh out the complexity of the arguments, a look at some of the 
background moral and political concerns will also be noted which will provide a better 
understanding of the legal reasoning employed by administration officials.
Almost immediately after the attacks of 11 September the Bush administration argued 
that they were fighting a new kind of enemy. In an interview with reporters on 17 
September, Bush remarked:
I know that this is a different type of enemy than we're used to. It's an 
enemy that likes to hide and burrow in, and their network is 
extensive. There are no rules. It's barbaric behavior...
But we're going to smoke them out. And we're adjusting our thinking to 
the new type of enemy. These are terrorists who have no borders...
It's going to require a new thought process. And I'm proud to report our 
military, led by the Secretary of Defense, understands that; understands it's 
a new type of war, it's going to take a long time to win this war.46
In this way the Bush administration maintained that the war on terror is a conflict unlike 
any other in history in terms of its scope, the participants involved and in the very nature 
of the fighting which is being undertaken world wide. As such, it was argued that the 
President requires powers which enable the executive to protect the United States from 
attack and use force against those who threaten the safety of the nation and its citizens.
45 Bolton was the Undersecretary o f State for Arms Control and International Security and was became the 
US Ambassador to the United Nations in August 2005. Wedgwood was appointed by Rumsfeld to the 
Defense Policy Board. She is also the US member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and a 
member o f the US Secretary o f State’s Advisory Committee for International Law. Yoo worked for the 
Justice Department's Office o f Legal Counsel from 2001-3 and has subsequently returned to academia.
46 “Guards and Reserves ‘Define Spirit o f America’: Remarks by the President to Employees at the 
Pentagon.” 17 September, 2001. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001Q917-3.html.
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These powers are in fact authorized by “the text, plan and history of the Constitution, its 
interpretation by both past Administration and the courts, the longstanding practice of the 
executive branch, and the express affirmation of the President’s constitutional authorities 
by Congress”. 47 Additionally, this authority was recognized by Congress in the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force of 18 September 2001 which indicated that “the 
President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of 
international terrorism against the United States” and authorized the President:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.48
It was under this authorization, the President determined that the Taliban and al-Qaida 
constituted the organizations who carried out the attacks of 11 September.
Military Commissions
Consistent with the powers authorized by the Constitution and Congress, the President 
issued an executive order which set up military commissions to try enemy combatants 
captured either within or outside the territory of the United States on 13 November 2001. 
The use of military commissions, it was argued, is “firmly based in international law, [the 
US] Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice..., our nation’s history, and 
international practice.”49 This includes the use of commissions to try eight Nazi saboteurs
47 Memo from the US Department o f Justice Office o f the Legal Counsel written by John Yoo, the then 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, “Memorandum Opinion for Timothy Flanigan, the Deputy Counsel to 
the President” on “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against 
Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them” 25 September 2001.
48 jQyth Qjngres^ Authorization for the Use of Military Force, 18 September 2001. Public Law 107-40 [S.
J. RES. 23].
49 Statement o f Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel Department o f  Defense; Major 
General Thomas J. Romig, Judge Advocate General o f the Army; Major General Jack L. Rives, Acting 
Judge Advocate General o f the Air Force; Rear Admiral James E. McPherson, Judge Advocate General of 
the Navy; Brigadier General Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant o f the United
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during World War II (the 1942 ex parte Quirin) and some 500 war criminals at the 
cessation of that conflict.50 Additionally, such commissions and other military tribunals 
are expressly recognized by Congress through Article 21 of the UCMJ as legitimate 
means to try violation of the laws of war. Article 36 of the UCMJ authorizes the 
President’s authority to prescribe pretrial, trial and post-trial procedures for military 
commissions, and this includes rules about the conduct of the hearing and access to 
evidence.51
Prisoner o f War Status
Aside from the tribunals, the Bush administration also made determinations as to the 
status of captured fighters in the war on terror. Lawyers, mostly from the Department of 
Justice, were tasked with determining the applicability of domestic and international law,
States Marine Corps Before the Senate Arms Services Committee Subcommittee on Personnel Military 
Justice and Detention Policy, 14 July 2005.
50 See the judgement in ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
51 Statement o f Daniel Dell’Orto et al, 14 July 2005. Such commissions are appealing because the rules on 
evidence are much less demanding and they can help protect classified and sensitive information. Yet there 
is a striking comparison which can be made here. Perhaps one of the most interesting stories coming out o f  
Kosovo in relation to the laws o f war was the case o f the Nis bus bombers. On 16 February 2001, a bus was 
blown-up by a group of Kosovar-Albanians resulting in the death o f 11 Serbs. Four individuals were 
eventually detained for the incident. However, three out o f four o f the individuals thought to have been 
guilty were linked to the crime only by sensitive intelligence information -  information that NATO 
officials did not want to have in an open court. The arrested were eventually transferred into US custody at 
Camp Bondsteel -  but languished in prison for months as authorities debated exactly how the case could be 
prosecuted while protecting intelligence sources. Eventually UNMIK decided to create a Detention Review 
Commission o f three international judges (from the US, UK and Germany) with security clearance to 
determine the case in a closed courtroom. According to UNMIK spokeswoman Susan Manuel: “This is 
sensitive information which sources will not release as evidence in courts. This judicial review panel will 
decide based on the information presented to them, whether further detention by executive order is 
warranted... According to the regulation which set up this special panel, the Commission has seven days to 
render its decision on further detention...The commission's decision will not be subject to appeal.” 
Ultimately the court found that there was reason to detain the suspects for a further 90 days by which time 
charges were to be brought against them in a civilian court. However, without access to the intelligence in 
which to charge or convict the individuals involved, they were set free by Kosovo’s Supreme Court. The 
parallels o f this case with Guantanamo are striking -  right down to the orange jumpsuits the detainees were 
allegedly wearing. However, there was very little outcry in this case with regards to the rights o f the 
prisoners, NATO or UN policies. Perhaps this is because the court only extended detention for a further 90 
days or that the Detention Review Commission was comprised o f judges from different NATO countries. 
Still, the fact that the court went ahead with little outcry is interesting. However, because the incident deals 
with NATO and the UN rather than the US, and because the issue was relatively non-controversial, this 
work will not engage in a further discussion of these matters. The author feels that pointing out the 
similarities in these cases suggests an area o f potential future comparison or research. For more information 
on these rather unknown events, see UNMIK-OSCE-EU-UNHCR Press Briefing, 20 September 2001,
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including the Geneva Conventions, to enemy combatants. In a memo dated 9 January 
2002, it was argued by John Yoo, the then Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Robert 
J. Delabunty, Special Counsel that “nether the federal War Crimes Act nor the Geneva 
Conventions would apply to the detention conditions in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or to 
trial by military commission of al Qaeda or Taliban prisoners.” 52 In particular, the 
Geneva Convention and Common Article 3 did not apply because the Geneva 
Conventions never anticipated that there could be an insurgency movement that was not a 
nation state, it did not anticipate a conflict such as the global war on terror and that it is 
not clear that Congress would support an interpretation of Common Article 3 that 
supported its application in a war on terror. The same memo went on to conclude that 
“customary international law has no binding legal effect on either the President or on the 
military because it is not federal law, as recognized by the Constitution.”53 Similar 
findings were put forward in a memo by Jay S. Bybee on 22 January 2002.54 Adding to 
these legal findings, the then White House General Counsel, Alberto Gonzales argued 
that because the war on terrorism was essentially a new kind of war, the laws of war was 
rendered mostly irrelevant: “In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete 
Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of 
its provisions...”55
On 7 February 2002, President Bush accepted the conclusions of the Justice Department. 
The President “determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees,
52 Memo from the US Department o f Justice Office of the Legal Counsel, John Yoo and Robert J. 
Delabunty. “Memorandum For William J. Haynes II General Counsel, Department o f Defense”, 9 January 
2002.
53 “Memorandum For William J. Haynes II General Counsel, Department o f  Defense”, 9 January 2002. The 
conclusion did go on to say that “Nonetheless, we also believe that the President as Commander-in-Chief, 
has the constitutional authority to impose the customary laws of war on both the al Qaeda and Taliban 
groups and the U.S. Armed Forces.”
4 Memo from the US Department o f Justice Office of Legal Council, Jay S. Bybee, the then Assistant 
Attorney General, “Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes 
II, General Counsel o f the Department of Defense Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and 
Taliban Detainees” 22 January 2002.
55 Gonzales’ memo can be found online at Michael Isikoff “Memos Reveal War Crimes Warning” 19 May 
2004, Newsweek, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/.
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but not to the al-Qaida detainees.”56 A final breakdown of the Bush administration’s legal 
argument was presented in a press release:
• The United States is treating and will continue to treat all of the 
individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to the extent 
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a matter consistent 
with the principles of the Geneva Convention.
• The President has determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the 
Taliban Detainees, but not to the al-Qaida detainees. al-Qaida is not a 
foreign terrorist group. As such its members are not entitled to POW 
status.
• Although the US never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan 
government, Afghanistan is party to the Convention, and the President has 
determined that the Taliban are covered by the Convention. Under the 
terms of the Geneva Convention, however, the Taliban do not qualify as 
POWs as they do not meet the criteria spelled out in Article 4 of the Third
cn
Geneva Convention.
56 “Fact Sheet: Status o f Detainees at Guantanamo”, 7 February 2002. Available at: 
http://www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13 .html.
57 Article 4 o f the Third Geneva Convention reads:
A. Prisoners o f war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one o f the following 
categories, who have fallen into the power o f the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members o f militias or volunteer 
corps forming part o f such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those o f organized 
resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, 
even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized 
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:[
(a) that o f being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that o f having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that o f carrying arms openly;
(d) that o f conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs o f war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not 
recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian 
members o f military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members o f labour units or of 
services responsible for the welfare o f the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization, 
from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity 
card similar to the annexed model.
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• Therefore neither the Taliban nor al-Qaida detainees are entitled to POW 
status.58
Interrogation
Arguments regarding POW status and military tribunals rested on a powerful argument 
which put forward the idea that the President was authorized to do whatever it took to 
protect the nation’s security in a national emergency. These arguments, which rested on 
the idea that the President needed strong powers to protect the nation, its citizens and 
their rights under the Constitution, went together well with the ideas of the New 
Sovereigntists. In this “New Paradigm” of warfare, the President was morally, politically 
and legally obliged to violate international law if necessary in order to punish those who 
carried out the attacks of 11 September and to prevent future attacks.59 This, naturally,
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, o f the merchant marine and the crews of 
civil aircraft o f the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other 
provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants o f a non-occupied territory, who on the approach o f the enemy spontaneously take up arms 
to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided 
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs o f war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces o f the occupied country, if  the occupying 
Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally 
liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such 
persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are 
engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one o f the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been 
received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to 
intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may 
choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92,126 and, where 
diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power 
concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the 
Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions 
of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these 
Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status o f medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in 
Article 33 of the present Convention.
58 This argument was set out in a White House press release “Fact Sheet: Status o f Detainees at 
Guantanamo” 7 February 2002. Available online at:
http ://www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13 .html.
59 The term “New Paradigm” is taken from Jane Mayer. See Jane Mayer “The Hidden Power: The legal 
mind behind the White House’s war on terror”, The New Yorker. 3 July 2006. pp. 44-55.
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included obtaining as much information as possible from those captured in the war on 
terror and suspects at home.
The idea that the United States now found itself in this “New Paradigm” was also used as 
a basis for the arguments regarding the interrogation of captured enemy combatants. On 
26 February 2002 Bybee concluded that information derived from military interrogations 
may be admissible in court, even without Miranda warnings.60 Also, a reading of the 
Torture Convention by Bybee argued that the text only prohibited “the most extreme 
acts” as criminal penalties only applied to “torture” and not “cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”61 In a letter to Gonzales, Yoo maintained that 
because the President had determined al-Qaida members are not POWs under the Geneva 
Conventions, they could not be entitled to any protections of any of the Geneva 
Conventions. Therefore actions carried out during the interrogations of al-Qaida members 
or suspects could not constitute a war crime under Article 8 of the ICC Rome Statute.62 In 
October 2002 a series of memos were issued considering acceptable counter resistance 
techniques in interrogations. Aside from the 17 methods listed in Field Manual 34-52. 16 
additional techniques were authorized by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld after a 
legal review 63
60 Memo from the US Department o f Justice Office of Legal Council, Jay S. Bybee, the then Assistant 
Attorney General, “Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department o f Defense Re: 
Potential Legal Constraints Applicable to Interrogations of Persons Captured by U.S. Armed Forces in 
Afghanistan” 26 February 2006. Miranda warnings are given to suspects in police custody in the United 
States before they are asked any questions. The warnings are given as a way to protect an individual’s right 
against self-incrimination. Reminding suspects o f their “right to remain silent” was seen as problematic by 
those who wanted to gather information from suspects. For more information on Miranda Warnings see, the 
US Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
61 Memo from the US Department o f Justice Office of Legal Council, Jay S. Bybee, the then Assistant 
Attorney General, “Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President Re: Standards of  
Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Dated 26 February 2002.
62 Letter from the US Department o f Justice Office o f Legal Counsel to The Honourable Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President. 1 August 2002. In Article 8(2)(ii) the ICC Statue prohibits “Torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments”. Yoo was trying to determine if  the ICC would be 
able to prosecute interrogators for their actions. He claimed that the Article 8 o f the Rome Statue only 
applied to those protected by the Geneva Conventions but could not guarantee that the ICC, “rogue 
prosecutor” or other countries would see the legal argument the same way.
63 See Appendix A. These memos and their timeline will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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In summary, the legal argument rested on the assumption that the United States had 
entered a “new paradigm” of warfare and a national emergency which required 
strengthened presidential powers which, according to this view, were authorized by 
Congress and the Constitution of the United States. This authority allows the President to 
override international law and state practice where necessary and for the safety of the 
United States and its armed forces. In this way, the laws of war and other international 
legislation (such as the Torture Convention) could either be overridden or reinterpreted in 
light of the imperatives of the global war on terror.64
Internal Debate
As is fairly now well known not everyone in the US government was pleased with the 
outcomes of the legal review provided by (mostly) Department of Justice lawyers. From 
late 2001-2003 a debate emerged among the Justice, State and Defense Departments as to 
what exactly America’s obligations under international law entailed and whether or not 
the laws of war could and should apply. The Bush administration wanted to obtain as 
much information from detainees as possible and had asked its lawyers to investigate the 
applicable international law. What was perhaps peculiar about this arrangement, and 
came as surprise to many within the government, was who the administration had turned 
to for advice. Rather than turning to the experts within the Department of Defense or 
State, who had officials that were thoroughly familiar with the laws of war, state practice, 
US practice and had actually engaged in the process of negotiating the treaties to which 
the US was a party, the Department of Justice seems to have been asked to provide most 
of the advice. For example, while John Yoo had proficiency in the area of international 
law, he had little to no laws of war training or expertise and many felt that he had got 
some of his legal interpretations of the applicable treaties very wrong.65
64 An outline o f the US argument was provided by the White House Press Secretary on 14 November 2005. 
Available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d200602151egalbasis.pdf
65 That there were many within the government that were concerned with the interpretations o f the laws o f  
war being put forward by the administration has been made clear through discussions with officials in the 
research done by the author. One former State Department official confirmed that State was largely kept in 
the dark as to the debates going on. It was only after the advice had been asked for and received that 
internal concerns were raised about the detainee policies. Interview, Washington DC, 30 March 2006. This 
sentiment has also been noted by many news reports. See Jane Mayer, “The Memo”, The New Yorker. 27
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It was not until late 2001 and early 2002 that officials in the Departments of State and 
Justice became aware of the legal opinions which had been rendered and were about to be 
put into practice. The legal advisor to the State Department, William Howard Taft IV and 
Secretary of State Colin Powell both spoke out within the administration against the 
policies that were being put in place.66 Colin Powell, who was advising in his role the 
Secretary of State, but also as a former General, argued that the administration’s position 
jeopardized the safety of captured US personnel and undermined previous policy:
It will reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the 
Geneva conventions (sic) and undermine the protection of the law of war for 
our troops, both in this specific conflict and in general.67
These views appear to have been largely ignored in favour of the arguments being put 
forward by the Department of Justice.
Given this history, it is reasonable to assert that the critiques of international law put 
forward by the New Sovereigntists became very influential after 9/11. The Bush 
administration (and, it should be remembered, the Clinton administration) had already 
demonstrated a willingness to ‘take on’ the international community over Kosovo and the 
International Criminal Court. It is not surprising that the administration was willing to do 
the same with humanitarian norms in conflict, especially after 9/11. When pictures of 
detainees being transported to and living in Guantanamo emerged in early 2002, public 
shock and outrage over the 9/11 attacks lent support to the administration’s arguments 
that the security needs and the right of self-defense gave the US the right to deny the full 
protection of the Geneva Conventions to the prisoners. Besides, it was argued, the 
methods employed by the Taliban and al-Qaida, their failure to live up to what the laws
February 2006 and John Barry, Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff, “The Roots o f Torture”, Newsweek 24 
May 2005. Available online at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989481/.
66 See Colin Powell’s memo o f 26 January 2002 to Counsel to the President and Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, “Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the 
Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan”. Also see the memo from William H. Taft, IV to the 
Counsel to the President, “Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention”, 2 February 2002.
67 Colin Powell’s memo o f 26 January 2002.
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of war required and their obvious contempt for western/international human rights norms 
meant that they did not deserve such protection, either legally or morally.68
Yet, despite its downplaying of international law, the arguments that the US 
administration has and continues to rest on are legal arguments to some degree. It is clear 
that the Bush administration sought out a legal solution to carry out their desired security 
policy and relied on moral arguments to support this solution. While the Bush 
administration frequently referred to its enemies in the war on terror as “evil”, its 
arguments have continued to rely on the legal argument that those held in Guantanamo do 
not meet the requirements of the Geneva Conventions.
Perhaps this should not be surprising. This work has already made the claim that there is 
a dualistic tendency regarding the implementation of the laws of war to conflicts. That 
while policy and political concerns have often pushed for the downplaying of 
international law where there is a significant cost associated with full implementation, US 
administrations have still usually attempted to present legal arguments to back up their 
policies. Therefore, considering that the US had been very important in drafting many of 
the laws of war conventions, and that such conventions were considered “hard law” by 
many of the international lawyers in the Pentagon, a legal solution to the issue is more 
politically and morally palpable than a straight denial of the Geneva Conventions. Still, if 
it is not surprising, it is certainly ironic that the US had spent much time and effort 
making the exact opposite case with regards to its prisoners in Vietnam.69
International Lawyers and the Legal Response
It is fairly clear that the “international legal community” -  made up of mostly Western 
lawyers and NGOs -  was not on best terms with the Bush administration even before 
9/11. Despite a considerable amount of international support for the US after the attacks, 
international lawyers soon found themselves troubled with the measures that the US was
68 See, for example, Jeremy Rabkin, “After Guantanamo: The War Over the Geneva Conventions”, The 
National Interest. Summer 2002.
69 As discussed in Chapter Three.
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taking to fight the war on terror.70 Domestically, the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001 
(More commonly known as the USA PATRIOT Act) gave new powers to the federal 
government to detain and monitor individuals suspected of being involved with terrorism, 
which was a matter of concern for some civil and human rights lawyers. Yet, our main 
concern here is the reaction to the announcement that detainees would not be provided 
with the full protections of the laws of war, specifically, the Geneva Conventions and 
customary aspects of the Additional Protocols, which the US had previously indicated 
that it would adhere to.71
There have been many legal arguments made against the Bush administration’s argument 
that the detainees do not qualify, and therefore do not deserve the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions. Since the outbreak of hostilities, there have been several studies 
published by international lawyers arguing for the full application of the law to the 
military activities involved in the war on terror and criticizing the Bush administration’s 
policies. For the sake of brevity, they can be summed up as follows:
1) No one is “outside” the protection of the Geneva Convention. If an individual is 
not protected under the Third Convention Relevant to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, they are automatically considered civilians under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
Therefore there is no legal black hole into which the US can put the detainees.
70 Michael Byers, War Law: International Law and Armed Conflict London: Atlantic Books, 2005; 
Antonio Cassese, International Law. Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Yoram 
Dinstein, The Conduct o f Hostilities: Helen Duffy The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework o f International 
Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Forsythe, The Humanitarians: and Sands, Lawless 
World.
71 Although ultimately rejecting AP I, Ronald Reagan indicated that there were “sound elements” to the 
Protocols which the US would work with its allies to implement in conflict. See his “Message to the 
Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,” January 29, 1987. Accessible on the 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Website:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/012987B.HTM.
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2) It is customary law that belligerents do not need to meet the requirement of 
wearing a uniform or having a fixed, distinctive mark -  they need to only carry 
their arms openly.72
3) If the administration wishes to argue that the detainees do not qualify for POW 
status, then it must be able to demonstrate why in a tribunal operating in 
accordance with internationally recognized legal principles and proceedures.
4) The US is considering all of the detainees as a group, and not as individuals. This 
also violates the presumption of innocence.
5) The US actions undermine their own military manuals and procedures which 
make it clear that all prisoners are immediately assumed to be prisoners of war 
and that they must be treated in line with the laws of war. For example, Field 
Manual 27-10. “The Law of Land Warfare” deals extensively with the treatment 
of Prisoners of War as well as the military’s Operational Law Handbook.
Lawyers also point out that there is precedence for the US treating insurgents or those 
who do not strictly meet the requirements of that status. Duffy, for example argues that 
this was the case during Vietnam with regards to the Viet Cong and the North 
Vietnamese forces.73
The summary of the legal arguments here has been brief -  for several reasons. First, there 
have already been a number of detailed books written as to why the legal arguments 
made by the Bush administration are incorrect. While there is always room for debate and 
discussion, it would be difficult to add substance to what has already been written. 
Second, the intention for the argument and analysis being made here is to be more 
political than legal. This relates to the third point, that the main problem with the 
arguments being made by international lawyers is that they are, in fact, mostly legal. 
While this should not be a shocking revelation concerning lawyers, it does render their
72 It should be pointed out that has been a very contentious issue within the humanitarian and laws o f war 
community since before 9/11. In the case of Afghanistan Dinstein argues that the Taliban did not meet the 
criteria for POW status because they were not in uniform and did not have an identifiable mark, Cassese 
argues that this is irrelevant in modem customary law. See Dinstein, The Conduct o f  Hostilities, pp. 47-48 
and Cassese International Law, pp. 405-410.
73 Dufly, Helen. The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. p. 243 see also note 143 on the same page.
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argument somewhat ineffective against an American administration which is essentially 
downplaying the importance of international law albeit partly through legal arguments 
about constitutional powers. If the argument being made is essentially “international law 
as it has operated in the past does not apply and cannot be applied to a war on terror”, 
counterarguments emphasizing the bits and pieces of customary law seem somewhat 
lacking in strength, if not substance.
The next part of the chapter will look at some of the political/moral arguments that have 
been and can be raised against the case being made by the “New Sovereigntists”. In doing 
so, it is hoped that the chapter can provide an evaluation of the arguments being made by 
all sides and give us a better understanding of what the implications of international law 
are for the war on terror.
The Case against the “New Sovereigntists”
The Constitution
The first and one of the most powerful arguments that challenging the New Sovereigntist 
position is that their arguments are based on a particular reading of the US Constitution 
and its history. As Peter Spiro argued in Foreign Affairs:
These arguments are grounded in highly formalistic readings of the 
Constitution and selective interpretations of its history... [T]he New 
Sovereigntists forget that the Constitution -  hardly blind to the national 
interest -  has always adapted itself successfully to new exigencies of the 
international system. Such values as federalism, the separation of powers, and 
individual rights are not so brittle that they will shatter at the intersection with 
globalization.
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Indeed, the Constitution will have to adapt to global requirements sooner or 
later, for the New Sovereigntist premise of American impermeability is 
flawed.74
Spiro raises an important point -  to suggest that the Constitution cannot adapt, and that 
individual rights are so weak as to crumble when faced with globalization seems to be a 
flawed argument. Relying on Jacksonian thinking for problems that are occurring well 
over a century later may be emotionally appealing in its harkening back to the historical 
roots of the foundations of the Republic, but at the same time it seems to be somewhat 
completely out of touch with modem considerations.
Origins o f the laws o f war
New Sovereigntists argue that the laws of war and the norms that it embodies are 
standards which have been set by undemocratic international bodies that are accountable 
to no one -  or international judges that do not have America’s best interest in mind: As 
Rabkin argues, “we cannot delegate our own decisions about national defense to 
prosecutors in The Hague or moral monitors in Geneva any more than we would give 
final word on these matters to the spiritual admonitions of the Pope in Rome.”75
Some have argued against this point, stating that the Geneva Conventions and other laws 
of war treaties are international “objectively verifiable standards” that all parties are 
bound to meet in warfare.76 One can only presume that “objective” in this case means 
politically neutral. Given the fact that the law has typically been drafted and decided 
upon after wars, largely influenced by its victors who are in turn also looking towards the 
next war, this does not quite fit. A better argument ironically stems from one of Rabkin’s 
own points -  that the dispute over the Geneva Convention “is a dispute about treaty law -  
but law with a history.”77
74 Spiro, “The New Sovereigntists”, pp. 9-16.
75 Rabkin, “After Guantanamo”.
76 Duffy, The “War on Terror”, p. 2.
77 Rabkin, “After Guantanamo”.
136
Unlike international human rights law (for which the New Sovereigntists seem to save a
• 70special variety of loathing ), the laws of war have been carefully acknowledged, 
negotiated and (mostly) accepted by states via diplomatic conferences where they were 
able to consult with their own military professionals and protect their national interest. 
Where international human rights law remains vague and full of generalities, the laws of 
war are generally more specific and can be broken down relatively easily to be 
incorporated into military doctrine and taught to soldiers during training and in the field. 
This does not render the law into “objective standards” but certainly a stronger form of 
law that states have explicitly agreed to through treaties. As the New Sovereigntists 
themselves argue, it does create political obligation. However, this seems to imply to the 
New Sovereigntists that this “political obligation” can be easily denied and down played 
without too much political consequence; given the relative strength of the US in the 
international system in comparison to its allies and enemies, it is contended that states 
will have to come back and conform to the US no matter what they wish. As Rabkin 
argues:
As the strongest and richest country in the world, the United States can afford 
to safeguard its sovereignty... we have every reason to expect that other 
nations, eager for access to American markets and eager for other cooperative 
arrangements with the United States will often adapt themselves to American 
preferences.79
However, is a dismissal of political obligation really so easy? If it was, it is doubtful that 
so many words would have to be written justifying the Bush administration’s policies, or 
that this justification continues to rely on a legal basis. Even the New Sovereigntists, in 
arguing that the laws of war do not fully apply to the war on terror often point to legal 
reasons why this is so, aside from constitutional limitations. Jeremy Rabkin argues that 
the Geneva Conventions are treaties and “a treaty, as The Federalist (No. 64) explained in
78 For example, see Rabkin’s chapter “The Human Rights Crusade” in Law Without Nations or Bolton’s 
Foreign Affairs article, “The Global Prosecutors”.
79 Jeremy Rabkin quoted in Spiro, “The New Sovereigntists”.
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1788, ‘is only another name for a bargain.”’ In other words, the Geneva Conventions do 
not apply because terrorists have not lived up to their side of the bargain. Therefore, what 
Rabkin’s argument ultimately comes down to on this point is a different interpretation of 
the law from that of the pro-laws of war lawyers -  not that the law itself is entirely 
irrelevant.
The value o f the Ictws o f  war
It is clear that the US military and Pentagon lawyers value the laws of war if only from 
the comments made prior to 9/11. Since Vietnam, laws of war training has become 
entwined with US military doctrine. Lawyers have become integral to the conduct of 
military operations. Although he was critical of the overall conduct of the campaign in 
Kosovo, Short argued:
My lawyer most of the time was a lieutenant colonel. It is very difficult for 
him to come in and say to a three star ‘you are out of bounds, sir you are 
about to break the law.’ But [military lawyers] have got to be able to do that.
[They] have got to know [their] business inside and out and [they] have got 
to think like an operator.81
A fairly robust commitment to the laws of war within US military culture is apparent in 
other ways. Within the Pentagon there exists the Department of Defense Law of War 
Working group, and the US military has the highest number of judge advocates in the 
world -  the Marine Corps, the smallest of the US armed services, has more active duty 
judges advocates than the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand combined. The 
Army has established a Centre for Law and Military Operations at the Judge Advocate 
General’s School which publish “lessons learned” reports which include rules of 
engagement and laws of war training information. While respect may at times be
80 Rabkin, “After Guantanamo”
81 Short, “Operation Allied Force”, p. 26.
82 In 2002 there were 428 judge advocates in the Marine Corps alone compared with 102 in the UK, 100 in 
Canada, 90 in Australia and 17 in New Zealand. W. Hays Parks, “The United States Military and the Law 
o f War: Inculcating an Ethos” in Social Research. Vol. 69 No. 4, Winter 2002. pp. 981-1015. p. 989.
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grudging, it is clear that the laws of war are taken seriously by most Pentagon military 
lawyers and officials. It is clear that much effort has gone into ensuring that the 
applicable law has been incorporated into the everyday training of US soldiers.
Why this is the case is also understandable. Aside from addressing the ideal of protecting 
innocent life -  something that is inherent in western human rights culture -  it is widely 
acknowledged that soldiers who play by the rules in all respects of their training and in 
terms of operational doctrine are the ones that best accomplish their mission. Unruly and 
ill-disciplined troops are not only more likely to commit war crimes, they are also most 
likely not to effectively complete their mission.83 This claim -  of the consistency between 
following the laws of war and military effectiveness -  is backed up by the Department of 
Defense’s report to Congress on the Persian Gulf War:
It is important to note that, with the possible exception of the Coalition’s need 
to direct considerable effort toward the hunt of the Iraqi scud missiles, no 
Iraqi action leading to or resulting in a violation of the law of war gained Iraq 
any military advantage. This “negative gain from negative action” in essence 
reinforces the validity of the law of war.84
Considering this attitude towards what helps to ensure military effectiveness, it is 
unsurprising that Pentagon officials draw a link between war making, policy and law. 
These three factors are inherently intertwined to create a lethal yet effective fighting force 
that follows Clausewitz’s teaching on the economy of force.85
If military lawyers and Pentagon officials can see this importance, then why are the New 
Sovereigntists so casual about dismissing these links? In arguing that it is America’s right 
to take whatever steps are necessary to defend itself, are the New Sovereigntists actually 
undermining some of the key components that the Pentagon has regarded for years as
83 Parks, “The United States Military” pp, 983-4.
84 United States Department o f Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War. 
Washington DC: Department o f Defense, 1992. p. 624.
85 As explained in Chapter 3.
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essentially required for fighting effective wars? Perhaps this is why several accounts 
report dissatisfaction within the Pentagon and the Department of State as to how the Bush 
administration handled the Guantanamo issue -  and its attitude towards the laws of war.86 
As we have already seen from above, Colin Powell, had argued that the policies did not 
just contravene international law, but also undermined US state practice for over a 
century and put the lives of American soldiers at risk.
Therefore, the New Sovereigntists can be accused of ignoring the views of many 
American military lawyers when they suggest that the US is above or can choose to 
ignore the laws of war.87 Considering that those who were making these arguments in the 
Departments of Justice or Defense were political appointees (few had any military 
experience or any specialty in the laws of war), ignoring the link between effective 
fighting, policy and law seems to be a serious omission to their arguments.
The Pentagon, especially since the lessons learned in Vietnam, has valued the laws of war 
and sought to incorporate it in its training. Having previously argued that there is a link 
between effective fighting and adhering to the laws of war, it is clear that many soldiers 
felt they have an interest in preserving the latter in US military training and its 
implementation in war. After all, it is apparent that soldiers would probably know best 
that the laws of war are written in the blood of war’s victims, and there is therefore a 
significant interest in ensuring that they are not thrown away.
86 See for example, John Barry, Michael Hirsch and Michael Isikoff, “The Roots o f Torture”, Newsweek 17 
May 2004. Available online at: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4989422/. This also reflects the attitude expressed 
by several current and retired military officials when confidentially interviewed on the issue. The debate’s 
paper trail has largely been captured in paper and published in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel 
eds., The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
87 For example, in the continuing battles over military tribunals, several Department o f Defense lawyers 
have continually argued, against the position of the Bush administration, that suspected terrorists should be 
tried according to the standards set in the UCMJ which are internationally respected. See the testimony of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, “To continue to receive testimony on the future o f military 
commissions in light o f the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld”, 2 August 2006. Available 
online at: http://armed-services.senate.gOv/e witnesslist.cfm?id=::2032. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld will be dealt 
with later in the chapter. Also see Anne Plummer Flaherty, “Gonzales Holds Line on Terror Detainees”, 
Associated Press, 2 August 2006.
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Nature of the Threat
But what about arguments that the US is now in a new paradigm of war fighting? It is 
clear from the statements made by US officials and leaders since 9/11 that they, and 
much of the US public, believe that they are engaged in a new kind of war. Aside from 
the quotes listed above, six weeks after 9/11 US Vice President Richard Cheney argued:
We cannot deal with terror. It will not end in a treaty. There will be no 
peaceful coexistence, no negotiations, no summit, no joint communique 
with the terrorists. The struggle can only end with their complete and 
permanent destruction...88
In other words, in fighting the war on terror, the US sees itself as confronting a dangerous, 
nihilist peril that seeks to destroy the liberties and freedoms of the West. In this sense, al- 
Qaida have become an enemy of all humanity and civilization, an enemy that cannot be 
negotiated with, only exterminated because of the nature of the threat they pose.
Thus it seems logical that when a nation is fighting a war against this kind of ultimate 
threat to the Western way of life that the requirement of restraint becomes questionable at 
best. To what extent should a nation restrain itself when it is clear that its opponent 
clearly rejects the idea of humanitarian limitations? This point is reinforced when one 
considers the fact that it is actually al-Qaida and the Taliban who brought the war onto 
themselves in a horrific and bloody manner on 9/11. Rumsfeld hinted at this line of 
thinking when he addressed the nature of the challenge that the US was facing:
We did not start the war... The Taliban, an illegitimate, unelected group of 
terrorists, started it when they invited the al Qaeda into Afghanistan and 
turned their country into a base from which those terrorists could strike out 
and kill our citizens.
88 “Vice President Cheney Delivers Remarks at the 56th Annual Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation 
Dinner” 18 October, 2001. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news- 
speeches/speeches/vp20011018.html.
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So let there be no doubt; responsibility for every single casualty in this war, 
be they innocent Afghans or innocent Americans, rests at the feet of Taliban 
and al Qaeda. ”89
To Rumsfeld, where violations of the laws of war may have occurred, the US is excused, 
if not justified, because it is confronting a major threat to itself. The fault ultimately lies 
with the terrorists for making the war necessary and the laws of war should not constrain 
the US in doing what it needs to do to ensure its safety.
To anyone who has studied just war theory, these arguments are nothing new. Aside from 
the many books and articles which have been written on just war theory, there are the 
famous cliches such as that the Constitution or Bill of Rights should not be allowed to 
become “suicide pacts.”90 Yet the controversies regarding humanitarian restraint and civil 
liberties in the war on terror seem to have placed a new urgency on old debates. Does the 
severe and extreme maliciousness of a threat justify a response that violates customary 
and/or legal norms? Does the fact that the terrorists brought war onto themselves mean 
that they deserve to suffer whatever harm befalls them in the ensuing conflict?
What unites these two questions is that consideration of the nature of the threat is key 
when considering the restrictions we want to place upon our response to the terrorists. 
We have already seen an argument for the first question emerge from Ruth Wedgwood 
before 9/11. She argues that Nazism was a threat so severe that it necessitated violation of 
the rules of war in order to confront that evil. At the time of her comments, she was 
arguing about the war in Kosovo; stopping the genocide on the ground in Serbia surely 
must legitimate a looser interpretation of targeting restrictions or even a bending of the 
laws of war to achieve this greater good.91 In other words, to Wedgwood, jus ad bellum
89 “Excerpt: Rumsfeld Says Taliban to Blame for Casualties” 29 October, 2005. Excerpt available online at: 
http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/news/press/2001/nrotl 13 .htm.
90 There is actually some dispute as to who originated the phrase -  Justice Jackson or Justice Goldberg. 
Most citations o f the cliche usually refer to Justice Jackson in Terminiello v. City o f Chicago (1949). See 
“The "Suicide Pact" Mystery: Who coined the phrase? Justice Goldberg or Justice Jackson?” David Com, 
Slate.com, 4 January 2002. Available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2060342/.
91 Ruth Wedgwood, “Propositions on the Law of War after the Kosovo Campaign” pp. 433-441.
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in both of these cases should (and politically did) alter the way jus in bello was 
considered.
As pointed out earlier, this line of argument challenges thinking about the laws of war as 
they have existed for the last 100 years. Yet the division between just war and just 
conduct in war has existed for centuries with the increased recognition that that no state 
had a monopoly on true religion or justice. This partition between the two branches of the 
law has been regarded by virtually every laws of war scholar as instrumental in 
preserving humanity and restraint through the insistence that no cause could ever 
undermine the need for restraint in warfare. Whether this argument is made on the basis 
of custom, honour or treaty, it is a cornerstone of modem law of war. But can it still hold 
in an era of nihilistic terrorism? And if it does not, does this mean that the terrorists are 
liable to suffer whatever consequences that the US can impose on them for engaging in 
activities which clearly violated international treaty and customary law -  as well as 
virtually every norm of civilized conduct?
Finding a Lesser Evil
The legal, but more importantly, the political and moral debates over Guantanamo 
highlight the problems that democracies face when they are confronted with emergencies: 
a balance between liberty and security. The argument that Guantanamo Bay may 
represent an affront to international law, human rights or democratic values is a strong 
one. However, what has been argued here is that the Bush administration has based its 
case on necessity, security and honour -  and no matter how much one may disagree with 
their line of reasoning, it is not an entirely incomprehensible argument. Not bestowing 
protections to those who not only refuse to play by the rules but distain the very existence 
of the rules in the first place is not morally unintelligible. And allowing international law 
or constitutions to become the very instruments by which democracies expire (or become 
suicide pacts) will not ultimately serve the cause of human rights or freedoms.
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Perhaps it needs to be recognized that arguments strictly over domestic and international 
law may only be able to take us so far in this dispute. Although law has certainly played a 
major role in the debate over security and liberty, in complex emergencies it may only 
take us to an unsatisfactory quandary as to what is legal and what is illegal; not what is 
right or not what is necessary. In the eyes of the Bush administration the political and 
moral imperatives of 9/11 take the dispute beyond a mere legal debate. But the same can 
probably be said for commentators, academics and individuals living in democracies. The 
events of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror challenge commonly accepted notions as to 
how far a nation may act to protect itself from harm and threats that pose a significant 
risk to the life of its citizens.
“What lesser evils may a society commit when it believes it faces the greater evil of its 
own destruction?”92 This is the question that Michael Ignatieff tries to answer in his book 
The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. In trying to answer the question he 
sets out, Ignatieff takes an approach which seeks to combine legal, political and ethical 
theory by looking at the lessons learned in emergencies in the UK, Canada, Italy, 
Germany, Spain, Israel and Sri Lanka.93 In this way, Ignatieff provides an alternative 
approach for thinking about the role of law (including international law) when states are 
faced with acute threats that demand immediate action.
The crux of this problem, argues Ignatieff, is that for liberal democratic societies 
confronted with terrorism, “what works is not always right. What is right doesn’t always 
work.”94 Necessity may require us to take actions in defence of democracy which will 
stray from democracy’s own foundational commitments to dignity. Therefore, liberal 
democratic societies must act on the principle the “lesser evil”. Ignatieff does not provide 
an exact definition of the ‘lesser evil’, but what is implied is the idea that in confronting 
terrorism, choices must be made on laws and rights -  to what degree they should be
92 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age o f Terror. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2004. p. 1.
93 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. vii.
94 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, pp. 8-9.
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allowed to bend without breaking. That when societies are faced with a real threat or 
“evil” that stopping them may require methods that reply to that threat in kind.95
Importantly, this differs from opportunistic selectivity; these are arguments for “cafeteria- 
style” international law where governments pick and choose to follow international law 
and norms where they can and when it suits their strategies. Rather, Ignatieff s arguments 
imply the need for a greater deal of democratic oversight and, ultimately, democratic 
accountability when tough decisions need to be made in an emergency.
Yet, Ignatieff is cautious enough to specify several caveats in his description as “human 
beings can justify anything as a lesser evil as long as they only have to justify it to 
themselves.”96 After all, there is a clear difference between claiming that emergency 
measures need to be put in place and having to justify such measures via democratic 
institutions. First, he argues that violence can be a lesser evil has real meaning only for 
liberal democratic societies as they are guided by a constitutional commitment to 
minimize the use of force, violence and dubious means.97
Ignatieff s second qualification is somewhat more defensive and relates to his larger 
argument -  that qualifying evil would seem to excuse it. He notes that it is essential to the 
idea of a lesser evil position that one can justify a resort to it politically without ever 
denying that it is evil. The lesser evil is only justifiable because any other measure or 
means would be insufficient or unavailable.98 The crucial factor is having the appropriate 
institutions that can guide debate and judgments that we have to make in extreme 
circumstances. As Ignatieff argues, democracy is designed to cope with tragic choice, and 
it does so by understanding that if anyone can justify anything, they are less likely to be 
able to carry out if they are forced to do so in adversarial proceedings before their fellow
. . 99citizens.
95 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 12.
96 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 14.
97 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 16.
98 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 18.
99 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, pp. 14-5
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Greater Evils?
Ignatieff s approach is geared towards answering the age old question of liberty and 
security or how can rights be best preserved when democracies face emergencies. In this 
way it is a useful approach for assessing at the arguments for security measures post-9/11 
and for Guantanamo. However, (or perhaps unsurprisingly given the political and moral 
nature of the discussion) harsh evaluations of Ignatieff s argument are not in short supply. 
Much of this often passionate criticism stems from the idea that Ignatieff is using a model 
that is too legal or legalistic and places too much emphasis, if not faith, in democratic 
oversight. Ignatieff s arguments, caveats and explanations ultimately sound more like 
rationalization than restraint.100
One of the most vocal critics has been Conor Gearty, who goes so far as to describe 
Ignatieff as “Rumsfeldian” and a “hand-wringing, apologetic apologist”. In a scathing 
critique, Gearty argues:
...if we change our rules to allow us to respond in an evil way, or our 
operatives stray over the boundary into evil behaviour without our explicit 
authorisation, it is really not so bad (fine even?) because all that is 
happening is that evil is being met with (lesser/theoretically accountable) 
evil...
Our evil is better (because less bad) than theirs. If Abu Ghraib was wrong, 
then that wrongness consisted not in stepping across the line into evil 
behaviour but rather allowing a ‘necessary evil’ (as framed by the 
squeamish intellectuals) to stray into ‘unnecessary evil’ (as practiced by the 
not-so-squeamish Rumsfeldians).101
100 This point was made by Ronald Steel in his harsh criticism of Ignatieff s book in the New York Times. 
July 25, 2004.
101 Conor Gearty, “Legitimising torture - with a little help”, Index on Censorship issue 1/05. Available 
online at: http://www.indexonline.org/en/news/articles/2005/l/intemational-legitimising-torture-with-a- 
li.shtml. Apparently, by Rumsfeldians, Gearty is implying individuals who are “distinguished by their 
determination to permit, indeed to encourage, the holding o f suspected ‘terrorists’ or ‘unlawful 
combatants’... in conditions which make torture, inhuman and degrading treatment well-nigh situationally 
inevitable.” Given the nuances of Ignatieff s argument, it is certainly a provocative description.
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From this point of view, the problem with Ignatieff s lesser evil argument is that even 
officially sanctioning or justifying emergency measures in democratic institutions does 
not make them right or just. It is to conflate morality and legality and/or process; or to use 
one of Gearty’s examples, it is “like reacting to a series of police killings with proposals 
to reform the law on homicide so as to sanction officially approved pre-trial 
executions.”102
Does Ignatieff s argument, which emphasizes the virtue of democratic oversight, lead 
down paths where Ignatieff would no doubt be uncomfortable? Arguably, the most 
interesting lesser evil case study to come out of the war on terror is the issue of torture (a 
frequent accusation thrust at the Bush administration). Alan Dershowitz has argued that 
torture could be legalized and carried out under a warrant.103 This would require the 
government to provide a heavy burden of evidence to show that torture was justified. The 
warrant would specify the individual to be tortured and set limits to the technique used 
and for how long it could be applied. Anyone who committed torture without a warrant 
would be considered to be committing a criminal offence. Therefore, rather than trying to 
adhere to an “unrealistic” ban on torture, the process would be subject to legal and 
judicial oversight.
To Dershowitz, this situation is superior to what the French did during the Algerian war 
for independence -  where rebels were secretly (and not so secretly) tortured, despite 
France having signed up to the Geneva Conventions and other agreements against torture. 
In this case, despite being against torture in principle, the French carried it out anyway 
and in a fairly brutal manner. Argues Dershowitz, “If we ever came close to doing 
[torture]...I think we would want to do it with accountability and openly and not adopt 
the way of the hypocrite.”104
102 Gearty, “Legitimizing torture”.
103 See Jonathan Alter, “Time to Think about Torture” Newsweek. 5 November 2001. Alan Dershowitz, “Is 
There a Torturous Road to Justice?” Los Angeles Times. 8 November 2001. Dershowitz made this same 
argument while debating on CNN, 4 March 2003. Transcript available at: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/Q3/cnna.Dershowitz/.
104 Dershowitz, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/Q3/cnna.Dershowitz/.
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Herein lies the major difficulty for the lesser evil outlined above -  that transparency and 
legality are often conflated with morality. It is true that France never tried to legalize its 
treatment of prisoners; for the French army in Algeria, raison d ’etat was enough and
those who committed torture were never prosecuted. But the idea that democratic
oversight, due process and legalities can morally excuse an activity is problematic.
In fairness to Ignatieff, he recognizes this point:
This legalisation of torture seeks to prevent it from becoming a first resort 
of interrogators in terrorist and criminal cases as well. The proposal seeks 
to bring the rule of law into the interrogation room and keep it there. All 
this is well-intentioned, but as an exercise in the lesser evil it seems likely 
to lead to the greater... The problem with torture is not just that it gets out 
of control, not just that it becomes lawless. It inflicts irremediable harm on 
both the torturer and the prisoner. It violates basic commitments to human 
dignity, and this is the core value that a war on terror, waged by a
democratic state, should not sacrifice, even under threat of imminent
attack.105
Ignatieff has been fairly adamant on an absolute ban on torture, although he admits that 
certain coercive measures (such as sleep deprivation) would likely meet the standards of 
the lesser evil approach.106 Yet there remain two problems with Ignatieff s line of 
thinking if we are to apply it to the problems encountered in this chapter. First, if we are 
truly fighting what he calls “apocalyptic” or “nihilistic” terrorists who will stop at 
nothing to carry out their goals, at what point can we say something is not justified?107 If 
the enemies of liberal democratic societies plan to fight us using every means they can, at
105 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, pp. 139-140. This argument can also be found online at the Kennedy School 
of Government website: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2004/ienatieff torture ft 051504.htm.
106 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 138. Ignatieff recently defended himself against the criticisms o f Steel’s 
review of The Lesser Evil in the New York Times arguing that Steel has mischaracterized his intentions.
107 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil. See in particular the chapter titled “The Temptations o f Nihilism”, pp. 112- 
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what point do we say that the means to protect ourselves is no longer appropriate? 
Labeling someone, or a group, apocalyptic is to imply their irrationality and this 
characterization would seem to create a slippery slope which would justify any and all 
means to combat them. Second, Ignatieff argues that if states act on threats, these threats
1 n o
must be real in order to be justified. Yet he does not seem to acknowledge that threats 
are to a large extent constructs -  subjective not objective calculations. What happens 
when a state acts in a way that they feel is consistent with the lesser evil, only to find out 
that the threat they have acted upon does not exist? Does this mean they have now 
become the greater evil? Does intention matter when evaluating the lesser evil? Or only 
outcome? If serious doubts have emerged over the usefulness of the information 
gathered from the detainees at Guantanamo, at what point has the greater/lesser evil 
distinction been crossed?
Re-claiming a balance?
Yet in some ways these criticisms seem to be somewhat off mark with regards to what 
Ignatieff is arguing. As mentioned above, he outlines in his first chapter, he is writing on 
the premise that “Democracy is designed to cope with tragic choice”.109 He notes that his 
argument does not imply that politicians in democracy do not commit evil, but that “Only 
liberal democracies have a guilty conscience about punishment.”110 Lesser evil thinking 
suggests that a greater tragedy would be to pretend that there is no choice at all: that there 
are no circumstances in which rights may be violated; that there is no other way to 
combat terrorism. Both of these positions deny the possibility of choice and constitute an 
‘easy-out’ for leaders and citizens who are faced with tough decisions. But the reality of 
the war on terror is that there are choices which must be made if democracies are to 
successfully balance liberty and security. In his book describing the activities of the 
American intelligence community after 9/11, Ron Suskind describes how the age-old 
dilemma of walking a fine line between “right” and “wrong” was opened for reappraisal 
in the days following 9/11:
108 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 165.
109 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 14.
110 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 17.
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The “dark side” is a complex, shape-shifting term -  its meaning altered by 
tone and inflection. When Cheney spoke about it on national television a 
few days after the attacks, he had given it a note of resignation -  this is what 
we must do, where we must live, like it or not...
There is, however, always a choice in such matters, in the actions that 
ultimately define character. The character of an individual or nation.111
And, as Ignatieff describes his intentions:
The book is designed to make people think about hard choices -  like 
interrogation, assassination and pre-emptive war -  and to show how 
democratic societies can make these choices without sacrificing key 
liberties and key constitutional restraints.112
In this way, what lesser evil thinking implies is that the measures taken to preserve the 
security of liberal-democracies times of emergency need to be justified. But this 
justification cannot come about via claims that ‘there is no other way’. Rather, such 
measures need to be explained and defended through democratic institutions, such as 
courts, and limited through sunset clauses. Claims that Guantanamo Bay is morally 
acceptable are only valid in so much as the Bush administration can prove it is necessary 
-  not by claims that there is no other choice in the matter.
The central problem of Guantanamo ultimately comes down to the debate at the heart of 
Ignatieff s book -  a conflict over the difficult choices that liberal democratic societies 
must make when confronting terrorism; in how it creates laws and interprets old ones. 
While complex emergencies may require new thinking about how we think about such 
laws, finding a balance between necessity and liberty in liberal democracies will always
111 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit o f Its Enemies Since 9/11. 
London: Simon & Shuster UK Ltd, 2006. p. 42.
112 Michael Ignatieff, “The Lesser Evil” Letter published in the New York Review of Books 15 August 
2004. Ignatieff was responding to Ronald Steel’s criticism o f The Lesser Evil that had been published in 
the Review on 25 July 2004.
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require a set of domestic and international institutions created to deal with the dilemmas 
in times of crisis. They are, as Ignatieff describes it, “devises of reason, designed in 
moments of tranquility, to master temptation in times of danger.”113
Applying the Lesser Evil
Yet this is perhaps one of the areas where the Bush administration has failed the lesser 
evil test. In arguing for new powers after 9/11 the administration has done all it could to 
restrain the powers of Congress and challenge the powers of the Supreme Court to 
maintain its policies. While it should not be too shocking that a political body is trying to 
assert power in a time of crisis, it is possible to argue that the Bush administration is 
taking this practice to a new level. The administration’s defenders cite Lincoln’s example 
of suspending habeas corpus during the Civil War as a measure to protect national 
security. Or, they remind us that military commissions have been used through out US 
history to prosecute individuals in the “chaotic and irregular circumstances of armed 
conflict”.114 However, as Arthur Schlesinger argues, Lincoln never claimed an inherent 
right to do what he did. In this way, the Bush White House has seized on historical 
aberrations and turned them into a doctrine of presidential power.115
Therefore, it is not hard to understand why cynics might remain sceptical of a lesser evil 
approach -  and for good reason. Democratic institutions are not always known for their 
willingness or ability to stand up to executive power. Congress has been relatively silent 
on the issue of law -  the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act perhaps being a significant, albeit 
rather late, attempt by Congress to limit the administration’s policies towards 
detainees.116 Yet even here the Bush administration has sought to limit the impact of such 
legislation through “signing statements” -  that is declarations upon Presidential signature 
of a piece of legislation which reserves the right to re-interpret or ignore portions of the
113 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 31.
114 DelFOrto, “Hearing on the Supreme Court’s Decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld”.
115 Mayer, “The Hidden Power”, p. 44.
116 109-359 109th Congress, Making Appropriations for the Department o f Defense for the Fiscal Year 
Ending September 30, 2006 and for Other Purposes. 18 December 2005 (H.R. 2863, Title X). (Also 
referred to as the Detainee Treatment Act)
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law. For example, on a bill that sought to prohibit federal funding to programs that 
collected intelligence in a manner that violated the Fourth Amendment, a signing 
statement was added upon signature which stated that the Commander-in-Chief had the 
right to collect intelligence in any way he deemed necessary.117 A similar signing 
statement was made on the Detainee Treatment Act.
It is possible, then, to remain sceptical about the ability or willingness for domestic and 
international institutions, including international law, to protect rights and freedoms. So 
far there have been many court cases and challenges to these policies -  perhaps the truest 
test of the lesser evil argument. A look at one of these cases reveals the balancing of 
liberty and security through process.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
As mentioned above, on 29 June 2006 the Supreme Court rendered judgement on the 
Bush administration’s policies in Hamdan v Rumsfeld.m  The case involved the legal 
situation of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni citizen and the former driver for Osama bin 
Laden who was captured in Afghanistan. Hamdan was charged with “conspiracy to 
commit terrorism” and was to be tried by a military commission. The government had 
argued that Hamdan was not a prisoner of war, the Geneva Conventions could not apply 
to him (or any enemy combatant that is not a POW) and that the President had the 
authority, given by Congress, to establish military commissions to try these enemy 
combatants in the war on terror. These assertions, of course, matched the political 
determinations and legal arguments presented to the public regarding the treatment of 
detainees that had been captured in the war on terror.
However, the arguments presented by the Bush administration were dealt a serious blow 
in the Court’s ruling which declared that military commissions are not expressly
117 Mayer, “The Hidden Power”, p. 55. Specifically, the signing statement read: “The executive branch 
shall construe these sections in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority o f the President.” The 
text o f the signing statement is available online at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/2005123Q-8.html.
118 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U .S . , 2006.
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authorized by any Congressional act. While Congress had sanctioned the use of military 
commissions to try offenders and offences against the laws of war, “conspiracy” is not a 
breach of the laws of war and therefore a suspect could not be tried for such an act in a 
military commission. Neither the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) or 
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) can be read to provide specific overriding 
authorization for the military commission to try Hamdan.
Together, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most acknowledge a 
general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in 
circumstances where justified under the Constitution and laws including the 
law of war. Absent a more specific congressional authorization, this Court’s 
task is...to decide whether Hamdan’s military commission is so justified...
The military commission at issue lacks the power to proceed because its 
structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and the four Geneva 
Conventions signed in 1949.119
Additionally, the Court added that the “procedures adopted to try Hamdan also violate the 
Geneva Conventions.” The Geneva Conventions were found to be applicable US law that 
the President’s authority could not overturn without the express direction/instruction from 
Congress. Finally, it was determined that Common Article 3 did apply to Hamdan as the 
Court found that it was intended to provide protection to individuals regardless of the 
characterization of the conflict. The argument that the Conventions did not apply because 
al-Qaida was a non-state actor and therefore not a party to the Geneva Conventions was 
not valid.
This ruling essentially undermined many of the Bush administrations arguments -  that 
the AUMF and Constitution granted the President sweeping powers to deal with a 
national emergency and that the Geneva Conventions did not and should not apply to a 
war on terror. Naturally, the Bush administration was not pleased with this turn of events. 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven G. Bradbury of the Department of Justice
119 See the decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 2006.
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indicated to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that he found many aspects of the 
Court’s judgments “problematic”, although he indicated that the Bush administration
190would abide by the ruling. Daniel J. DelPOrto, the Defense Department’s Deputy 
General Counsel, testified to the same Senate Committee that the military tribunals 
remained the best way to try enemy combatants for war crimes:
While tradition and common sense...provide strong support for alternative 
adjudication processes for terrorists and other unlawful enemy combatants, 
military necessity is perhaps the strongest reason of all. It is simply not 
feasible in times of war to gather evidence in a manner that meets strict 
criminal procedural requirements.121
Dell’Orto also expressed his wish that Congress and the President would work quickly to 
resolve the matter.
Given the above statements, it is clear that Bush administration officials are keen to work 
with Congress to preserve as much of the policy as it can. Yet it is also apparent that the 
ruling has forced some changes for the administration. On 7 July 2006, a two-page memo 
was issued by Gordon England, the Deputy Defense Secretary, which indicated that the 
US military will abide by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.122
The significance of this memo is clearly important as it marks a change from the Bush 
administration’s strict stance that the Conventions do not apply. The effect of this 
announcement, however, may be somewhat less revolutionary. Common Article 3
120 Steven Bradbury, “Statement o f Steven G. Bradbury Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, Department o f Justice, Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Concerning 
the Supreme Court’s Decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld” 11 July 2006. Available online at: 
http://iudiciarv.senate.gov/testimonv.cfin?id=1986&wit id=5505.
121 Daniel Dell’Orto, “Statement o f Daniel J. Dell’Orto Principal Deputy General Counsel, Office of 
General Counsel U.S. Department o f Defense, Before the Committtee on the Judiciary United States Senate 
Hearing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld” 11 July 2006. Available online at: 
http://iudiciarv.senate.gov/testimonv.cfrn?id=1986&wit id=5506.
122 It should be noted that the application o f Common Article 3 applies only to those detainees being held 
by the Department o f Defense. Detainees being held around the world by other US government agencies 
(such as the CIA) do not benefit from this protection.
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provides a bare minimum standard of humane treatment and is far less demanding than 
the full Conventions. It has always been the Bush administration’s stance that they are 
treating detainees “humanely” and that all policies towards suspects in Guantanamo meet 
this requirement. If the administration insists that its procedures are already humane, 
there may be less dramatic change in the treatment of detainees than what some 
advocates may be hoping for.
Additionally, it is still unclear as to what path the administration will choose with regards 
to the tribunals. The administration has announced that it wants to work with Congress to 
come up with a legislative solution which would give Congressional blessing to the 
commissions. However, some Republicans such as Senators John McCain and John 
Warner have indicated that they would prefer a slower process which designed a legal 
tribunal that could not be knocked-down by the Supreme Court. Some reports have 
suggested that the issue of the commissions have been very divisive among 
Congressional Republicans -  some who side with the administration and others who are 
more cautious or skeptical.123 Either way, given the efforts of the Bush administration 
over the past five years in defending its policies, it would be surprising to see a complete 
surrender of its position.124
123 See Kate Zemike and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Detainee Rights Create a Divide On Capitol Hill” New 
York Times. 10 July 2006. p.l; Maura Reynolds, “Messages Conflict on Detainee Trials”, Los Angeles 
Times. 14 July 2006. p. 22.
124 By early August 2006, it was clear that the Bush administration was going to press Congress to support 
its policies regarding the military commissions. For example, the New York Times reported in July 2006 
that after the Hamdan decision, legislation was being drafted by the Bush administration that set out new 
rules on bringing terror detainees to trial. The legislation would allow hearsay evidence to be introduced 
“unless it was deemed ‘unreliable’ and would permit defendants to be excluded from their own trials if  
necessary to protect national security, according to a copy of the proposal.” See David S. Cloud and Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg, “White House Bill Proposes System to Try Detainees” New York Times. 25 July 2006. 
Additionally, testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gonzales stated; “We believe that 
Congress should enact a new Code o f Military Commissions, modeled on the court-martial procedures of 
the Uniform Code o f Military Justice, or “UCMJ,” but adapted for use in the special context o f military 
commission trials o f terrorist unlawful combatants.” See “Statement of the Attorney General Before the 
Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, Concerning Legislation in Response to Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld” 2 August 2006. Available online: http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/August/Gonzales%2008-02-Q6.pdf. Gonzales did indicate that the 
administration’s proposal for changes to the military commissions would permit hearsay to be used as 
evidence. This approach is not permitted under the UCMJ. (Whether or not Congress would approve of the 
new commissions was not clear as o f the time o f writing. According to news reports, Senate Majority 
Leader Bill Frist indicated in early August 2006 that he expected a detainee bill to be presented to Congress
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Still, that the Bush administration has agreed to apply Common Article 3, the bare 
minimum treatment specified under the laws of war, to the conflict is, as has already been 
discussed, a significant move. This is especially so considering that the arguments against 
applying the Conventions had been put forward with considerable force. Whether or not 
major changes will result remains to be seen.
The Court ruling suggests that the Bush administration overreached in asserting powers 
in the post-9/11 environment. Specifically, the Court indicated that the administration 
needs to get permission from Congress and operate within the limits of the law -  even 
when it comes to matters of national security. Additionally, despite being in a “new 
paradigm”, the Court recognized that there are still domestic and international standards 
and obligations which apply to the conduct of hostilities despite the assertions of the 
administration. Finally, the Courts recognized the role of international law that the US 
Congress has acknowledged as binding. In this way, the Courts recognized that there are 
limits on the treatment of detainees regardless of the characterization of the conflict. 
Although such limits are vague (just what constitutes “humane treatment” is still a matter 
of dispute) they can be interpreted and enforced.
Vindicating the lesser evil?
A look at the American detainee policy reveals that the facts on the ground are changing. 
The American detention policies of 2002 are not the same as the policies of 2003, 2004 
or 2005, and they continue to evolve. For better or worse, American policy regarding 
detainee issues has been developing since 2002 -  partially out of a response to domestic 
and international criticism. However, perhaps more important is the fact that many of the 
changes have been forced by democratic institutions, especially the Supreme Court 
decisions as well as legislation brought forward.
in September 2006.) See Anne Plummer Flaherty, “Senators Skeptical o f Tribunal Plans” Associated Press, 
2 August, 2006.
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In this sense there may be some merit to the lesser evil argument. Domestic and 
democratic institutions seem to be having an effect on Bush administration policies where 
international pressure is not. Policies which restrict the rights of detainees, justified under 
arguments about a “new paradigm”, are being challenged in courts and legislatures. The 
overall effect thus far has proved to be mixed. The Courts seem to be willing to assert 
authority, but Congress has arguably been very lax in its monitoring of or input into 
detainee policies. But the changes coming out of democratic institutions are having at 
least some effect and are forcing the administration’s hand to act or respond to these 
developments. The end result is uncertain -  but it would appear that change, albeit slow 
change, continues to be on the horizon. The courts have stepped in where the 
administration went too far, but the administration continues to fight back with new 
legislation to have the policies it wants.125
Conclusion
The problems encountered when societies need to balance liberty and security are nothing 
new. The need to fight an effective campaign that also reflects the core humanitarian 
agreements of the last 100 years is a somewhat more recent problem -  but was hardly a 
new issue by the time the war on terror began in 2001. Yet the horrific attacks of 9/11 
and America’s Guantanamo policy has caused these questions to reemerge in an urgent 
manner.
In some ways, the questions come down to legal interpretation. But the underlying 
political and moral arguments which form the backdrop to the legal debate seem to hold 
the key in understanding why America chose the path it has taken and the justification for 
its policies. The arguments of the New Sovereigntists are moral and political arguments 
in their defense of the idea that political communities should not be accountable to any 
form of international law, especially when it comes to their self-defense. The idea that 
actions to protect the life of a political community should be subject to an unaccountable
125 For examples, see the above footnote.
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prosecutor is, in this view, irresponsible, if not immoral. Yet humanitarians are correct to 
point out that such an attitude leaves open the road to unrestricted slaughter. The US has 
signed treaties on the laws of war because it participated in their negotiation and signed 
them because it was seen as being in its interest. In the last thirty years, they have put a 
remarkable amount of effort into ensuring that laws of war principles are included in 
training and targeting. That it should turn its back on such a tradition has come as a deep 
shock to many.
This chapter has put forth the argument that the origins of the Guantanamo controversy 
began with the rise of the New Sovereigntist critique in the 1990s, as well as the 
frustrations encountered with the Kosovo campaign in 1999, both in terms of the 
requirements of coalition warfare under NATO, and the actions of the ICTY. The sudden 
and brutal realization of the nature of the threat that America (if not the West) was now 
facing after 9/11, suggested to many that the war on terror was going to require a new 
type of fighting, and that the nature of the threat called for a new evaluation of the 
international law applicable to warfare. Such arguments also emphasized the need for a 
Presidential powers which could override domestic or international legislation which, in 
the eyes of the Bush administration, are necessary to protect the United States.
This chapter has also tried to show that arguments criticizing US policy coming from the 
international legal community have been very thorough in their legal analysis and mostly 
very severe in their critique of the interpretation of the law that America has presented. 
The difficulty with these counter-arguments is that they ignore and thus fail to deal with 
the political and moral arguments being put forward by the New Sovereigntists and the 
Bush administration. To argue that violations of international law are occurring to an 
administration that has essentially downplayed the relevance of international law is 
probably going to be ineffective. Instead, it has been domestic courts which have brought 
about the most (albeit gradual) change and political arguments that continue to hold sway. 
At the very least, on an academic level, arguments that take the New Sovereigntist 
position seriously need to be presented.
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One such argument, briefly touched on here, is that the New Sovereigntists tend to 
downplay the links between law, policy and effective fighting. If effective fighting 
depends on policy, and policy to a great extent depends on law, including the laws of war, 
then is not the argument that the Geneva Conventions do not matter dangerous for US 
effectiveness? It may be argued that this is a very theoretical argument -  but some argue 
that US willingness to ignore parts of the Geneva Convention directly lead to the 
controversy over Abu Gharib prison in 2004, doing damage to America’s image in and 
outside Iraq. The events at Abu Gharib and the question of a possible link to 
Guantanamo will be addressed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Failure of an Ethos?
Operation Iraqi Freedom, America and the Law of Armed Conflict after 
Abu Ghraib
Introduction
If the 1991 Gulf War indicated how effective the laws of war could be in modem 
warfare, the 2003 Iraq war may be considered to demonstrate the opposite. In terms of 
the “war” aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the fighting may be said to have been 
relatively uncontroversial in terms of the laws of war and certainly over with very 
quickly.1 Beginning on 19 March 2003 and lasting for 27 days, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom was conducted with remarkable speed and in a relatively humane manner.2 
By 15 April, Coalition forces were in control of all major Iraqi cities and the Baathist 
leadership had disintegrated. On 1 May 2003 President Bush declared a formal end to
-j
major combat operations.
Yet it was precisely when the fighting ended and the occupation phase of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom began that the troubles seemed to have started. The Coalition’s 
presence in Iraq has been plagued by a violent and bloody insurgency, described in 
July 2003 as “a classical guerrilla-type campaign” by Commander of the United
‘See, for example Michael N. Schmitt, “Conduct o f  Hostilities During Operational Iraqi Freedom: An 
International Humanitarian Law Assessment”, 6 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 2003. 
pp. 73-110.
2 NGOs critiqued the US for the decapitation strikes aimed at the Iraqi leadership on 20 March 2003 
and for the use o f cluster munitions. During the campaign, Amnesty International argued for “an 
immediate moratorium on the use o f cluster bombs by US/UK forces and on other weapons that are 
inherently indiscriminate or otherwise prohibited under international humanitarian law”. See Amnesty 
International “Iraq: Civilians under fire” AI Index: MDE14/071/2003, 8 April 2003. Available online 
at: http://web.amnestv.org/librarv/Index/ENGMDEl40712003: Also see Human Rights Watch, 
“Background on International Humanitarian Law, War Crimes and the War in Iraq” Available online: 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/12/ihl-qna.htm. Human Rights Watch concluded “U.S.-led Coalition 
forces took precautions to spare civilians and, for the most part, made efforts to uphold their legal 
obligations. Human Rights Watch nevertheless identified practices that led to civilian casualties in the 
air war, ground war, and post-conflict period.” Additionally, HRW argued that the Coalition did not 
investigate matters thoroughly enough as to why civilians had been killed in some circumstances. See 
Human Rights Watch, “O ff Target: The Conduct o f the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq” December 
2003. Available online: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usal203/.
3 For an overview o f Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent challenges that Iraq has faced, see 
the summary by Steve Bowman, “Iraq: U.S. Military Operations” Congressional Research Service, 
Library o f Congress, Updated 23 January 2006. Available online: 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/25375.pdf
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States Central Command (CENTCOM) General John Abizaid.4 It is typically assumed 
that the insurgency is led by a core group of fighters and supported by a larger pool of 
active and passive supporters sympathetic to the cause, predominantly drawn from the 
Sunni Muslim population.5
In terms of the law of war, this proved to be a frustrating situation. With the onset of 
looting and violence immediately following the invasion, as well as the emerging 
insurgency, the law which properly governed the military operations in Iraq was 
unclear. Did the situation remain an international armed conflict, or was it a case of an 
internal armed conflict, or a mixture of the two? On top of this, there was the legal 
issue of occupation to sort out in terms of policies and obligations on the ground.6 As 
Adam Roberts argues, there is no dispute about the fact that between April 2003 and 
28 June 2004 there was a foreign military occupation in Iraq.7 However, after the 
transition to the Iraqi Interim Government on the latter date and the election of a 
government, the situation grew more confusing. While the Iraqis have increasingly 
taken charge of their own country, the continued presence of Coalition troops, 
ongoing hostilities, and the instability of the new Iraqi government suggests that the 
law governing occupation (albeit a changing occupation) and the law of war, remain 
important issues in post-war Iraq. In fact, in terms of law, the Iraq conflict appears to 
have been the most problematic for the US since Vietnam. And these issues only 
became more complicated when, in 2004, pictures of abuse committed by US troops 
at Abu Ghraib prison were splashed across the pages of newspapers around the world.
The last chapter examined how the case for a rebalancing of the need for security and 
obligations to international law was put forward by the Bush administration after 
9/11, but also how a sceptical sentiment towards international law had been growing 
in certain legal circles and came to influence the administration’s response. Yet when 
such a rebalancing was implemented, there appears to have been several crucial errors
4 US Department o f Defense News Briefing “DoD News Briefing - Mr. Di Rita and Gen. Abizaid” 16 
July 2003. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030716-0401 .html.
5 Bowman, “Iraq”, p. 7.
6 A good and brief summary o f the law o f belligerent occupation, Michael N. Schmitt “The Law o f  
Beligerent Occupation”, Crimes o f War Project, 15 April 2003. Available online: 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/news-iraq5.html.
7 Adam Roberts, “The End o f Occupation in Iraq”, Policy Brief, Harvard Program on Humanitarian 
Policy and Conflict Research, 28 June 2004. Available online:
http://www.ih lresearch.org/iraq/feature.php?a=51.
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made by the Bush administration, including failures of oversight, failures to consider 
the roles of new actors in the ongoing conflict and failure to establish whether the 
“new rules” were robust enough to withstand the pressures of an emerging 
insurgency. This chapter will look at the implications of Operation Iraqi Freedom for 
America’s relationship with the laws of war through the prism of the Abu Ghraib
Q
controversy. The argument will proceed on the basis that the abuse which took place 
at the prison highlights several issues for this relationship, including the Bush 
administration’s policies regarding the laws of war, private military firms and military 
training. In doing so it will look at whether American policies regarding the laws of 
war and its military doctrine which are designed to enforce an “ethos” are adequate 
for the ethical challenges posed by the war on terror.
What went wrong at Abu Ghraib?
Background
Even before the pictures of detainees being sexually humiliated, terrified and 
physically abused were made public in the spring of 2004, it had become apparent to 
many in Iraq and Washington that something was not quite right about the prison 
arrangement. The prison itself, which had been one of Saddam Hussein’s most 
notorious, was re-opened as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in August 2003, after it was increasingly becoming 
apparent that the conflict was transforming itself from a traditional war to an 
insurgency.
Originally, the intention was to house only criminals, but as more and more insurgents 
and “security detainees” were captured throughout the autumn of 2003, these
8 As indicated above, there are several possible issues here that could be explored. There are, however, 
good reasons to focus the chapter on the scandal at Abu Ghraib. First, controversy over targeting is a 
perennial issue when it comes to the law o f war in armed conflict. It would seem that every time bombs 
are dropped by Western forces that there are those who will always declare such actions illegal or 
controversial no matter the outcome. Second, and in this vein, the scandal over Abu Ghraib was a 
controversy in the way that targeting issues have not been. The shock and outrage that the abuse at the 
prison generated was substantial and provoked almost universal condemnation. Finally, as this work 
has primarily looked at issues surrounding prisoners of war and detention issues, focusing on Abu 
Ghraib makes sense in terms o f the focus o f the larger project being presented.
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individuals were kept in the same centres. According to several military reports on 
conditions at Abu Ghraib, the flood of incoming detainees overwhelmed the staff. 
This was confounded by the fact that relatively few individuals were being released. 
Significantly, while this initial peak of detainees were being collected, many of the 
military police and interrogators coming from the US Reserves had reached the 
mandatory two-year limit on their mobilization time and were being sent home. 
According to one report, this resulted in a situation where “the ranks of soldiers 
having custody of detainees in Iraq fell to about half strength.”9
By virtually all accounts, conditions at Abu Ghraib were exceptionally poor for both 
detainee and military personnel alike. Part of the problem seems to stem from the fact 
that the Bush administration had failed to properly anticipate post-war conditions.10 
This includes the failure to commit enough troops necessary to ensure order in post­
war Iraq, the failure to anticipate a resistance that had been coordinating their efforts 
months before the initial invasion and, finally, an ideologically lead belief that 
Coalition troops would be welcomed as liberators. As a result, few had anticipated 
the resistance that American troops would encounter, and those who did had been 
shoved aside in the lead up to the invasion.11
As a result, there was inadequate preparation for the establishment of prisons or a 
prison system, and the conditions at Abu Ghraib were appalling for soldier and 
prisoner alike. Janis Karpinski, the commanding general in charge of rebuilding the 
civilian prison system, described Abu Ghraib “as the worst MP assignment
i
possible.” A psychological assessment of the conditions at Abu Ghraib, included as 
a part of one of the reports on the prison scandal concluded, “all present at Abu
9 “Final Report o f the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations Inspection” (The 
Schlesinger Report), August 2004. Cited in Karen J. Greenburgh and Joshua L. Dratel eds. The Torture 
Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 921.
10 Perhaps the one o f  the most critical o f all o f the accounts o f the failures o f Bush administration 
policies regarding Iraq is from Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story o f the 
Invasion and Occupation o f  Iraq. London: Atlantic Books, 2006. Also see the remarks o f a former 
Senior Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, Larry Diamond, “What Went 
Wrong in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs. Vol. 83 No. 5, September/October 2004.
11 As Larry Diamond argues, “Contemptuous o f the State Department’s regional experts who were seen 
as too “soft” to remake Iraq, a small group o f Pentagon officials ignored the elaborate postwar planning 
the State Department had overseen through its ‘Future o f Iraq’ project, which had anticipated many o f  
the problems that had emerged after the invasion.” Larry Diamond, “What went Wrong in Iraq”.
12 Janis Karpinski, One Woman’s Army: The Commanding General o f Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story. 
New York: Miramax Books, 2005. p. 208.
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Ghraib were truly in personal danger. Daily mortar attacks from without and sporadic
prisoner riots from within led to several deaths and numerous injuries of both Soldiers 
11and detainees alike.” As conditions worsened, prisoners began to attempt to escape 
from the prison and several succeeded. By November 2003, there were riots in protest 
of living conditions. This lead to the shooting of 12 detainees on 24 November with 
three fatalities. Through to the end of December 2003 there were at least four more 
shooting incidents and numerous escapes.
Although military staff at Abu Ghraib, requested more personnel to help with the 
situation, this was denied by superiors in Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7)14, 
the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and US Central 
Command (CENTCOM). Still, as conditions deteriorated, it was becoming rapidly 
apparent that the situation at Abu Ghraib needed a great deal of improvement. 
Assistance was requested from the Provost Marshal General of the Army, Major 
General Donald Ryder who was tasked with providing suggestions and 
recommendations for reform. Yet, as the Schlesinger Report indicates, “There seemed 
to be some misunderstanding of the... intent, however, since MG Ryder viewed his 
visit primarily as an assessment of how to transfer the detention program to the Iraqi 
prison system.”15 In other words, Ryder, who assessed the operations at Abu Ghraib 
from 11 October to 6 November, seems to have failed to pick up on the major abuses 
of prisoners that were taking place by this point.
Indeed, according to the dates of the pictures of the prisoners being abused in Abu 
Ghraib, most of the abuses occurred from between October-December 2003. On 13 
January 2004, Specialist Joseph Darby alerted his superiors to the abuse taking place 
and turned in a CD-ROM of incriminating pictures, taken from the laptop of one of 
the perpetrators. This immediately spurred an investigation into the abuse that was 
summarized in the March 2004 Taguba Report. Although the military did announce
13 Col Henry Nelson, “AR 15-16 Investigation -  Allegations o f Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib: 
Psychological Assessment” Annexed to “Article 15-16 Investigation o f the 800th Military Police 
Brigade” (The Taguba Report), March 2004. Cited in Karen J. Greenburgh and Joshua L. Dratel eds. 
The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp. 448- 
449.
14 Re-designated Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Corps-Iraq on 15 May 2004.
15 “Final Report o f  the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations” (the Schlesinger 
Report), Cited in Karen J. Greenburgh and Joshua L. Dratel eds. The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu 
Ghraib. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp 908-986. p. 944.
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that an investigation was taking place at a press conference in January 2004, the 
nature of the abuses which took place or public awareness of them did not truly turn 
into outrage until the photographs were made available to the public at the end of 
April 2004.
Source(s) o f  the Abuse?
Since the publication of the graphic pictures indicating the scale of abuse at Abu 
Ghraib there has certainly not been a shortage of theories at to how such actions -  
clearly in breach of international law, military codes of conduct and criminal law -  
could have occurred. How could trained soldiers of a western democracy treat 
individuals, detainees or not, in such a manner?
In terms of the theories, commentaries and criticisms which have emerged, it is 
possible to argue that there are two generalizable categories. The first group of 
theories are those which have often come out of US military investigations and 
reports themselves. These arguments tend to suggest that the source for the abuse at 
Abu Ghraib lies with low-ranking individuals and their direct superiors. In addition, 
they tend to argue that conditions, doctrinal training that did not match actual 
conditions and failures to supply adequately sufficient equipment, but more 
problematically, troops, to the prison, played a significant role in leading to the 
ultimate deterioration of order inside Abu Ghraib.
The second typically comes from journalists and human rights advocates who argue 
that Abu Ghraib is the direct result of America’s failure to adhere to international law 
-  that the abuse which occurred is undeniably linked to US policies in Afghanistan 
and Guantanamo Bay’s Camp Delta. In this camp is the argument that the ultimate 
responsibility for Abu Ghraib lies at the highest levels of the George W. Bush 
administration.
What divides these two groups is where responsibility ultimately lies and whether the 
root causes of the abuse were in fact systemic. A brief look at these two groups of
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arguments will be useful here in order to determine implications for the American 
military and its relationship with the laws of war.
Arguments for “condition specific ” roots o f the abuse
There have been several reports into the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison conducted by the 
US Department of Defense -  some of which have already been mentioned.16 For the 
purpose of this section the reports examined include the March 2004 “Article 15-6 
Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade” (the Taguba Report), the July 2004 
“Department of the Army, The Inspector General -  Detainee Operations Inspection” 
(the Mikolashek Report), the August 2004 “Final Report of the Independent Panel to 
Review DoD Detention Operations” (the Schlesinger Report) and the August 2004 
“Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib/Investigation o the Abu Ghraib 
Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, LTG Anthony R Jones/Invesitgation of
tfithe Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205 Military Intelligence Brigade, MG 
George IU Fay” (the Fay-Jones Report).17
16 The major reports on the abuse are: MG Miller Report, “Assessment o f  Interrogation & Detention 
Operations in Iraq” (September 2003); MG Ryder Report, “Assessment o f Detention & Corrections 
Operations in Iraq” (November 2003); BG Jacoby Report, “Inspection o f  Detainee Operation & 
Facilities in Afghanistan” (July 2004); Mikolashek Report, “Department o f the Army, The Inspector 
General -  Detainee Operations Inspection” (July 2004); MG Taguba Report, “Article 15-16 
Investigation o f the 800th Military Police Brigade” (July 2004); Schlesinger Report, “Final Report of  
the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations” (August 2004); Fay/Jones Report 
“Investigation o f Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib/Investigation o the Abu Ghraib Prison and 
205th Military Intelligence Brigade, LTG Anthony R Jones/Invesitgation o f the Abu Ghraib Detention 
Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, MG George R. Fay” (August 2004); BG Formica 
“Investigation Into Abuse (SOF) on Arabian Peninsula” (November 2004); Church Report “Review o f  
Policy, Doctrine, Gaps & Seams” (February 2005).
17 Although all o f  these documents are available online through the DoD website, I have accessed them 
through an edited collection o f  papers, reports and memos regarding Abu Ghraib. Karen J. Greenberg 
and Joshua L Dratel, The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. Page numbers will therefore refer to this collection. This section has chosen not to look at 
the MG Ryder Report as it deals more with the overall problems o f the prison system in the fall o f 2003 
rather than the abuse directly. Certainly the Ryder Report should be taken as a document which 
forewarned o f many o f the problems that occurred. Other reports not discussed here are the Jacoby 
Report, Formica Report which were not released to the public until June 2006. The Jacoby Report was 
mainly concerned with the treatment o f Afghan detainees and the Formica Report on detainees in Iraq 
by Special Forces. Both reports essentially agree with the points made by the others -  that there were 
serious faults in training, oversight and that many o f the actions taken (such as feeding prisoners only 
bread and water for 18 days) constituted abuse. Both reports also suggest problems with oversight and 
generally support the findings and recommendations o f the above mentioned Reports. The Church 
Report, which investigated all Department o f Defense detainee operations, has still not been fully 
released. However, an executive summary, again mostly supporting the contentions o f  the other 
reports, was presented to the public.
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Although these reports were commissioned at different times, by different people with 
similar yet differing purposes, they all seem to suggest similar conclusions about what 
went wrong at Abu Ghraib. First, all of the above reports comment on the poor 
conditions at Abu Ghraib, not only for detainees, but also for the military staff 
working there. The reports make it clear that the prison was often under attack by 
insurgents and the staff was left to manage a mixed population of prisoners (who 
included both men and women, criminals, insurgents, enemy prisoners of war, 
“security detainees”) who were very hostile to their captors. Poor quality food for 
prisoners and military personnel, a lack of resources (such as secure radios for 
communication or an internet connection and even according to some reports, clothes) 
and a serious overcrowding of prisoners combined with a shortage of personnel 
(which in turn led to shortcomings in leadership oversight) to make an incredibly 
stressful environment. The Taguba Report included an annex dealing with a 
psychological assessment which argued “Given this atmosphere of danger, 
promiscuity, and negativity, the worst human qualities and behaviours came to the
1 ftfore and a perverse dominance came to prevail, especially at Abu Ghraib.”
Part of the problem, according to the above reports, included the fact that the training 
received by the individuals at Abu Ghraib was insufficient or inadequate. Detention
tlitraining was only given to some of the soldiers. While the 800 Brigade -  the brigade 
which most of those charged with war crimes came from -  had planned for a major 
detention exercise during the summer of 2002, this was cancelled following the 
activation of many Reservist troops after September 11. The Schlesinger report also 
claimed that training in managing detention facilities at mobilization sites failed to 
prepare units for conducting detention operations:
Leaders of inspected reserve units stated in interviews that they did not 
receive a clear mission statement prior to mobilization and were not 
notified of their mission until after deploying. Personnel interviewed 
described being placed immediately in stressful situations in a detention 
facility with thousands of non-compliant detainees and not being trained
18 Nelson, “Psychological Assessment”, Annex to the Taguba Report, p. 448.
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to handle them. Units arriving in theatre were given just a few days to 
conduct a handover from the outgoing units. Once deployed, these 
newly arrived units had difficulty gaining access to the necessary 
documentation on tactics, techniques, and procedures to train their 
personnel on the... essential attacks of their new mission. A prime 
example is that relevant Army manuals and publications were available 
only online, but personnel did not have access to computers or the 
internet.19
The Taguba report draws similar conclusions, especially as regards the laws of war:
I also find that very little instruction or training was provided to MP 
personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, [and applicable Field Manuals].
Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions
00were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees.
Additionally, as the Mikolashek Report notes, because most personnel were not
trained in detention operations, they were unaware of Army doctrinal requirements,
or policies and procedures that address the responsibilities for confinement, security,
01preventative medicine and interrogation.
Related to this, all of the reports conclude that military doctrine was also insufficient 
or inadequate for the situation that the personnel on the ground at Abu Ghraib found 
themselves in. As the Taguba report notes, the 800th MP Brigade was originally 
designed to conduct standard prisoner of war operations in Kuwait and that the 
doctrine used to train military personnel are based on templates predicated on a
compliant, self-disciplining prison population rather than criminals or high-risk
00security detainees. The Mikolashek report also noted that:
19 Schlessinger Report, p. 934.
20 Taguba Report, p. 419.
21 Mikolashek Report, p. 665.
22 Taguba Report, p. 411-2.
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Doctrine does not address the unique characteristics of [Operation Iraqi 
Freedom] and [Operation Enduring Freedom], specifically operations in 
non-linear battlespaces and large numbers of detainees whose status is 
not readily identifiable as combatants, criminals or innocents.... 
Detainee doctrine does not address operations in a non-linear 
battlespace.23
In other words, the doctrine that the military was dealing with had its origins and 
thinking firmly rooted in the Cold War and in European-battlespace mentality with 
compliant prisoners of war who would be quickly and relatively easily evacuated 
from the battlefield.
Yet although conditions were bad in Abu Ghraib, they did not have to lead to what 
several of the reports describe as “purposeless sadism.”24 Clearly other brigades and 
soldiers faced moral dilemmas or shortfalls in doctrine while carrying out operations 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom but then did not lead to 
the same levels of abuse seen at Abu Ghraib. This is where the reports tend to place 
blame with low-ranking individuals who actually committed the abuse and, for the 
most part their direct superiors. As the Mikolashek Report claims, the occurrences of 
abuses at Abu Ghraib are “aberrations” and atypical of the military:
The abuses that have occurred... are not representative of policy, 
doctrine or soldier training. These abuses were unauthorized actions 
taken by a few individuals, coupled with the failure of a few leaders to 
provide adequate monitoring, supervision, and leadership over those 
soldiers.25
And later on in the Report that “In those instances where detainee abuse occurred, 
individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training or Army 
values...”26
23 Mikolashek Report, p. 664-5.
24 For example, see the Schlesinger Report, p. 909.
25 Mikolashek Report, p. 635.
26 Mikolashek Report, p. 636.
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Yet it is also interesting that two of the reports include psychological assessments of 
the situation of Abu Ghraib and of those who committed the abuse. The Schlesinger 
Report explicitly cites several studies dealing with obedience to authority and with 
prison environments, in trying to explain what went wrong in Abu Ghraib.27 Taguba 
found that psychological factors played a major role in the abuse, including cultural 
differences, the poor quality of life and the real presence of mortal danger over an 
extended time period. The report also notes that “There was a complex interplay of 
many psychological factors and command insufficiencies.”29 The Mikolashek Report 
gives several reasons in its report as to why detainee abuse may occur despite efforts 
to eliminate detainee abuse including “the psychological process that increases the 
likelihood of abusive behaviour where one person has complete control over 
another”.30
Arguably, by placing blame on psychological factors, the responsibility for the abuse 
can be placed more on individuals rather than on policy. Part of the criticism 
emerging from this line of argument is resounding criticism of the immediate 
leadership of the Abu Ghraib abusers for failing to observe and take note of the 
deteriorating material and psychological conditions at the prison. Taguba is extremely 
harsh in his criticism of the military leadership involved in the abuse at Abu Ghraib. 
This includes Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800 MP Brigade who, 
the Report alleges, did a poor job in allocating resources and ensuring that there were 
appropriate standard operating procedures for dealing with detainees at detention 
facilities in Iraq. Additionally the Report notes that Karpinski failed to take 
appropriate action regarding ineffective staff and that numerous and reported
27 These include Haney, C., Banks C., and Zimbardo, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison”, 
International Journal o f  Criminology and Penology. 1973, 1, 69-97; and the work o f  Dr. Robert Jay 
Lifton who has argued that ordinary people can experience a “socializing to evil”, especially in a war 
environment. Schlesinger Report, Appendix G, “Psychological Stresses”, pp 970-972. For his part, 
Lifton appears to agree, at least regarding the role o f medical personnel in the War on Terror, writing: 
“We know that medical personnel have failed to report to higher authorities wounds that were clearly 
caused by torture and that they have neglected to take steps to interrupt this torture. In addition, they 
have turned over prisoners' medical records to interrogators who could use them to exploit the 
prisoners' weaknesses or vulnerabilities. We have not yet learned the extent o f  medical involvement in 
delaying and possibly falsifying the death certificates o f prisoners who have been killed by torturers.” 
Lifton, Robert Jay, “Doctors and Torture” New England Journal o f Medicine. Vol. 315, No 5. 2004 pp. 
415-6.
28 Taguba Report, p. 438.
29 Taguba Report, p. 443.
30 Mikolashek Report, p. 656.
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accountability lapses were not corrected. The Schlesinger Report goes so far as to 
argue that Sanchez “should have taken stronger action in November when he realized 
the extent of the leadership problems at Abu Ghraib” and that both Lieutenant 
General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of CJTF-7 and Walter Wojdakowski, his 
Deputy General Commander, failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and 
interrogation operations.32
The leadership point is an interesting one. Certainly the failures to punish those who 
were carrying out the abuse and to rectify the serious failing at Abu Ghraib seem to 
have lead to a culture of permissiveness that allowed the abuse to continue. Yet this is 
one of the areas where the reports tend to differ. The Taguba Report concentrates 
most of its blame on the leadership of Karpinski and her immediate subordinates who 
failed to adequately monitor what was going on in Abu Ghraib. This may be a result 
of the fact that the report was researched and written before the photographs of the 
abuse were in the public domain and there was less pressure to look at leadership 
further towards the top or bottom of the command chain. The Mikolashek Report 
tends to place increased responsibility on the individuals who actually carried out the 
acts, several times stating that there were no “systemic” causes for the abuse. The 
Schlesinger Report, perhaps the most political of the reports, makes specific 
arguments about higher levels of leadership, including Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld, it is claimed, should have better utilized the legal opinions of 
the Judge Advocates and General Counsels regarding detainee policies so as to have 
ensured a more consistent practice.34
This is perhaps indicative of the fact that there is still much uncertainty as to where 
the responsibility for the abuse should go. However, as mentioned above, there is 
another group of theories who believe that the events at Abu Ghraib were the direct 
result of the George W. Bush administration’s policies -  and that the real 
responsibility lies at a much higher level.
31 Taguba Report, p. 439.
32 Schlesinger Report 915.
33 Mikolashek Report -  see the Foreword, p. 632. The Report specifically defines an issue as 
“systemic” if  it can be found horizontally across many various types o f units, or vertically through 
many command levels from squad through division or higher level. In this way, the Report argues that 
the abuse should be considered “isolated events.” P. 652.
34 Schlesinger 924.
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Systemic causes o f  the abuse
Since the discovery of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, there have been many editorials and 
books written that tend to blame systemic factors and deliberate actions by the Bush 
administration. These arguments tend to come from journalists, lawyers and 
academics who argue that it is possible to directly trace the actions of the prison 
guards at Abu Ghraib to the confused legal and material situation on the ground 
created by high-ranking military officials and even members of the Bush cabinet.35 
Although each argument comes with its own agenda36 and understanding of the 
circumstances depending on the time it was written, it is possible to put forward a 
summary of points that are being made.
The first point relates to the discussion in the last chapter as to the alleged distain for 
international law held by the Bush administration and its supporters. Philippe Sands 
argues that “Distain for global rules underpins the whole enterprise”37 and David Rose 
writes of the way the administration is “isolationist and disinclined to fetter its 
autonomy through treaties and international law”. Therefore, in the wake of 9/11, 
Bush’s decision that the war on terror would be fought “according to new rules of his 
own administration’s devising” was really a “reflex” response.38 This distain has lead
35 O f course there are many books from which one could chose in order to demonstrate this point. In 
order to make a concise argument, four books dealing with international law and the war on terror were 
chosen that were published between 2004-5. Two are by journalists (Seymour M. Hersh who played a 
role in bringing the Abu Ghraib scandal to light and David Rose, a British journalist who travelled to 
Guantanamo and who was writing shortly after the scandal emerged) and two lawyer/academics 
(Philippe Sands and Michael Byers.) This is, naturally, an arbitrary decision and allegations that the 
responsibility for the torture lies with the Bush administration are not limited to these books. Even in 
her relatively descriptive book on the role o f international law in the war on terror, Helen Duffy, an 
international law and human rights advocate notes that “In light o f the parallel allegations arising from 
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, others have emerged as to these practices revealing 
a systemic policy o f  either encouraging, purporting to justify or turning a blind eye, to such abuse.” 
Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework o f International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. p. 268. Still, it is the assertion here that a basic summary o f the arguments put 
forward by this ‘group’ may be summarized by looking at these texts.
36 It is fair to say that most o f these works start from an anti-war/anti-Bush perspective. Virtually all o f  
the authors listed here agree that the Iraq War was illegal under international law and that Bush 
administration policies are as wrong as they are dangerous. The works cited here should be understood 
in this context.
37 Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking o f Global Rules. London: 
Allen Lane, 2005. p. 221.
38 David Rose: Guant&namo: America’s War on Human Rights. London: Faber and Faber, 2004.
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to the down playing of international humanitarian and human rights law and has 
encouraged policies which, when carried out against detainees, amount to torture.
This, it is argued, was arranged by a group of ‘political appointee’ lawyers who, 
rather than serving the cause of law, have bent, twisted and reinterpreted international 
rules to suit the purposes of their political masters. Sands provides what is, perhaps, 
one of the most resounding critiques of these lawyers writing that “The ‘war on 
terrorism’ has led many lawyers astray. This phoney ‘war’ has been used to eviscerate 
well-established and sensible rules of international law ...”39 He claims that the 
arguments and legal interpretations of whether or not the US is bound to particular 
treaties and international obligations has been made by “political appointees, many of 
whom had no real background in international law or were closely associated with a 
group of American academics known to be hostile to international law.”40 On this 
point Sands lays out special criticism for former White House Council (and now 
Attorney General) Alberto Gonzales, former Assistant Attorney-General Jay S. Bybee 
and former Deputy Assistant Attorney-General John Yoo, who all had a role in 
“redefining” the administration’s obligation to adhere to the Geneva Conventions and 
international treaties on torture. Rose argues that “at every location in the global war 
on terror, from Washington DC to Afghanistan, previous restraints on the treatment of 
prisoners was being reconsidered and in significant ways abandoned” by lawyers 
from all branches of the military and intelligence agencies 41 These redefinitions and 
reclassifications of what constituted legal treatment of detainees, what obligations the 
US had to “detainees” as opposed to prisoners of war and what activities amounted to 
torture, created a climate of legal confusion which seemed to suggest that suspected 
terrorist had no rights under international law and could be subject to whatever 
treatment or abuse that was deemed to be prudent. The abuse at Abu Ghraib was 
therefore the tragic logical endpoint of this misleading legal strategy.
The systemic argument then rests on the idea that officials within the Bush 
administration pushed forward a legally (and morally) dubious interpretation of the 
law that was readily accepted as sound legal advice given the already skeptical view
39 Sands, Lawless World, p. 205.
40 Sands, Lawless World, p. 229.
41 Rose, Guant&namo. pp. 90-2.
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of international rules that the Bush administration had. This created, throughout world 
where the global war on terror is being fought, a confused environment for military 
personnel on the ground. The administration had developed several categories of 
detainees -  enemy prisoners of war proper, prisoners of war who were eligible for the 
protections of the Geneva Convention but failed to meet the criteria set out by the 
Conventions, “security detainees”, ordinary criminals, insurgents, etc. Each group was 
entitled to a different set of rights or, alternatively, a different set of interrogation 
methods that could be used. As Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted in 
Hamdi et al v. Rumsfeld, the Bush administration never actually set out a list of 
criteria determining the distinctions between the different categories.42 In a situation 
where legal definitions and categories were in flux, it is not surprising that abuse took 
place. As Sands argues, “it seems pretty clear that the legal minds which created 
Bush’s doctrine of pre-emption in the use of force and established the procedures at 
the Guantanamo detention camp led directly to an environment in which the 
monstrous images from Abu Ghraib could be created.”43
However, criticism is not just directed towards the executive branch of the American 
government, but also the complacency of Congress, lawmakers and even the media 
who have allowed the Bush administration to ‘get away with it.’ In the same way that 
military leaders failed to control and curtail the actions of the Abu Ghraib prison 
guards through a lack of oversight and regulation, Sands argues that the US Congress 
did not engage with the issues until late in the day. He also accuses the US media of 
taking its eye off the ball or becoming “engaged in the kind of 9/11 coverage that 
made it impossible to give rules which might constrain American actions a decent 
hearing.”44 Although he notes that the allegations at Abu Ghraib are beginning to 
cause the evaporation of an unquestioned-environment for the Bush administration, 
Rose argues that the American responses to criticism on the war on terror had been 
marked with “complacency and insouciance.”45 Even after the fact, there was a failure 
of Congress to follow up on what happened at Abu Ghraib and to determine who
42 Specifically, she argued in the majority opinion: “The threshold question before us is whether the 
Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as "enemy combatants." There is some 
debate as to the proper scope o f this term, and the Government has never provided any court with the 
full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.”
43 Sands, Lawless World, p. 221.
44 Sands, Lawless World, pp. 229-30.
45 Rose, Guantanamo, p. 10.
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knew and ordered what at which level. Seymour Hersh writes that in the wake of Abu 
Ghraib, “The problems weren’t confronted, and no independent Committee 
investigation was authorized into the policies that led to Abu Ghraib.” In fact, 
Senators who had pressed for further investigations into the matter came under 
pressure to cease their calls for an independent inquiry.46
This is what has led many of those arguing for systemic responsibility to claim that 
the reports and investigations carried out by the Department of Defense into the abuse 
at Abu Ghraib a “whitewash”. It is a virtually unanimous consensus from this 
perspective that Bush administration officials bear responsibility for the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib. Michael Byers goes so far as to argue that “Had Saddam ratified the ICC 
statue, the chief prosecutor would, quite properly, already be investigation the Abu 
Ghraib situation, with a view to possibly laying charges for command responsibility 
against the secretary of defense and president.”47
Hersh writes that of the official inquiries into the abuse, none have challenged the 
official Bush administration line that there was no high-level policy condoning or 
overlooking such abuse:
The buck always stops with the handful of enlisted Army 
Reservists...
It’s a dreary pattern. A military report is released and, within a few 
days, a high-level general or admiral appears before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee...and reveals under questioning, that he 
has no mandate to investigate the responsibility, if any, of higher-ups 
such as President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld.48
46 Seymour M. Hersh, Chain o f  Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York: Harper 
Collins, 2005. pp. 66-8. Hersh argues that Senator John Warner, a Republican, Bush supporter and 
chairman o f the Armed Services committee, as one o f these antagonists. Warner, a former Marine was 
upset at the mistreatment o f  prisoners. However, within a few weeks o f his calls for a full accounting of  
what happened, Warner began to backtrack under “a lot o f pressure” to protect national security.
47 Michael Byers, War Law: International Law and Armed Conflict. London: Atlantic Books, 2005. p. 
145.
48 Hersh, Chain o f  Command, p. 369.
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As Hersh sees it:
The legal and moral issue is not high-level knowledge of the specific 
events in the photographs -  of course the President and his senior 
advisors did not know of the particular acts of insanity repeatedly 
taking place on the night shift at the prison. The question that never 
gets adequately asked or answered, though, is this: What did the 
President do after being told about Abu Ghraib?...
It’s what was not done at that point that is significant. There is no 
evidence that President Bush, upon learning of the devastating 
conduct at Abu Ghraib, asked any hard questions of Donald 
Rumsfeld and his own aides at the White House...There was no 
evidence that they had taken any significant steps upon learning in 
mid-January of the Abu Ghraib abuses to review and modify the 
military’s policy toward prisoners.49
Therefore, from this perspective, the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison originated from 
systemic sources, that is, problems having do with the confusion generated by legal 
definitions and standards in constant flux, a willingness on the part of the 
administration to achieve its goals in the war on terror at all costs, including the 
violation of international law, poor leadership oversight from all levels (horizontal 
and vertical) within the US government and military, and deliberately dubious legal 
advice. In this way, the blame for Abu Ghraib lies at the top of the chain of command, 
rather than the bottom. With their emphasis on conditions on the ground, 
psychological factors and low-lying leadership culpability, the official reports into the 
abuse really amount to little more than a cover-up for the Bush administration and 
high ranking US officials.
For example, as Hersh questions in his book, why did a group of Army Reserve 
military policemen, most of them from small towns, torment their prisoners as they 
did, in a manner that was especially humiliating for Iraqi men? He postulates that 
such techniques were learned from special forces and intelligence operatives who
49 Hersh, Chain o f Command, p. 372-4.
176
were also at work at Abu Ghraib. Karpinski, in writing her side of the Abu Ghraib 
story, agrees indicating that the young soldiers who were involved:
...could not have had an inkling of President’ Bush’s decision to exempt 
the terrorists of Afghanistan from the Geneva Conventions, permitting 
more extreme interrogation techniques that eventually leeched over into 
Iraq. They could have had no understanding of the conflicting and 
confusing rules for interrogation issued at various times... They had no 
part in General Miller’s mission to ‘Gitmo-ize’ Abu Ghraib, introducing a 
tougher style of questioning. They had not studied Arab psychology, 
giving them the tools to humiliate security detainees without physically 
harming the great majority of them. While it’s true that the 372nd MP 
Company was a patchwork outfit suffering like many Reserve unites from 
the ills of cross-levelling, sloppy training, and spotty leadership, the 
soldiers had demonstrated one consistent trait throughout their seven 
months of service in Iraq: They did as they were told... For the rest of my 
days I will believe that, at Abu Ghraib, these solders also were following 
orders when they humiliated and abused detainees.50
Hersh argues these trained figures “had been authorized by the Pentagon’s senior 
leadership to act far outside the normal boundaries, the normal rules of 
engagement.”51 Such techniques then, authorized by the top, were unsurprisingly 
adopted by the bottom of the command chain. The responsibility for passing these 
techniques is therefore directly linked to higher-ups.
Analysis: Who is responsible?
50 Karpinski, One Woman’s Army, pp. 207-208. Of course it is important to read this quote with the 
understanding that Karpinski’s book is written for the purpose o f clearing her name in the scandal. It 
also does not answer the question as to why the soldiers did not recognize that such orders were 
patently illegal. In this way, Karpinski’s book comes out o f the military, but tends to fall in the 
‘systemic’ side o f the debate. Interestingly, Karpinsky’s assertions both complement and contradict the 
testimony given by the soldiers charged with their participation in Guantanamo, discussed below. 
Many o f the soldiers did argue that they were acting under orders, but many o f  them also admit to 
knowing what they did was wrong at the time. Certainly they should have known that obeying an 
illegal order is a violation o f  the Uniform Code o f Military Justice.
51 Hersh, Chain o f Command, p. 373.
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In the political and legal fallout of the scandal at Abu Ghraib, it is certainly possible 
to point to factors that probably did contribute to the situation on the ground, aside 
from a failure to plan adequately for the problems of post war Iraq. That many of the 
troops did not have, and were not provided with training in their duties, and that 
military doctrine did not take into consideration the circumstances that the military 
personnel at the prison found themselves confronting, is clear. Additionally, if the 
accounts of the conditions that both detainee and soldier found themselves in are 
accurate, it is certainly possible to argue that the environment at Abu Ghraib, with its 
poor supplies, understaffed personnel and constant risk of danger from shelling 
probably was a factor in creating stressful conditions for those individuals stationed 
there.
Naturally, this does not excuse such sadistic behaviour. Certainly the troops of the 
800th Military Brigade were not the only ones to face harsh circumstances in the war 
on terror. Then why did circumstances turn out as they did at Abu Ghraib? The photos 
of soldiers standing around and over hooded, beaten and terrified prisoners beg the 
question ‘how did this happen?’
One thing that the systemic and non-systemic views of Abu Ghraib have in common 
is the idea that there was a confused legal situation on the ground. According to the 
military reports, this stemmed from a lack of adequate training in the laws of war and 
US military doctrine and the inability to obtain training or resources in this area. Yet 
even some of the military reports, such as the Schlesinger Report go further than this. 
In this way, both the systemic and non-systemic theories agree that there was a 
confusing situation originating from the decisions made by the Bush administration 
since 2002.
A closer look at the timeline will make this clear. What was in place with regards to 
interrogation of prisoners of war before 9/11 was listed in Army Field Manual 34-52. 
This included as list of 17 authorized interrogation methods. In October 2002, 
authorities at Guantanamo requested approval for stronger interrogation techniques to
52 See Techniques A-Q listed in Appendix B
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counter “tenacious resistance” by some detainees.53 On 2 December 2002, Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorized 16 additional techniques for use at 
Guantanamo.54 However, the Navy General Council Alberto J. Mora, raised concerns 
with these new techniques and on 15 January 2003 Rumsfeld rescinded the majority 
of the approved measures in the December 2002 authorization.55
At this time, Rumsfeld directed the Department of Defence General Council to 
establish a working group to study interrogation techniques. According to the 
Schlesinger Report, 35 techniques were reviewed and 24 were eventually 
recommended to the Secretary of Defense -  although this was not shown to all 
members of the working group. On 16 April 2003, a list of approved techniques, 
strictly limited for use at Guantanamo, was secretly approved.56
Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, from the beginning of the war on terror through to the 
end of 2002, all forces used the field manual as a guide for interrogation. However, as 
the Schlesinger Report points out, more aggressive interrogation of detainees appears 
to have been on-going. In January 2003, a list of techniques being used in 
Afghanistan, including some not explicitly set out in the field manuals was forwarded 
to the working group that had been set up by the Secretary of Defense. This included 
Special Operations Forces Operating Standard Operating Procedures. According to 
the Report, the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, which was later sent to Iraq, 
assisted in the interrogations in support of the Special Operations Forces and was 
fully aware of their interrogation techniques.
This, the Report states, made it clear that during this time “Interrogators and lists of
fO
techniques circulated from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq.” When the officer 
in charge prepared the draft interrogation guidelines, they were a near copy of the 
Special Forces Standard Operating Procedures. Techniques which had been approved
53 This is the term o f  the Schlesinger report, p. 910.
54 See Appendix A
55 For an interview with the Mora and an account o f  the internal debate within the Pentagon, see Jane 
Mayer “The Memo: How an internal effort to ban the abuse and torture o f  detainees was thwarted”, 
The New Yorker. 20 February 2006. http://www.newvorker.com/fact/content/articles/06Q227fa fact
56 For a list o f the techniques, see Appendix B.
57 Schlesinger Report, p. 911.
58 Schlesinger Report, p. 911.
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for very particular circumstances in Guantanamo were now migrating and being 
applied elsewhere -  outside of Guantanamo’s controlled conditions.
This was further confused when Major General Geoffrey Miler, who had been in 
charge at Guantanamo, was sent to Iraq to conduct an assessment of DoD counter­
terrorism interrogations and detention operations.59 According to the Schlesinger 
Report, Miller brought with him the April 2003 approved guidelines for Guantanamo 
and gave them to the CJTF-7 as a possible model for the command-wide policy that 
he recommended be established. At this time Miller called for the military police and 
military police intelligence soldiers to work cooperatively in “setting the conditions” 
for interrogation. While previously military police had played a passive role in 
collecting intelligence, a cooperation on this level had not yet been tried outside of 
Camp Delta.
Most of the military reports indicate that Miller stated that his model was approved 
only for Guantanamo. However, CJTF-7, using reasoning from the President’s 
argument that the Geneva Convention did not apply to “unlawful combatants”, 
believed that additional, tougher measures were warranted “because there were 
unlawful combatants mixed in with Enemy Prisoners of War and civilian and criminal 
detainees.”60 On 14 September, 2003, LTG Sanchez signed a memorandum 
authorizing a dozen interrogation techniques beyond Field Manual 34-52 -  five 
beyond those approved for Guantanamo. CENTCOM, however viewed this policy as 
unacceptably aggressive and on 12 October 2003, the interrogation techniques 
approved by CJTF-7 were rescinded.
Clearly, this created a confusing situation. As the Schlesinger report notes, “The 
existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique polices contributed to 
the belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned.”61 Again, the 
involvement of other government agencies in the collection of intelligence and 
treatment of detainees contributed to the belief that methods harsher than those which
59 In much o f  the critical literature on this, it is often said that Miller was deliberately sent to “Gitmo- 
ize” the prisons. See Hersh, Chain o f Command, p. 31 and Rose, Guantanamo, p. 82.
60 Schlesinger Report, p. 912.
61 Schlesinger Report, p. 912.
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f/yare found in Field Manual 34-52 were allowed. But even more confusing was the 
fact that where military personnel at Abu Ghraib did consult field manuals, they used 
versions that were out of date. The 1987 version of Field Manual 34-52 authorized 
interrogators to control all aspects of the interrogation to include light, heating, food, 
clothing, and shelter given to detainees. This was changed in the 1992 version of the 
Manual and again led to a variance of opinion as to what techniques were permissible. 
The lack of attention paid by commanders to these kinds of details leads the 
Schlesinger Report to assert, “We cannot be sure how much the number and severity 
of abuses would have been curtailed had there been early and consistent guidance 
from higher levels.”63
Given the length and detail in the reports, (as well as the sheer number of them) it is 
hard to disagree with this assessment. It is obvious that there was serious confusion as 
to which law applied where and to whom. That a military reservist might become 
confused by this constant flux of rules seems very reasonable.64 It also is clear that
62 Schlesinger Report, p. 921.
63 Schlesinger Report, p. 926.
64 A survey o f the legal defences presented by those charged with abuse at Abu Ghraib is telling as to 
whether these individuals felt their actions were legal. At his courts-martial, Charles Graner argued that 
the abuse was carried out at the behest o f military intelligence officers and that he was following 
orders. However, Graner seems to have known that the activities being carried out were illegal, stating 
in his testimony "A lot o f it was wrong, a lot o f it was criminal." Kate Zemike, “Ringleader in Iraqi 
Prisoner Abuse Is Sentenced to 10 Years” New York Times. 15 January 2005, p. 12. Graner also 
acknowledged that the abuse was in direct violation o f  the law o f war: "I know the Geneva 
Conventions, better than anyone else in my company. And we were called upon to violate the Geneva 
Conventions." T.R. Reid, “Graner Gets 10 Years for Abuse at Abu Ghraib” Washington Post. 16 
January 2005, p. A01.
Lynndie England’s defence rested on the fact that she was an overly compliant person who participated 
in the detainee abuse to please her then boyfriend, Granier -  even though she knew the actions were 
wrong. “England sentenced to 3 years for prison abuse” MSNBC, 28 September 2005. Available 
online: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9492624/: T.A. Badger, “Jury deliberations expected in Lynndie 
England's Abu Ghraib abuse case” Associated Press, 26 September 2005.
Ivan Frederick indicated that he knew his actions were wrong, but when he brought up the matter with 
his military commanders that he was instructed to do that he was told. At his courts-martial, Frederick 
came “to the conclusion that his actions broke the law” and plead guilty to charges o f  maltreating 
detainees, conspiracy to maltreat detainees, dereliction o f duty and wrongfully committing an indecent 
act. Hugh Williamson, “Charges likely for two officers” Financial Times. 25 August 2004. Tony 
Paterson, “Soldier Will Admit Role in Abu Ghraib Abuse” The Independent. 24 August, 2004. Tim 
Reid, “Abu Ghraib abuser jailed for 8 years”, The Times. 22 October 2004, p. 4.
Annin J. Cruz also plead guilty to the abuse on similar grounds, indicating that he knew his actions 
were wrong and Specialist Cruz said. "There's no way to justify it." Norimitsu Onishi, “Military 
Specialist Pleads Guilty to Abuse and Is Jailed” New York Times. 11 September 2004; “US soldier 
pleads guilty in Iraq detainee abuse scandal” Agence France Presse, 11 September 2004.
Jeremy Sivits, the first soldier charged with abuse at Abu Ghraib testified that while some o f his 
colleagues at the jail indicated that their actions were ordered or condoned by military intelligence, but 
he did not believe the man. James Drummond “Court martial sentences US soldier to year in jail for 
abusing Iraqi prisoners” Financial Times. 20 May 2004, p. 9.
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Miller’s advice was very problematic for the Iraq theatre. When his model was 
applied outside the controlled Guantanamo environment it led to disaster. 
Guantanamo has a 1 to 1 prisoner to guard ratio and is in a (very) remote area. Given 
the chaotic prison conditions of Abu Ghraib, the shortage of personnel, and the lack of 
training for applying the ‘advanced’ techniques, the same approach, ethical or not, 
was bound to fail. What all of the military reports also tend to criticize is Miller’s 
suggestion that the military police play a larger role in collecting intelligence by 
‘setting favourable conditions’. The Taguba, Schlesinger and Fay-Jones Reports argue 
that in the environment of Abu Ghraib, this was taken to be an excuse for abusive 
behaviour towards detainees.
In this way, it is fairly clear that there were mistakes and errors made as well as 
confusions propagated at many levels of the command chain. Given this chaotic state 
of affairs, it is difficult to assign blame in the way that systemic or non-systemic 
proponents seem to want to. In some ways it seems as wrongheaded to suggest that 
these actions were solely the responsibility of low-ranking ‘sadistic’ military 
personnel as it does to suggest that all blame should rest with President Bush for 
starting the war in the first place. Certainly, policy confusion was generated from the 
top, but it is also clear that individuals acted inappropriately and interpreted their 
orders in what must have been one of the worst ways possible.
Given the policy confusion, it is not that difficult to see why critics would want to 
start with the initial decision to reinterpret or redefine the laws of war. The argument 
presented in the last chapter suggested that it may be reasonable to reconsider (but not 
reject) the balance of liberty, law, freedoms and security in the context of an 
existential threat or nihilistic terrorism. However, the Bush administration has dome
Specialist Sabrina Harman also argued that she knew the abuse was wrong but apparently felt 
“powerless to stop the sadistic activities when her superiors - Colonel Thomas Pappas, commander of  
military intelligence at the prison, and Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, head o f Abu Graib's 
interrogation centre -  knew what was going on.” “Hearing o f US soldier accused o f  posing with Iraqi 
corpse raises questions” Agence France Presse, 25 June 2004.
In this way, the individuals charged seemed to have realized that the activities they were doing were 
wrong and illegal but carried out the activities for different reasons. Those who argued that they had 
been given directions from their superiors claimed to have been rebuked when they brought up the 
issue o f abuse. Therefore it seems that none o f the individuals believed that their actions were legal but 
that some may have been operating under the impression that they were either allowed to or were being 
forced to carry out the abuse regardless o f the law and that the abuse was considered permissible.
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more than merely ‘reconsider’ the laws of war. Instead, between 9/11 and the end of 
2004, it was clear that the administration reinterpreted and redefined the rules every 3- 
6 months, and did so in a highly secretive and inconsistent manner. It is one thing to 
change the rules of the game when that game changes, it is entirely another thing 
when those rules change every few weeks.
Clearly, in this respect, senior officials are to blame for creating this initial confusion. 
Some of the ‘political appointee’ lawyers in the Departments of Justice and Defence 
sought to challenge the restrictions that Vietnam and Watergate had placed on the 
powers of the President, especially in war time. John Yoo argued that, after 9/11, all 
decisions on how to defend the country under the American Constitution “are for the 
President alone to make”.65 Arguments defending this authority were made with 
reference to the USA PATRIOT Act and, as we have seen, to the argument that 
America was fighting a new kind of war. As such, commitments to international law 
were significantly downplayed. Yet, what really seems to have been the driver of 
abuse was that after the rules had been broken, nothing substantial or concrete was put 
in place. Concerns of government and military lawyers over these new legal 
interpretations were overlooked and it appears that the way to disaster was paved. As 
even the Schlesinger report notes, the Secretary of Defense clearly did not make use 
of all of the legal advice open to him. In retrospect, he only used the legal advice that 
would get him what he wanted.
Interrogation: A case study of ethics in war
The last chapter looked at whether a nation should consider the nature of the threat 
which it faced when it applied the laws of war. US policies in Iraq can then be 
considered a case study of the results of tampering with the standard separation of the 
two, and as such the arguments here have moved from the theoretical to the very 
practical. It has been argued that US policy in the area of the laws of war has taken 
the step of essentially re-linking the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It has 
also been suggested that this does not have to be, as some international lawyers would
65 Quoted in Mayer, “The Memo”.
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argue, an immoral or entirely unreasonable argument, provided that such actions are 
subjected to open political debate, democratic oversight and unambiguous guidelines 
are put in place with certain fundamental guarantees.66 It is clear that this is precisely 
what did not take place in the case of the Bush administration and Abu Ghraib. If the 
end result of this process is Abu Ghraib, the potential for abuse and scandal is very 
high indeed.
Still, it is possible to argue that Abu Ghraib represents an example of what can happen 
rather than being a guaranteed certainty whenever occupations take place. It 
represents a worst case scenario where righteous fury in soldiers (who become 
convinced that they are doing the ‘right thing’) is unchecked and leaders fail to 
monitor the effects of their decision. It is the end point of the cliched ‘slippery slope’ 
on which nations may find themselves when they begin to tamper with the law in a 
reckless manner. In failing to have a set of concrete, easy to understand guidelines for 
its troops, in failing to enforce a code of conduct or standard operating procedures, 
and in failing to act when it was clear that the prison in Abu Ghraib was in serious 
legal and moral jeopardy, the US went down that slippery slope.
The growing insurgency in Iraq and the always pressing need for timely and useful 
intelligence in relation to the war on terror were key considerations for the military 
and the Bush administration. This placed significant demands on individuals and 
interrogators on the ground. As the Schlesinger Report notes:
With the active insurgency in Iraq, pressure was placed on the 
interrogators to produce “actionable” intelligence... A number of 
visits by high-level officials to Abu Ghraib undoubtedly contributed 
to this perceived pressure... Despite the number of visits and the 
intensity of interest in actionable intelligence, however, the Panel 
found no undue pressure exerted by senior officials. Nevertheless, 
their eagerness for intelligence may have been perceived by 
interrogators as pressure.67
66 See Chapter Four.
67 Schlesinger Report, p. 940.
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However, even the Schlesinger Report notes that detention operations, especially in 
the War on Terror, are not just for detaining prisoners of war from returning to the
r-a
battlefield, but also for the key purpose of intelligence gathering. The role of 
intelligence gathering has been heavily emphasized by the Bush administration in this 
war. Yet, as the outcome of the war so far has demonstrated, it is one of those areas 
which is the most subject to grey areas and legal violations when not carried out 
correctly.
One of the most interesting accounts of the US military in the war on terror in this 
regard has come from Chris Mackey, who served with the intelligence corps in 
Afghanistan from December 2001 until the summer of 2002.69 During his time in 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Mackey supervised all military interrogations at 
Bagram airfield. In his book, he describes his training, the environment in which 
interrogations took place, the resistance offered by prisoners and some reflection on 
the events he experienced and the subsequent controversies regarding US detention 
centres in Iraq.
The need to get intelligence from these prisoners posed moral dilemmas for the 
interrogators in Afghanistan in establishing exactly how far they could go. Mackey 
refers to the techniques that he had been taught in his interrogation training as 
“schoolhouse” and not at all effective against the new breed of prisoner who would 
swear, spit and threaten when confronted about their activities.
When we arrived in Afghanistan, I had an unshakable conviction that 
we should follow the rules to the letter...
But, as I realized now, the trouble was that the safe route was 
ineffective. Prisoners overcame [our] model almost effortlessly, 
confounding us not with clever cover stories, but with simple refusal to 
cooperate. They offered lame stories, pretended not to remember even
68 Schlesinger Report, p. 917.
69 Chris Mackey and Greg Miller The Interrogators: Task Force 500 and America’s Secret War Against 
A1 Qaeda. New York: Back Bay Books, 2005. According to the book, “Chris Mackey” is a 
pseudonym.
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the most basic of details, and then waited for the consequences that 
never really came.70
Therefore, argues Mackey, the interrogators began, incrementally, to use harsher
71means. Later on this graduated to forcing detainees into stress positions. Upon 
reflecting on these experiences Mackey writes:
Of course, these changes really amounted to minor tinkering with 
technique, tiny encroachments on the rules. But during the coming 
months in Bagram, a combination of forces would lead us -  lead me -  to
77make allowances that I wouldn’t have even considered [earlier on].
What is striking about Mackey’s account is that the decisions made were not taken 
lightly. Considerations of law, morality and necessity played a significant role when 
determining “how far to go”. Mackey writes that he and his team “had been left 
largely on our own to sort out the ethical boundaries of our job.”73 This may then be 
an indication of where things may have also gone so horribly wrong in Abu Ghraib. In 
a section titled “Ethical Issues” the Schlesinger Report notes:
For the United States and other nations with similar value systems, 
detention and interrogation are themselves ethically challenging 
activities. Effective interrogators must deceive, seduce, incite and coerce 
in ways not normally acceptable for members of the general public....
In periods of emergency, and especially in combat, there will always be 
a temptation to override legal and oral norms for morally good ends.
Many in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were not well 
prepared by their experience, education and training to resolve such 
ethical problems.74
70 Mackey and Miller, The Interrogators, p. 288.
71 Although Mackey maintains that the interrogators remained well aware o f  their obligations under the 
Geneva Conventions. In an interview, Mackey added that at no time did anyone tell them that the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply. Interview with author via phone 11 March 2006.
72 Mackey and Miller, The Interrogators, p. 287.
73 Mackey and Miller, The Interrogators, p. 471.
74 Schlesinger Report, pp. 974-5. (Appendix H)
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The Report goes on to indicate that training had clearly failed in this regard and that a 
professional ethics program addressing these situations would help equip them with 
“a sharper moral compass for guidance in situations often riven with conflicting moral
7 r
objections.” In this way, the Report seems to be confident that improved ethical
76training could help improve the overall situation.
However, increasingly there is another element in warfare -  certainly in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom -  that is posing serious challenges to the ability of military training and 
responsible command chains to put a stop to violations of the law of war: private 
military firms.
Private Military Firms
Although the trend has certainly been growing since the end of the Cold War, the 
2003 Iraq war has highlighted the role of Private Military Firms in contemporary
77warfare. As has been pointed out in many stories on the Iraq war, PMFs have been 
contracted out to provide logistical support, food and services to troops and armed 
security for humanitarian organizations and even high ranking officials like the 
former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer.
The sheer numbers of PMFs operating in Iraq are noteworthy alone. Even the
70
Economist has referred to the conflict as “the first privatised war.” More than 60 
firms employing more than 20,000 private personnel were estimated to be in Iraq by 
mid-2005. This amounts to the roughly the same number of troops as provided by all
75 Schlesinger Report, p. 975.
76 More on training will be discussed at the end o f the chapter.
77 There is some controversy over what PMFs should be called. Frequently one can find references to 
“Private Military Companies” (PMCs) or “Private Security Companies” (PSCs) in the literature. P.W. 
Singer, who has written several articles and a book on the phenomenon as o f  this writing argues that 
“firm” implies a broader context and “thus encompass the overall industry rather than just a subsector, 
but is also more theoretically grounded, pointedly drawing from the business economics ‘theory o f the 
firm’ literature.” See P.W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise o f the Private Military Industry and 
Its Ramifications for International Security.” International Security. Vol. 26, No. 2, Winter 2001/2, pp. 
186-220. p. 186-7, note 2.
78 Economist. “Military Industrial Complexities” 29 March, 2003, p. 56.
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of the United States’ coalition partners combined.79 This means that the ratio of 
private contractors to US military personnel in the Gulf is roughly one to ten, ten 
times the ratio during the 1991 Gulf War.80
Yet the role of PMFs has also been highlighted for reasons other than numbers. PMFs 
have been involved in several controversies and incidents regarding the law of war 
which have raised some serious questions regarding the increasing numbers of PMFs 
in warfare. One of the most controversial issues (and most significant for our purposes 
here) is accountability. When questions are put to PMFs for their actions, very often 
there is no one to give answers regarding conduct and possible breaches of the law of 
war. Even the legal grounds for asking such questions or prosecuting individuals 
responsible for various actions is very problematic -  exactly whom are multinational 
PMFs to answer to, if not a military code of justice or even domestic laws? Given the 
increasingly controversial nature of the participation of PMFs in military operations, it 
is becoming clear that these are issues which needs to be addressed. The reports 
coming out of the Abu Ghraib investigation revealed that PMFs had played a role in 
the abuse which took place. The Taguba Report goes so far as to cite two contractors
O -I
of a Virginia based PMF, CACI, as partially responsible for what took place.
Part of the problem is that PMFs have a very ambiguous status in both domestic and 
international law. This of course, relates back to the less-savoury antecedents of 
PMFs, mercenaries. The first international legislation dealing with mercenaries came
tViout of 19 Century laws that were mostly concerned with implications for neutrality. 
A country that allowed its national territory to be used for the purpose of recruitment
79 P. W. Singer, “Outsourcing War: Understanding the Private Military Industry”, Foreign Affairs. Vol. 
84, No. 2. March/April 2005, pp. 119-132. Singer notes that this may imply that the “coalition o f the 
willing” might thus be mores aptly described as the “coalition o f the billing.”
80 Cited in P.W. Singer, “War, Profits, and the Vacuum o f Law: Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law”, Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law. Vol. 42 No. 2, Spring 2004, pp. 521-550. 
p. 523.
Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, with CACI was cited for giving false statements to investigators and for 
allowing MPs who were not trained in interrogation techniques to facilitate interrogations by “setting 
conditions” which were not authorized. As the report states: “He clearly knew his instructions equated 
to abuse.” Taguba Report, p. 442-3. Another CACI employee, Mr. John Israel, was also cited for giving 
false testimony. Taguba concludes that along with some o f  the other military personnel that were 
charged, Stephanowicz and Israel were “either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib.” Taguba Report, p. 443.
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89or enlistment of mercenaries was deemed to be in support of a belligerent. This 
principle was codified into the 1907 Hague Convention but was not a very strong one 
-  certainly not for the purposes of any kind of regulation. Serious attempts to do 
anything about the issue were not made until the 1960s and 1970s, after mercenaries 
became involved in various civil wars, wars of national liberation and coups in Africa. 
In December 1968, UN General Assembly Resolution 2465 was passed which 
designated mercenaries as outlaws. This position was further endorsed through 
subsequent resolutions concerned with colonialism.
Only two countries have really attempted to draft legislation in this area -  the US and 
South Africa, but even here the legislation is weak. There are several US laws or
82 Christopher Kinsey, “Challenging international law: a dilemma o f private security companies”,
Conflict. Security & Development. Vol. 5 No. 3, December 2005. pp. 269-293. p. 271.
83 Interestingly, this marked a significant move away from the idea that states were responsible for 
policing their own population’s mercenary activities, toward individual criminal liability. Kinsey, 
“Challenging international law”, p. 273. On this point Kinsey also cites James Taulbee “Myths, 
Mercenaries and Contemporary International Law” California Western International Law Journal. Vol. 
15 No. 2, p. 339-363. These developments and resentment regarding the participation o f private 
military forces in African conflicts lead to several declarations on mercenary activities, including the 
1976 Luanda Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression o f Mercenaries. This made 
government officials criminally responsible for employing, aiding or recruiting mercenaries. The anti­
mercenary sentiment was also encapsulated into the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Convention which denied mercenaries the opportunity to be considered either a combatant or a prisoner 
o f war. Yet the definition which was developed was highly controversial and in reality so specific as to 
be practically useless. Article 47(2) defines a mercenary as any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain 
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf o f a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess o f that promised or paid to combatants o f similar 
ranks and functions in the armed forces o f that Party;
(d) is neither a national o f a Party to the conflict nor a resident o f territory controlled by 
a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member o f the armed forces o f a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a 
member o f  its armed forces.
In order for someone to be declared a mercenary, they must fulfil all o f these criteria -  leaving a 
definition that is very easy for anyone caught fighting to get out of. How, for example, could anyone 
ever demonstrate motivation for fighting? Even the religious Taliban in Afghanistan typically fight for 
a combination o f  religious fanaticism but also for financial gain. As Geoffrey Best (somewhat 
colourfully) argues, anyone who manages to get prosecuted under this definition “deserves to be shot -  
and his lawyer [with him]” Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modem History o f the 
International Law o f Armed Conflict, p. 328 note 83. Considering that almost any subsequent 
definitions have relied on this definition o f a mercenary, regulation has mostly been left in the domestic 
sphere.
84 As the argument here is concentrating on the US, other attempts at regulation will be ignored. 
Information on South Africa’s legislation as well as any other relevant legislation put forward by 
(mostly) Western states is usefully summarized in Annex B o f the Green Paper on mercenaries 
published by the UK government in 2002. “HC577 Private Military Companies: Options for 
Regulation” 12 February 2002. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London: The Stationary Office.
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acts which seek to regulate PMFs. The Uniform Code of Military Justice only covers 
transgressions by the US military and not any civilians accompanying the forces 
overseas. The 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was intended to fill in the 
gap with respect to operations outside the US but it only applies to civilian contractors 
working for the US Department of Defense on US military facilities. The Act 
therefore does not apply to contractors working for another US agency (such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency), or for US nationals working overseas for a foreign 
government or organization. Even then, as Singer argues it is still not clear when and 
where this law would apply:
Thus, if an American PMF employee commits any offense abroad, under 
the frequent conditions that do not meet the above standards, only the 
host nation may prosecute. However, for many likely areas of [PMF] 
activity, prosecution against a PMF or its individual employee is
Of
unlikely to occur.
Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), there is limited licensing 
within the US of PMFs in cases where their contracts involve arms transfers. Yet the 
licensing procedures have been described as “idiosyncratic”.86 The input that the 
Defense and State Departments have regarding the licensing processes varies from 
case to case and neither companies nor independent observers have clear guidelines as 
to how the process works.87 Additionally, if  the contract is less than US$50 million, 
any US military firm can work without notifying Congress. Many contracts already 
fall under this category and larger ones are easily broken-up.88 Finally, as Singer 
points out, once a contract is awarded, there is little to no follow-up by the US 
government, or any other agency, to monitor the firms or their activities.89
85 Singer, “War, Profits and the Vacuum o f  Law”, p. 537. For example, the host state may be too weak 
to challenge the PMF as it is common in these areas that there is no enforcement or legal system 
capable o f handling such a case.
86 Singer, “War, Profits and the Vacuum o f Law”, p. 538.
87 On this point Singer cites Deborah D. Avant, “Privatizing Military Training”, Foreign Policy in 
Focus. May 2000. Singer, “War, Profits and the Vacuum o f Law”, p. 538-9.
88 Singer, “War, Profits and the Vacuum o f  Law”, p. 539.
89 Singer, “War, Profits and the Vacuum o f  Law”, p. 539.
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Many of the problems, controversies and difficulties regarding the use of PMFs to 
support military operations was already becoming apparent before 9/11. Two cases 
demonstrate the difficulty of enforcing accountability for actions committed and 
violations of the laws of war. In 1998 a Florida-based PMF, Airscan, coordinated an 
air strike which resulted in the accidental death of eighteen civilians, including nine 
children. In 2001, an Alabama-based PMF, Aviation Development Corporation 
(ADC) accidentally shot down a small plane of missionaries and businessmen in 
Peru.90 In neither case was anyone brought to account for their actions. In Bosnia and 
Kosovo, employees of Virginia-based PMF DynCorp, who were fulfilling part of the 
US governments commitment to the peacekeeping operation there, were found to 
have committed statutory rape, abetted prostitution and accepted bribes. While none 
of the employees were ever charged in the incident, the “whistleblowers” that brought 
these actions to light were fired by the firm in retaliation.91
The role of PMFs in Abu Ghraib has thrust these issues into the spotlight. The 
inability to properly control or regulate PMFs has contributed to the abuses which 
took place in the prison. Military investigations have found that contractors from two 
PMFs, Titan and CACI, were involved in 36 percent of the proven incidents of
Q9abuse. The Fay-Jones Report listed 6 PMF employees who should be referred to the 
Justice Department for prosecution and another PMF employee who was ‘confused’ 
about what constituted improper interrogation techniques. However, there have been 
no arrests or charges laid against any of the six PMF employees identified by these 
investigations (although the Justice Department still maintained that it did not 
consider the investigation closed in April 2006).94 Why this is so is still not entirely 
clear -  especially considering that the Army had successfully prosecuted 11 soldiers
90 See Julian Borger and Martin Hodgson, “A plane is shot down and the US proxy war on drug barons 
unravels” The Guardian. 2 June 2001.
91 Singer, “War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law”, p. 538.
92 Singer, “Outsourcing War”.
93 These individuals are listed as CIVILIAN-05, CACI employee', CIVILIAN-10, Translator, Titan 
employee', CIVILIAN-11, Interrogator, CACI employee', CIVILIAN-16, Translator, Titan employee', 
CIVILIAN-17, Interpreter, Titan employee", CIVILIAN-21, Interrogator, CACI employee. The 
individual who was ‘confused’ is listed as CIVILIAN-20, CACI employee. See the Fay-Jones Report pp. 
1122-1125.
94 Mark Benjamin, “No justice for all” Salon.com. 14 April 2006. Available online at: 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/Q4/14/contractor/.
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involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal.95 As Singer observes: “The only formal inquiry 
into PMF wrongdoing on the corporate level was conducted by CACI itself. CACI 
investigated CACI and, unsurprisingly, found that CACI had done no wrong.”96
These controversies and the still somewhat unclear role that PMFs played at Abu 
Ghraib suggest that there are some serious gaps in the law that the US and the 
international community need to address, especially regarding accountability. It 
would seem that most PMFs operate on the principle that employees, caught up in 
incidents where crimes or abuse may have taken place, are to be evacuated from the 
area which it occurred as soon as possible to avoid prosecution.
Additionally, it is fairly clear that there has been little attention paid to what the kind 
of training these individuals have received and probably none whatsoever to training 
in the laws of war. That the PMF employees at Abu Ghraib lacked proper training on 
the Geneva Conventions was one of the findings made in the Fay-Jones Report:
The necessity for some sort of standard training and/or experience is 
made evident by the statements of both contractor employees and 
military personnel... Likewise, numerous statements indicated that little, 
if any, training on Geneva Conventions was presented to contractor 
employees.... Prior to deployment, all contractor linguists or 
interrogators should receive training in the Geneva Conventions 
standards for treatment of detainees/prisoners. This training should 
include a discussion of the chain of command and the establishment of 
some sort of ‘hotline’ where suspected abuses can be reported in
07addition to reporting through the chain of command.
95 Benjamin, “No justice for all”. Those prosecuted include: Spc. Megan Ambuhl, 372nd M.P. Co.; 
Spc. Armin J. Cruz Jr., 325th M.I. Battalion; Sgt. Javal S. Davis, 372nd M.P. Co.; Pfc. Lynndie 
England, 372nd M.P. Co.; Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick II, 372nd M.P. Co.; Cpl. Charles A. Graner Jr., 
372nd M.P. Co.; Spc. Sabrina Harman, 372nd M.P. Co.; Spc. Roman Krol, 325th M.I. Battalion 
Spc. Jeremy Sivits, 372nd M.P. Co.; Sgt. Santos Cardona, 320th M.P. Co.; Sgt. Michael J. Smith, 
523rd M.P. Detachment. Also, in April 2006 Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan became the first officer to face 
charges associated with the prison scandal. Most of the higher ranking officials, such as Karpinski, 
have faced non-judicial punishment.
96 Singer, “Outsourcing War”.
97 Fay-Jones Report, pp. 1052-1056.
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Considering the significant role that PMFs had in the 2003 Iraq War, it is likely that 
the issues and controversies surrounding them will remain in future conflicts unless 
some sort of accountability mechanism is derived on legal or some other grounds.
Preventing Atrocity in War
At Abu Ghraib, Iraqi prisoners found themselves as the victims of some very serious 
abuse and the US found itself in a highly embarrassing situation which, in a graphic 
manner, created serious doubts about its claim that all prisoners were being treated 
humanely. It has been the argument here that the wavering of the Bush administration 
with regards to the laws of war, its assessment that different laws applied in different 
places to different individuals at different times and its failure to set in place a single 
set of guidelines for its troops, created an environment whereby abuse was likely to 
occur. It has been further suggested that the involvement of PMFs in Abu Ghraib has 
also added to this confusion as to which rules apply where and whether or not those 
rules can be enforced.
However, what the situation in Abu Ghraib ultimately seems to amount to is that a 
group of soldiers felt that it was acceptable, or even proper, to carry out the actions 
which created the abuse scandal. These actions have been attributed to poor quality 
circumstances, harsh and dangerous living, racism, or psychological factors. 
Inadequate training has also been mentioned by most of the reports investigating the 
abuse. Yet, it seems almost intuitive that soldiers would automatically regard such 
abuse as a violation of the principles of laws of war, or barring this, codes of basic 
decent behaviour. These actions were not committed in the ‘fog of war’ or in the ‘heat 
of battle’, circumstances which sometimes allow us to at least understand how 
atrocity may occur (if not excuse it).
What happened at Abu Ghraib seems to go beyond a failure of training and to go into 
something more towards the core of the military code which democracies try to instil 
in their armies. Several authors who write about the subject of military training and
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the laws of war refer to this idea as the military “ethos” which is necessary in order 
for the laws of war to be instilled and maintained in the conduct of military activity.98
A military ethos can be described as an ethical culture embedded within every day 
operations. This culture reflects the fundamental values and character particular to the 
military and therefore the culture should reflect the way operations are conducted. 
The opposite should then hold true as well -  that actions should reflect ethos. If 
respect for life and the principles of the laws of war are seen as a priority for the 
military and the society in which it sits, respect for the laws of war needs to be 
cultivated within the military ethos.
Ethos-advocates have set out a list of requirements in order for this approach to 
enforcing the laws of war to work. First, there needs to be appropriate internal 
regulations and/or doctrine for a variety of issues.99 This may be set out in field 
manuals, codes, rules and regulations which are geared towards every day operations. 
These are set policies to which soldiers can refer to provide guidelines as to proper 
conduct. Second, these guidelines and policies must be linked to training and become 
an integral part how soldiers are taught to perform their jobs. The training a soldier 
goes through is not categorized explicitly as law of war training, but instead as 
instruction in set doctrine or regulations.100 If troops are taught to perform their tasks 
in accordance with military doctrine (which, in turn, is in accordance with the laws of 
war), the conduct of soldiers becomes ingrained and automatically compliant with 
international obligations. For example, soldiers taught not to pillage or attack innocent 
civilians follow these rules not because they are taught explicitly that this is part of an 
international treaty obligation, but because this is the way operations are conducted, 
period. Respect for civilians then becomes automatic. As Anthony E. Hartle writes of 
his experiences in Vietnam:
981 here refer to two authors and commentators on the laws o f  war: W. Hays Parks and Charles 
Garraway -  both o f whom have practiced as military lawyers specializing in the laws o f war. Both of 
them comment on the importance o f military ethos in a special issue o f Social Research on 
“International Justice, War Crimes and Terrorism: The U.S. Record”. See Charles H. B. Garraway, 
“Training: The Whys and Wherefores” and “The United States Military and the Law o f War: 
Inculcating an Ethos” in Social Research Vol. 69 No. 4 (Winter 2002) pp 949-962 and pp 981-1015 
respectively.
99 Parks, “The United States Military and the Laws o f War”, p. 982.
100 Parks, “The US Military and the Law o f  War”, pp. 982-3.
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As a young lieutenant in [the military], I learned what it meant to 
function effectively and professionally... I knew what was expected of 
me as a leader and as an officer. I knew the established procedures.
When our [Vietnamese guide] suggested torturing the prisoner, I really 
did not give the matter a second thought. As I look back, I recognize 
that my reaction resulted from the training that I had received and my 
experience in the Army.101
Of course this is just one experience of one individual. However, the value of such a 
policy is maintained by those who train, teach and comment on the laws of war. Yet 
there is one more crucial requirement, namely that relating law to procedures and 
rules must be linked to common sense. Law embedded within procedures must make 
sense for the soldier told to carry out a specific operation. Training should be tailored 
to individual soldiers, consistent with their mission and responsibilities. The training 
should cover all of the circumstances that a particular soldier will be dealing with but 
at the same time not overload that individual with complex international legislation. 
For example, for those members of the military whose job involves target selection, 
more complex training is needed than for someone whose job is more focused on 
logistics. In addition to this, as Charles Garraway argues, law within procedures
1 (Y)should reflect reality and reflect principles of proportionality. This then ensures that 
soldiers can look upon the rules as their ally in getting tasks done correctly rather than 
as a restricting annoyance.103
However, what is also crucial is whether or not such training is insisted upon by 
higher-ups in the military and by political leaders -  and there was a clear failure in 
this regard at Abu Ghraib. Political and military leaders can enforce and insist upon 
law of war training to be carried out. However, commanders of troops and soldiers 
also play a huge role in ensuring that the laws of war are embedded into training, are 
taken seriously, and are violations are followed up. As W. Hays Parks notes, 
“Commands promulgate directives and provide guides for law of war instruction
101 Anthony E. Hartle, “Atrocities in War: Dirty Hands and Noncombatants” Social Research. Vol. 69 
No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 963-979. p. 964.
102 Garraway, “Training” p. 954-5.
103 Garraway, “Training”, p. 955-7.
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while integrating law of war issues into training exercises at all levels.”104 Garraway 
also notes that while military lawyers are useful adjuncts in creating an ethos, the 
prime responsibility rests with the commanders:
History shows that leaders can be good or bad. If we want to instil in our 
soldiers an ethos of doing what is right, of moral integrity and obedience 
to the law, then it is to the commanders that we must look. Unless the 
commander is prepared to take his or her responsibilities in this field 
seriously, there is little chance of anyone else doing so.105
Parks notes that, like any topic necessary for soldiers to know in order to complete 
their missions or tasks correctly, law of war training competes with other mandatory 
subjects in units that are busy returning from deployment, getting ready to go on a 
deployment or are on deployment.106 Because there is considerable competition for 
training time, commanders must believe that law of war training is a necessary and 
important task for their troops rather than supply another ‘box to tick’.
Parks acknowledges that it is understandable that military commanders might view 
law of war training in this way -  that it is natural to believe that soldiers of western
democracies will automatically behave in a way that will support human rights or that
soldiers will instinctively ‘do the right thing.’ “Commanders and their soldiers 
undoubtedly tire of receiving law of war training because they do not believe they or 
members of their unit are capable of violating the law of war... [the] response was
1 (Y1simple ‘Marines don’t do that.’” Garraway agrees that this seems to be the 
consensus, arguing that “in many Western countries there is still a belief that our
10Sforces do inherently know ‘what is right.’”
Yet if the experiences of Mai Lai or Abu Ghraib demonstrate anything, it is that under 
the right (or more correctly, wrong) conditions soldiers will violate the laws of war. 
While it may seem natural to citizens or soldiers of a westem-style democracy that
104 Parks, “The US Miliary and the Law o f  War”, pp. 994.
105 Garraway, “Training”, p. 955-6.
106 Parks, “The US military and the Law o f  War”, p. 996-7.
107 Parks, “The US military and the Law o f  War”, p. 997
108 Garraway, “Training”, p. 951.
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their soldiers would never commit atrocities, the very nature of war and violence is 
that they just might. Emphasis on law of war training is crucial and necessary to 
prevent abuse of the sort that happened in Iraq, or, perhaps phrased in a more ugly 
way, we need to put emphasis on the laws of war because we cannot trust human 
nature in war. Where actions are to easily justified as necessary or where 
proportionate or pressures intense, the laws of war can be very easily overlooked. 
Therefore, in terms of results, it is hoped that law of war training embedded into an 
ethos will result in a system where adherence to the laws of war becomes automatic, 
where soldiers do not torture their prisoners because its wrong, but also because it has 
been ingrained in their training. This training then needs to be emphasized in terms of 
comprehensive rules of engagement, discipline and command supervision.
The reports of the various investigations into Abu Ghraib are interesting in this 
respect. While Schlesinger ultimately concludes that what is needed is better doctrine 
regarding the new conditions that soldiers are facing (such as the working 
relationships between military police and military intelligence) and a “professional 
ethics program” he also states that:
Major service programs such as the Army’s core values” however fail to 
adequately prepare soldiers working in detention operations....
Core-values programs are grounded in organizational efficacy rather 
than the moral good. They do not address humane treatment of the 
enemy and non-combatants, leaving military leaders and educators an 
incomplete tool box with which to deal with “real-world” ethical 
problems.109
This seems to be suggesting that training can only take soldiers so far, that when 
conditions that go beyond training and pose ethical dilemmas, complex decisions will 
have to be made. Soldiers on the frontlines, who may not be the best educated, need 
references through which they can make ethical judgements. In this way, future 
training may have to make the ethical component more prominent.
109 Schlesinger Report, p. 975.
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While ethics training for soldiers may seem unrealistic as demands for soldiers 
training time are already so high, it may be the case that the US military is starting to 
take this approach seriously. In June 2006 it was announced that troops in Iraq were 
immediately to undertake a course on battlefield ethics after allegations were made 
that 11 civilians were shot by marines near Haditha. The course involves an 
explanation of “core warrior values” which included a slideshow on ethical standards 
under fire.110 President Bush described the program as “a reminder for troops in Iraq, 
or throughout our military, that there are high standards expected of them and that 
there are strong rules of engagement”.111 It would appear that, in the wake of Abu 
Ghraib, Bush administration and military officials are taking such charges very 
seriously and are eager to be seen as responding quickly to allegations of war crimes. 
However, it also suggests that the military is taking seriously the idea that it may need 
to contextualize its law of war training within a program of ethics and moral values in 
order to make such training more relevant and, perhaps, accessible to its personnel.
The Lessons of Iraq and Abu Ghraib?
It is clear from the investigations of what went wrong at Abu Ghraib that what took 
place was not solely a failure of training -  though this can certainly be considered one 
of the causes. It was noted above that western societies and militaries typically expect 
that their soldiers, when in a grey area, will be able to tell right from wrong and act in 
a manner which supports the values of the military and society from which they come. 
However, unless a sense of the rules is cultivated under high-pressure and stressful 
conditions, this is not what will occur. Human nature alone will not ensure that 
soldiers will ‘do the right thing.’ In this way, it may be more correct to say what really 
happened at Abu Ghraib was a failure of ethos on many levels. The worst of human 
nature gave way in a stressful environment because individuals did not seek out, or 
could not seek out, the rules. Commanders did not ensure that the proper procedures
110 Julian Borger, “US troops ordered to undergo ethical training after killing o f Iraqi civilians” The 
Guardian. 2 June 2006. Available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Storv/0.. 1788643.00.html: 
Ned Parker, “US orders coalition troops to take lessons in the ethics o f battlefield” The Times. 2 June 
2006. Available online: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0..7374-2207570.00.html: Hamza 
Hendawi, “U.S. Troops in Iraq to Get Ethics Training” CBS News, 1 June 2006. Available online: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/01/ap/world/mainD8HVL8EQ3.shtml
111 Cited in Borger, “US Troops ordered to undergo ethical training”.
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were in place and being followed. Worse, they ignored indications that something was 
seriously wrong. Military superiors and, ultimately, the political administration, 
neglected to ensure that commanders were doing their jobs, created an environment of 
legal confusion and failed to provide a set of comprehensive and easy to follow 
guidelines for the troops in the field. The ethos -  or military culture which reinforces 
the rules in the conduct of its activities -  was significantly altered in the wake and 
rush of 9/11 and did not long survive in the new conditions.
The addition of PMFs to this picture only serves as a serious complication, especially
to the military ethos model. Many of the employees of private military firms are
former soldiers of western democracies. However, despite their ever increasing role in
military operations, there is certainly no guarantee as to the origins of a PMF’s
employees, or as to the training they have received, especially regarding the law of
war. Regulation may be one solution to this problem, but consensus the of the
literature suggests that this is not a likely development in the near future.112 As for the
firms themselves, they prefer a system of self-regulation (such as that which already
exists in the form of security industry associations in the domestic security market).
This would be a system which essentially rests on a corporate social responsibility
model whereby “reputable” companies would set standards to be voluntarily adhered
to in the absence of domestic and international legislation. Certainly this is an
interesting idea in the absence of a regulation regime, but as Clive Walker and Dave
Whyte argue, this model does not really seem appropriate for an industry where
companies are often established for one purpose -  military or security services -  and
11 ^
often disbanded after a tour of duty.
Even if such a model were to be created, there is an additional problem -  
humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC have a very problematic relationship 
with PMFs and do not see them as appropriate organizations to affiliate with114 or to
112 This was certainly the opinion o f the UK green paper on the subject which looks at different 
regulating options. See “Private Military Companies, Options for Regulations” pp. 20-27.
113 Clive Walker and Dave Whyte, “Contracting Out War? Private Military Companies, Law and 
Regulation in the United Kingdom”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol. 54, July 2005, 
pp. 651-690. p. 665.
114 Although by its own admission, the ICRC has used PMFs when operating in “exceptional cases and 
exclusively for the protection o f premises”. See “The ICRC to expand contacts with private military 
and security companies”, ICRC website, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengQ.nsfi4itml/63HE58 4 
August, 2004.
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instruct in the laws of war due to their questionable legal status and mercenary roots. 
In recognizing the way war was changing in this respect, the ICRC announced in 
2004 that it would plan for “a more systematic approach focusing on companies 
operating in conflict situations or providing training and advice to armed forces” with 
regards to the law of war.115 Yet, even in its announcement, it was clear that the ICRC 
is uncomfortable with the idea, indicating that it is important to look at PMFs on a 
case by case basis in terms of legitimacy and that the “ICRC does not plan to take a 
position on the legitimacy of these private companies.” The announcement also calls 
for states to play a larger role in terms of monitoring mercenary activity for violations 
committed by “individuals operating on or from their territory.”116 While this is 
certainly a step forward in terms of promoting the laws of war among PMFs, given 
the problems listed above regarding regulation, it will hardly solve the problems of 
accountability and enforcement of the law for countries where PMFs are deployed and 
those from which they are deployed. For the US, a step forward was taken when a 
federal jury, under domestic legislation, indicted David Passaro, a contractor working 
for the CIA for committing acts of torture in Afghanistan, claiming jurisdiction over 
US “diplomatic, consular, military or other US government missions or entities in 
foreign states, including buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or 
ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities irrespective of
117ownership.” Still, this is just one case -  and much of the legalities involved relate to 
whom the PMF was contracted to (ie: which government department) and where.
The question remains then, what next for the laws of war in America? There seems to 
be an agreement in the literature, as argued previously, that Mai Lai was a wake-up 
call for the US military in the 1970s. As a result, there was an entire restructuring and 
reconceptualization of the way the laws of war were taught to soldiers. However, after 
9/11, the security environment has not been very conducive to such a rethinking in a 
way that would strengthen adherence to America’s international law of war 
obligation. It seems clear that in times of war, the pressure on a military’s adherence 
to the laws of war is always downwards. While a descent down a slippery slope is by
115 ICRC “The ICRC to expand contacts with private military and security companies”.
1,6 ICRC “The ICRC to expand contacts with private military and security companies”.
117 Human Rights Watch, “Q&A: Private Military Contractors and the Law”, 
http://hrw.orgenglish/docs/2004/05/05iraq8547 txt.htm 5 May 2004. Human Rights Watch indicates 
that this law is Title 18, section 7(9)(A) o f the U.S. Code.
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no means unavoidable (though accidents and at least some violations in warfare seem 
inevitable), in a permissive environment, with unclear law and an increasingly 
unstable ethos, the journey down that slope is going to be made that much quicker.
American leaders and military commanders have clearly paid a political cost for the
1 1 0
scandal over Abu Ghraib and have indicated as much. That the response to an 
alleged massacre at Haditha has come swiftly and with the implementation of an 
ethics training program after the allegations were made, suggests that there have been 
lessons learned. That a legislative tug-of-war continues in the US government over 
detainee policy suggest that these lessons may only go so far.
Conclusion
In looking at the challenges posed to America’s relationship with the laws of war 
through the controversy that came out of Abu Ghraib, the chapter has not spent much 
time looking at the actual insurgency and fighting that has been underway since the 
end of formal hostilities in Iraq. This is not to down play the important issues that 
have arisen out of the conflict but merely to recognize that the methods of fighting 
employed raise more or less traditional concerns regarding the laws of war -  what 
weapons can be used, how the law of occupation applies and the rights of insurgents 
are not new questions for the law of war.119
The scandal at Abu Ghraib prison, however, represents new challenges and questions 
-  or at least old issues in a newer light. The full implications of America’s rebalancing 
of its commitment to international law in the face of a new security threat, the 
changing and increasing role of PMFs, (including in detention operations) and the 
need to address gaps in terms of training and military doctrine in the wake of the war
118 See the remarks o f President Bush at a press conference in May 2005 where he indicates that Abu 
Ghraib is one o f his biggest regrets about the Iraq invasion” “President Bush and Prime Minister Tony 
Blair o f the United Kingdom participate in Joint Press Availability” 25 May 2006. Available online at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/2006Q525-12.html
119 New and significant challenges in these areas are actually being felt by the UK, America’s main 
ally, since the UK High Court o f Justice ruled that certain human rights laws and treaties applied to 
areas under British control.
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on terror, have had a major impact on the way the American relationship with the law 
of war is conceived.
There have been several arguments put forward in this chapter. First, that the Bush 
administration’s policies, which downplayed America’s traditional commitment to the 
laws of war as they are, for the most part, internationally understood, failed to replace 
this commitment with any thing concrete enough to withstand the pressures of the war 
on terror. This resulted in a situation of confusion with regards to which law applied 
and as a result, not only did soldiers completely fail to uphold the law, in some cases 
they felt they were doing the right thing through their abusive actions towards 
prisoners. Second, related to this, the soldiers at Abu Ghraib failed to uphold the 
military ethos that their training was designed to instil in them. There are several 
reasons why this appears to be the case. Training was inadequate for the purposes of 
the mission as circumstances rapidly went beyond what soldiers had been prepared 
for. When faced with ethical dilemmas in an incredibly stressful environment, soldiers 
failed entirely to maintain proper conduct. In part this seems to be due to a failure of 
command responsibility, that is an environment of permissibility generated by legal 
confusions and lack of accountability. However, the increasing roles of PMFs seem to 
have only complicated this as the training and accountability of PMFs involved in 
military operations remains undefined and unclear. There is substantial evidence to 
suggest that there was PMF involvement in what happened in Abu Ghraib, yet it 
appears there will be no prosecutions of the personnel involved.
In this way there is no one clear reason why Abu Ghraib occurred but rather a 
considerable number of factors came together to generate the circumstances in which 
the abuse could take place. The implications of all of this, however, suggest that 
America needs a serious reconsideration of its policies towards the laws of war. After 
taking away the stable foundation for conduct and prosecution of offences provided 
by international law, the Bush administration’s failure to set standards of its own is an 
incredibly risky approach that may lay the foundation for further incidents like Abu 
Ghraib.120
120 In July 2006, Human Rights Watch released a report which argued that detainee abuse had become 
part o f the “standing operation procedure” for US forces. The report cites several soldiers who 
witnessed or took part in the abuse. It also indicates that any soldier concerned about what was taking
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place was told to stop their line o f inquiry or were presented with legal arguments that such actions 
were permitted. In this way the report seems to agree with the assertion that the overall confused and 
permissive environment allows abuse to take place. Human Rights Watch, ‘“No Blood, No Foul’: 
Soldiers’ Accounts o f Detainee Abuse in Iraq” Human Rights Watch. Vol. 18, No. 3(G), July 2006. 
Available online: http://hrw.org/reports/2006/us0706/us0706web.pdf.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
The United States and future of the law of war
Introduction
It has been almost 60 years since the signing of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949. 
Since then, the way states wage war and engage in conflicts has undergone a dramatic 
change. This is partially due to rapid developments in technology which have enabled 
more accurate targeting and deadlier weapons. Because of this increasingly sophisticated 
machinery, the advance of the coalition in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was the 
fastest recorded in world history. However, warfare has also changed in terms of who is 
doing the fighting. Large-scale national armies fighting set-piece battles on open fields 
have been replaced by guerrillas in the tropics, insurgents in Iraq or, perhaps saddest of 
all, child soldiers in Africa. Clearly, none of these groups were likely to have been in the 
minds of the negotiators in Geneva when they drafted the rules of the Conventions.
In the past 60 years the American armed forces, who have engaged in many of these post- 
World War II conflicts, have changed as well. The military has adapted from a 
conscription-based force to one based entirely on enlisted volunteers. It is technologically 
superior to any other army on the planet, and although it is not the largest, it remains the 
strongest. In terms of the law of war, the US forces have increasingly taken matters 
seriously. The Uniform Code of Military Justice was developed, as was ‘operational law’ 
after the mistakes of Vietnam. US weaponry allows for discriminate attacks and efforts 
are made to try to spare innocent civilian life wherever possible. Yet, as this study has 
demonstrated, adapting to pressures and changes involving the law of war has always 
been, and clearly remains, a challenge.
But the law of war itself has not remained a constant in the past 60 years. It has changed 
and developed -  becoming increasingly more specific and complex. There are increasing 
pressures to blend “international humanitarian law” with human rights law. There are
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more non-governmental organizations concerned with, and seeking to monitor, the law of 
war in conflict situations than ever before.
This study has tried to examine developments in the approach of the United States to the 
laws of war, given these changes which have occurred in the nature of fighting and 
warfare, in its armed forces and in international law. In order to make these changes clear, 
it has advanced in a chronological fashion. Yet the interaction between these factors 
through the years makes apparent certain trends and ‘themes’ in America’s relationship 
with the law of war, and this concluding chapter will attempt to draw out some of the 
major ‘themes’ of the proceeding chapters to help provide a sense of the bigger picture. 
These include the issue of the role of ideology, a ‘dualistic tendency’, implementation, 
and complications with the involvement of new actors. Because a project such as this 
cannot engage in all of the questions that may be raised, issues and problems which 
emerge, it will conclude by looking at areas for further research.
Ideology
Perhaps in its simplest terms, ideology is best understood as that which helps to take us 
from our ideas to understanding issues. It forms the prism through which we view the 
world and ourselves in it. Ideology plays an important part in self-identification and in 
forming expectations. As such, ideology has a major impact on the way we conduct our 
behaviour and, it can be said, how states conduct their foreign policy.
A major claim of this work is that the United States, in it conduct of foreign policy, is 
greatly influenced by the idea of American exceptionalism. Again, this is the idea that 
there is a powerful strand of thinking in the United States which views the republic as 
‘exceptional’ among nations; that the United States is unique in the world for its founding 
values and for its way of life. While Chapter 2 discussed the impact of “Jacksonianism” 
on America’s attitudes towards international law, American exceptionalism is strongly
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reflected in what Walter Russell Mead describes as “Wilsonianism”.1 This is a belief that 
both democracy and democratic institutions are good for America and the world as they 
promote domestic and international stability. He notes that Wilsonians, inspired by 
missionary-like zeal, are the ones who have sought to limit the scourge of war through 
anti-war movements, humanitarian activities (including the development of the laws of 
war) and international institutions. The spreading of American and democratic values is 
conceived as an important impediment to war.
But Wilsonians have also been driven by their desire to promote the “global triumph of 
democracy and the rule of law”, as well as an American understanding of human rights 
abroad.2 Where necessary, this translates into a desire to promote military interventions 
into countries like Cuba and the Philippines, with the idea of transforming these societies 
into American-style democracies. Max Boot usefully differentiates between “soft” and 
“hard” Wilsonians; the former being those who prefer to work multilaterally and with 
international institutions in their foreign policies and the later those who are willing to 
commit US military might to secure Wilsonian ideas.3
Yet what unites all Wilsonians is that they are inspired by American-exceptionalist 
conceptions of democracy and the rule of law. In this way, the American role in the world 
has manifested itself into a mission to promote and defend those values which are 
perceived as making the nation great. In the 19th Century, this was a civilizing mission to 
the First Nations within its own borders and in the Philippines. In the 20th Century, this
1 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World. New  
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001. See the discussion in Chapter Five. Mead argues that although 
“Wilsonianism” takes its name from President Woodrow Wilson, its origins are much older than his 
presidency. Instead, he looks back to the American missionaries who, for the most part, believed in 
universal values. As he writes: “Wilsoniansim is a universal, not a particular, ideal. That is, no races, 
individuals, countries, or cultures are in principle excluded from the Wilsonian vision o f a world o f  
peaceful democracies treating one another with respect.... All nations an all peoples are assumed to be, or 
at least capable o f becoming, equal.” p. 169.
2 Mead, Special Providence, p. 172.
3 Max Boot, “What the Heck is a ‘Neocon’?” Opinion Journal. 30 December 2002. Available online: 
http^/www.opinioniournal.com/editorial/feature.htm^id^ 10002840. As Boot argues, “Advocats o f [hard 
Wilsonianism] embrace Woodrow Wilson’s championing o f American ideals but reject his reliance on 
international organizations and treaties to accomplish out objectives.”.
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role translated into that of a defender of freedom against fascism, communism and today, 
Islamic radicalism.
Clearly, such a world view and self-understanding are going to affect the way that
tViAmerica regards its enemies. In the 19 Century, America attempted to bring its ideas of 
civilization to the First Nations and Filipinos. When these ideas were rejected and 
fighting began, employing methods which fell outside of the American understanding of 
war, the results were bloody and brutal. Those who rejected America’s mission in the 
world, its ideas and conducted their fighting in ways that ‘civilized’ nations did not 
recognize, were shown little mercy. It is not hard to draw parallels to America’s 
engagements in the Vietnam War or the ongoing insurgency in Iraq. In this way, it 
appears to be the rejection of values and a refusal to adhere to a set of expectations which 
often influenced the restraints the US chose to impose on its fighting campaign.
This rejection matters more than either race or religion. While America’s notion of 
civilization, the implications of this understanding and the practical results of its 
civilizing mission may today be characterized as racist, it would appear to be that the 
rejection of ‘civilized’ values, including ‘civilized’ warfare, over racial notions and 
conceptions, were of paramount importance as to how America’s enemies were regarded. 
The campaign against Vietnam was carried out with much brutality on both sides. 
However, the Korean War, which fitted the classic model of interstate warfare far better 
than the conflict in Vietnam, saw the US treat the prisoners it had taken relatively well. 
The overall violence and bloodshed in Korea should, of course, not be underestimated. 
Yet, in many ways, the conflict, which fell into a recognized category of warfare, does 
not have the same notions of mayhem and savagery associated with it.
The US is not exceptional in that its ideology influences its world view and behaviour. 
Clearly the same may be said for every nation which needs to choose between priorities 
and engage with others politically. Instead it is the ideology itself which makes America 
unique in the world. More often than not, it is an imperative that the United States act in 
accordance with its ideological vision of itself. Surely this is the case with how it has
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interacted with international law, including the law of war. Treaties, which become the 
supreme law of the land, are not to be undertaken lightly, and those who sign on with the 
United States are expected to live up to their end of the bargain.
The discussion here is not meant to imply that American exceptionalism automatically 
dictates a dislike or disinclination towards international law. Rather, because the US sees 
itself as exceptional in its virtue, the United States will only sign those treaties to which it 
fully intends to adhere. It would violate America’s view of itself to only partially 
implement a commitment that it had made. So, while one may be tempted to point out 
the differences between Democrat and Republican administrations, (such as the 
differences between the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, or 
Clinton and George W. Bush) it is clear that the ideological imperatives of 
exceptionalism have played a role in most American administrations regardless of 
political affiliation.4 Although Clinton (often described as a “soft Wilsonian”) may have 
been more willing to engage multilaterally, or with international institutions, when 
examined closely, it is clear that his administration was not willing to bind itself to 
international law much more than the current one. For example, while Clinton did sign 
the Kyoto Protocol (fully aware that it would not pass in the Senate), it only gave 
lukewarm support to the ICC during its negotiations and the treaty was only signed on the 
last day of his presidency. He refused to sign the 1997 Landmine Treaty and did not take 
any steps to sign legislation such as the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. In this way, differences between administrations may be more in lip-service to 
the international community rather than substantial differences in attitude towards 
international law.
Dualistic Tendencies
America’s ideology can thus be said to give it a unique relationship as regards the laws of 
war and its enemies. The above argument suggests that American exceptionalism results
4 The Foreign policy o f the Nixon administration, clearly influenced by the realpoltik o f Henry Kissinger, 
being a possible exception.
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in a set of understandings and expectations regarding international law and the laws of 
war. In terms of understandings, American administrations have tended to view 
international law as a binding contract which is not to be undertaken lightly. 
International law is signed and ratified because it matters, not because it ‘looks good’ in 
either domestic or international circles. In this way America undertook its negotiations at
a|_ aL
The Hague and Geneva in the 19 and 20 Centuries very seriously, with a real 
commitment to the further development of international law. As discussed above, this 
was inspired its liberal vision for the world, which included the rule of law and a desire to 
end, or limit, all wars.
On the other hand, such understandings results in an expectation that the other side will 
live up to its side of the bargain. In order to qualify for the restraints set out in the laws of 
war, enemies were expected to act within a set of boundaries of ‘civilized warfare’. 
Where its opponents failed to do so, its enemies could expect little mercy. This helps to 
explain a ‘dualistic tendency’ when it comes to America’s implementation of the laws of 
war. The Confederate Army’s actions fell within the set of understandings that the laws 
of war had set out, and, as such, Southern prisoners fared relatively decently under the 
care of the Union Army. On the other hand, as seen in Chapter 2, the First Nations and 
Filipinos fell outside this understanding and were not afforded the same rights or 
restraints.
This ‘dualistic tendency’, influenced by ideology, was also supported by the generally
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accepted notion of reciprocity as applicable to the laws of war in the 19 Century. Under 
this notion, when an opponent fails to live up to their obligations under the laws of war, 
they lose any protections or restraints that would otherwise be applied. However, after the 
Second World War and the signing of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, reciprocity began to 
lose its normative basis. Common Article 3 of the Conventions stated that parties would 
agree to treat their prisoners humanely, no matter how a conflict was characterized and 
what law applied. States were increasingly expected to apply the law in all circumstances. 
Thus, the ‘dualistic tendency’ began to clash with the idea that some restraints were
209
always applicable, no matter how enemies conducted their campaigns or what kind of 
conflict was being fought.
The events of Vietnam as relating to the laws of war can, perhaps, be explained by these 
conflicting ideas. The US applied POW status to the prisoners it captured in the conflict 
because it was seen as the morally correct course of action and politically prudent. 
However, the nature of the insurgency, which frustrated the US military, began to push 
for harsher tactics against an entrenched foe. As US soldiers became increasingly 
frustrated, some, albeit a small minority, took their frustrations out on those they could 
get their hands on -  villagers and civilians who were seen as collaborating with the 
enemy. While such behaviour was never condoned, there was very little political will to 
prosecute those who were responsible for massacres like Mai Lai.
Implementation
However, the problems in regarding the implementation of the laws of war in Vietnam 
did illustrate a point to the US military: that when soldiers are untrained, poorly 
disciplined and failed to adhere to the laws of war, the results can be militarily disastrous. 
In the post-Vietnam era, military lawyers who had taken part in the conflict began a 
process that tried to impress this point on their military commanders. It was argued that 
enforcing the laws of war made good military sense. The Vietnam War demonstrated that 
units who were well disciplined, adhered to international standards, and domestic codes 
of conduct, were the ones that were ultimately far more effective in accomplishing their 
missions.
Essentially, the principle was as old as Clausewitz’s dictum on the ‘economy of force’: 
effort wasted on pointless murder and pillage takes away from the overall effectiveness 
of a military campaign. If soldiers are trained to do their tasks in such a way as to 
automatically and fully implement the laws of war, the US military was more likely to 
complete its missions efficiently and effectively. Thus, the “re-branding” and “re-selling” 
of the laws of war back to the US military resulted in the development of “operational
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law.” Conceived as a tool that would help commanders conduct their missions (rather 
than just restrict them), operational law would demonstrate its usefulness in the conduct 
of the 1991 Gulf War. In this way the military lawyers had proven that the laws of war 
were something more than an impractical list laid out by lawyers in Geneva; law, policy 
and effectiveness were essentially linked. Put simply, following the laws of war made 
good military sense.
So why was this view rejected after 9/11?
The argument contained in this work has tried to suggest why this might be the case. It 
has looked at the Bush administration’s argument that the ‘war on terror’ has placed the 
United States in a ‘new paradigm’ of warfare. This new paradigm requires new thinking 
about issues such as the relation of law to policy, including policy towards the laws of 
war. The President requires new and sweeping powers to defend the United States from 
attacks and these powers, it was argued, were granted by the Constitution and authorized 
by Congress. This included the power to override international law wherever and 
whenever necessary.
And it was clear that the Bush administration did think it was necessary. The need to 
prevent further attacks, to gather intelligence and to disrupt al-Qaida as much as possible 
meant that rights traditionally afforded to prisoners of war could not be given to those 
who were potentially so valuable for the fight against terrorism. While the Geneva 
Conventions allow for the questioning of prisoners, the administration believed that their 
interrogations needed to go beyond this level, especially when facing fanatics willing to 
die for their cause. Because the President needed to protect the United States at all cost, 
the Geneva Conventions did not, and should not, apply to the war on terror in 
Afghanistan.
Ultimately, when the Geneva standard was taken away, nothing firm was put in its place. 
As the war on terror expanded to encompass Iraq, different sets of rules began to apply to 
different areas. One set of rules was set for to Guantanamo Bay, another applied at
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Bagram Air Base and yet another in Iraq. Different sets of rules began to migrate from 
one area of operations to another. Guantanamo’s rules, intended for its strict and isolated 
environment, were applied to the relative chaos of Abu Ghraib. It was under these 
confusing conditions that the opportunity for abuse at Abu Gharib emerged.
In this way it can be argued that the link between law and policy holds; and this may be 
the strongest argument for the implementation of the laws of war. Where there is one 
clear standard, soldiers in a zone of conflict, already burdened with many pressing and 
demanding tasks, know what is expected of them. When this guidance is taken away, the 
confusing can lead to disaster. As has been acknowledged by the administration, nothing 
was served by Abu Ghraib, and a lot was lost.
New Actors
Yet the nature of the threat, and those who impose this threat, should not be forgotten. 
The United States has typically faced difficulties in applying the laws of war when it has 
been confronted with fighting that has fallen outside of its understanding of ‘legitimate’ 
warfare. The same may be said for when it has confronted new actors. As this work has 
tried to demonstrate, when confronted with the First Nations and Filipinos, who used 
tactics deemed ‘uncivilized’, or with the style of guerrilla fighting in Vietnam, the US has 
had difficulties in applying restraints on its fighting. Today, it is the tough Taliban 
fighters, determined insurgents and globally networked al-Qaida who pose challenges to 
the US military and comprise the threat to the United States. These are groups unlike any 
other enemy the US has faced, and again serious challenges have materialized as these 
new actors have emerged. But it is not only America’s enemies that have posed 
difficulties in this regard. As argued in Chapter 5, the dramatic increase in the number of 
private military firms (PMFs) mean that new problems of regulation and enforcement of 
the laws of war have transpired.
Arguably, the emergence of these new actors fall outside of the concept of warfare that is 
implicit in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. As such, insurgents, terrorists and PMFs have
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challenged both international law and the ability for the United States to implement it. On 
top of this, the illegal (or at least immoral) tactics of insurgents against civilians make it 
difficult to apply restraints to such a dangerous foe. The unaccountability of PMFs also 
create challenges as to how the law is applied. Given that indications suggest that these 
‘new actors’, in terms of war fighting, are here to stay, the problems that they pose, in 
terms of the ability for the US to apply the laws of war, may become increasingly 
problematic. If these new actors are here to stay, how the US chooses to deal with these 
actors may have major significance as to how the laws of war are regarded, or applied, in 
the future.
Law as Politics
Ultimately, one of the main goals of this thesis has been to demonstrate that the debate 
over America’s relationship with the law of war is telling about the way international law 
is viewed by both international relations scholars and international lawyers. Although the 
tendency has lessened within the last ten years, there is still an inclination for students of 
international relations to dismiss international law as ineffective or as a set of rules 
developed in times of peace which can be, and usually are, overlooked in times of crisis. 
International law is seen as the stale rules of conduct drafted in boardrooms in New York 
and Geneva. Compared to the forceful and active world of international politics -  wars, 
great powers, diplomacy -  international law is, quite frankly, boring. It tells us nothing 
much about the way the world works and never could as international law can only be 
based on naive idealism.
Most lawyers on the other hand tend to view international law as the final word on many 
matters of international politics. While there is always room for interpretation and 
arguments in front of international legal bodies on the matters of war, aggression and the 
rules of conduct in conflicts, there are set rules which bound states. These rules which 
control major international political actions are largely unambiguous and give little room 
for compromise no matter what the context. In writing on the relationship between law 
and the war on terror, many international lawyers have done no more than provide lists of
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applicable law, how it applies and to provide a ‘checklist’ of items which states must 
follow if they are to act with any kind of legitimacy. Where international law is ignored, 
actions are to be condemned. To these international legal scholars legality is implicitly, if 
not explicitly tied to morality.
Of course, for the most part, these are exaggerated stereotypes with a vast majority of 
scholars falling somewhere in between. But these stereotypes do point to a problem when 
looking at issues of international law and politics -  the tendency to let one, either law or 
politics, dominate the other. That the relationship between the two is of necessity 
dynamic and intimately related seems to be either ignored entirely, or often bemoaned, by 
those who believe that law should guide politics or that politics should not be constrained 
by a dubious international community. The history of international law, and the law of 
war, makes clear that the interpretation, development and implementation of international 
law has been and always will be accomplished through the prism of both international 
and, indeed, domestic politics.
Therefore, it is not only important to look at legal texts when faced with international 
developments, but the historical context, and the context of the law in its relationship to 
politics. Such an approach provides us better insight to our present predicaments and 
guides our interpretation of the law. While it would be wrong to chain ourselves to past 
understandings of the law, a full appreciation of how law relates to a particular situation 
will not occur unless we acknowledge the other forces at work, such as history and 
politics, that help to give us our present understandings.
In this way, the story of America and the laws of war is far less a legal as opposed to a 
political story. As the argument presented in the chapters of this work has tried to 
demonstrate, the role of politics has been central to the way the law of war has been 
implemented by the United States. Politics, influenced by both ideology and national 
priorities, determine how enemies of the United States have been viewed, regarded and, 
treated. Politics influences the way that training is conducted, the laws of war are 
implemented and ultimately how the law of war is perceived. In this way, a full
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understanding of how America has engaged with the laws of war is as much political as it 
is legal.
Issues for further research
The multifaceted story of the United States and the politics of the law of war raise many 
interesting points, but also many questions. Despite the very intriguing nature of these 
matters, time and space constraints prevent a full investigation of these issues. However, 
it is clear that there are several areas of future research on both theoretical and pragmatic 
issues that would help to enhance not our understanding of American policies towards the 
law of war, but also our understanding of the law of war itself. A brief survey of some of 
these issues follows below.
Post-Vietnam Military Reform
There has been surprisingly little written on the changes which occurred in the US 
military after Vietnam -  especially regarding the law of war. The development of 
“operational law”, and major changes regarding training and implementation of the law 
of war in the 1980s were quite substantial and, as has been argued here, enough to 
suggest that a legal revolution occurred in the US military at this time. The emergence of 
“activist lawyers” who, having seen mistakes made in Vietnam, worked their way into 
the trust of commanders to push the cause of their new legal approach also seems to have 
been largely ignored by both political and legal literature.
The changes of this period have been documented in some respect by military lawyers, 
historians and Department of Defense personnel. However, these writings tend to come 
from official histories and documents rather than through independent academic sources. 
This is not to suggest that the official histories are flawed or untrustworthy -  indeed, they 
are often very critical of past US actions. Nevertheless they are united in the fact that they 
come from a military perspective and usually, at least in part, are aimed at a military 
audience. Additionally, while there are articles written by military lawyers in non-
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military, scholarly, journals on the issue of changes in the military, there is still a lot of 
room for academic analysis on the matter. Again, while these military-affiliated 
individuals may claim to not be writing in an official capacity, they still come from a 
specific view point. The literature on this matter would perhaps benefit from non-military 
perspectives on the matter, critical or not. But, perhaps more importantly, scholarly works 
which highlight the post-Vietnam debates and activities that the US military lawyers 
engaged in, would also be of much use and interest to mainstream international relations 
and international legal studies.
Given the difficulties that have occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq, such an analysis might 
be useful in examining “where next” for the US in its implementation of the law of war. 
Media reports have made it clear that there are many civilian administrators as well as 
military lawyers and advisors who are upset with the current US policies and what their 
effect has been on the US military.5 If or when the war on terror winds down or if the US 
withdraws from Iraq, such a perspective might be useful if there is another ‘retrospective’ 
in terms of how training and implementation of the law of war takes place. Such a 
research project might prove very important for future reform or for governments who 
wish to revamp their current law of war program within their military.
Training
Aside from examining the development of international law, it would also be beneficial 
for there to be more academic work on training methods in the law of war. As mentioned 
in chapters two and five, the US military currently takes an approach which automatically 
incorporates the rules of the law of war into the job training for individual soldiers.6 This
5 Some of these reports have been listed in Chapters 4 and 5. Again, useful source are the articles by Jane 
Mayer in the New Yorker. See Jane Mayer “The Memo: How an internal effort to ban the abuse and torture 
of detainees was thwarted”, The New Yorker. 20 February 2006. Available online: 
http://www.newvorker.com/fact/content/articles/060227fa fact: and Jane Mayer “The Hidden Power: The 
legal mind behind the White House’s war on terror”, The New Yorker. 3 July 2006. pp. 44-55; John Barry, 
Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff, “The Roots o f Torture”, Newsweek 24 May 2005. Available online at: 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989481/.
6 Again, most o f the sources for this section are those used in Chapter 5. See also, Maj. Gen (Ret) William 
L. Nash “The Laws o f War: A Military View”, Ethics and International Affairs. Vol 16. No. 1, 2002.
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approach, which has been in place since the reforms of the 1980s, is custom-tailored to 
the needs of individuals in their various jobs on a need-to-know basis rather than as a 
large block of treaty text. In this way, the principles of the law of war are largely taught 
as US military doctrine rather than as direct principles of international law. Again, the 
aim of this approach is to keep matters as simple as possible for soldiers who may not 
have more than a high school education; that implementation of the responsibilities of the 
law of war becomes automatic rather than the result of a conscious decision.
As suggested in Chapter 5, the problem of this approach is what happens when matters go 
‘outside the box’ in terms of training. If soldiers are trained to automatically deal with a 
given situation -  what happens when that given situation goes well beyond the training of 
a particular group of soldiers? While the investigations into the scandal at Abu Ghraib 
indicate that there were in fact deficiencies in the training of the guards who were sent to 
that prison facility (for example a training simulation was canceled prior to deployment) 
it is also clear that the situation the guards were presented with went far beyond their 
training and perhaps intellectual capacity. While this is a problem that command 
oversight should have been more aware of at the time, it is questionable whether or not it 
is even possible to train a soldier for the circumstances that they would have faced at Abu 
Ghraib. Given that training in prisoner of war operations has traditionally put camps far 
from the battlefield and in a controlled environment, Abu Ghraib went far beyond these 
conditions. Between the shortage of supplies, the constant shelling and lack of manpower 
that affected the operations, is it reasonable to suggest that training for this situation 
could ever be adequate? Or in another scenario, how do you train a soldier to manage and 
control an entire town after an occupation where the inhabitants speak another language 
and belong to an entirely different culture?
In this way there is room for an examination of current military training policies to 
determine if there is room for improvements and/or alternatives. It has been suggested 
here, albeit quite briefly, that an approach which stressed the making of ethical decisions 
at the officer level, rather than approach which only emphasizes rules and doctrine, may 
be beneficial. Individuals given this training would therefore be given training or skills in
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making ethical decisions in stressful and complex environments. The drawbacks to this 
approach is that such a method may be unrealistic in that training time is already at a 
premium within the US military and an approach which encourages judgments rather 
than following orders on the battlefield is not necessarily one that the US military wants 
to encourage. Still, further research on this question would be interesting and perhaps 
useful in developing training techniques.
Private Military Firms
One of the issues that Operation Iraqi Freedom highlighted was the reliance of western 
armies on private military firms in their operations. While the issue of contractors had 
certainly been acknowledged in previous conflicts, including Kosovo and the 1990-1 
Gulf War, the sheer number of PMF personnel in Iraq indicates that this trend is likely to 
continue in the future, especially in western armies.7 The increasing role and integration 
of PMFs with modem military forces, especially those of the west, was also highlighted 
as reports of abuses by PMF personnel have been reported in the press. The argument 
here has briefly looked at the issue of PMFs and the problems they have posed in terms 
of the law of war. The fact that the US forces are so dependent on PMFs has brought 
problems in terms of regulation and prosecution for alleged war crimes.
Given that problems related to prosecuting PMF/contractor personnel have existed since 
at least Vietnam, it is surprising that there has been very little done in this area. Yet, 
traditionally, international lawyers and organizations such as the ICRC have been very 
reluctant to examine, research and develop relating to PMFs. This hostility stems from 
the deep antagonism and suspicions that the decolonizing and non-aligned states felt 
towards PMFs, more commonly referred to as mercenaries, in the 1960s through the 
1990s. Because international legislation such as the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions and certain UN General Assembly resolutions explicitly outlawed
7 A May 2006 estimate by the Associated Press suggested that there were around 20,000 PMF personnel 
operating in Iraq. Alexandra Zavis, “Rise o f guns-for-hire in Iraq creates regulatory quandary”, Associated 
Press, 8 May 2006.
218
the participation of mercenaries in conflict, there was some reluctance to deal with the 
issue.8
Yet given the increased participation of PMFs in armed conflicts, it has become 
increasingly obvious that the issue cannot be ignored. In the past few years there has been 
a number of books published on PMFs and international legal scholars as well as strategic 
studies and international relations scholars have turned their attention to the issue of the 
participation of PMFs in armed conflict.9 Presently, most of the research has been on 
regulation of the companies to ensure they remain in line with state interests and support 
at least reasonably ethical causes.10
There is clearly much room for more discussion on the relationship between PMFs, the 
laws of war and responsibility/prosecution for war crimes in conflict. It would seem that 
a large part of the problem is for NGOs to overcome their own reluctance to engage with 
PMFs, which increasingly seems to be the case. Research on regulations that would 
enhance accountability, better define legality of participation and tactics as well as the 
status of PMF personnel would be interesting and valuable for improving our 
understanding of the complexities surrounding PMFs in armed conflicts. Given the 
involvement in several scandals involving the law of war, a better understanding of the 
responsibilities of PMFs, as well as of the rights they have in a war zone, would be 
greatly beneficial.
America and the Laws of War after Iraq
8 See UN General Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) 12 December 1973 and Article 47, Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949. For a critical discussion of what went on during 
the negotiation o f Article 47, see Henry W. Van Deventer, “Mercenaries at Geneva”, American Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 70, No. 4. (October 1976), pp. 811-816.
9 Some of these have already been highlighted in chapter 5. Of those worth highlighting, the work of Peter 
Singer has been very influential. Relating to the law o f war, see P. W. Singer, “War, Profits, and the 
Vacuum o f Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law”, Columbia Journal o f Transnational 
Law. Vol. 42 No. 2, Spring 2004.
10 Again, the work o f Singer is key here. But see also the work of David Shearer, “Outsourcing War”, 
Foreign Policy. Issue 112, Fall 1998 and Private Armies and Military Intervention. Adelphi Paper 316, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.
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At the time of this writing, it is unknown how much longer the United States will be in 
Iraq and Afghanistan or engaged in the broader war on terror. While the Bush 
administration has promised a long-term commitment, falling domestic support for the 
conflict, a sense of fatigue in the military and spiralling costs may curtail US military 
activity sooner rather than later. The effect of current and emerging threats, such as 
instability in the middle east, (including a hostile and nuclear Iran), may also have an 
effect on US military policy in the near future, or the effects of natural disasters (such as 
a Katrina-style hurricane) or instability close to the US homeland (such as the possibilitiy 
that the ongoing crisis in Haiti may spill over into a refugee crisis) may also prompt 
changes in US military activity in the coming months or years.
The purpose of this section is not to speculate on where or how the US will be involved 
in conflicts around the globe throughout the world, but only how such changes may or 
may not prompt changes in US policies towards the law of war in the future. What can be 
expected of how the US will engage with the laws of war after Iraq? Given the recent 
past and the challenges ahead, there is plenty of opportunity for ongoing research into 
this complex relationship.
One scenario may be that after the scandals and controversies over the prison at 
Guantanamo Bay’s Camp Delta, the death of prisoners at Bagram Air Base in 
Afghanistan, the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and allegations of war crimes at Haditha in Iraq, 
US military lawyers or the Department of Defense may take an approach to the laws of 
war like that of their post-Vietnam predecessors. In this, a post-Vietnam model scenario, 
military lawyers, unsatisfied with what they have seen regarding the implementation of 
the laws of war in America’s current military engagements, might argue and push for 
new approaches of looking at and implementing and adhering to the law of war -  not just 
because it is the ‘right thing to do’, but so that operations continue to run smoothly and so 
that controversies which take away from the purpose of a mission (such as the above- 
mentioned scandals) are avoided. This would require a new generation of so-called 
“activist-lawyers” to emerge in the Department of Defense who would again, argue their
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case for operational law, one consistent legal policy and the role of lawyers in the war 
room. Such a shift might entail what otherwise might be referred to as a ‘second legal 
revolution’ or ‘renaissance’ within the US military.
On the other hand, the experiences regarding the politics of the law of war in the war on 
terror may provoke the opposite response. If there is a perception that the law of war 
prompted difficulties and frustrations in US military operations, or if the task of 
implementing the law of war leaves a bitter taste in the mouths of soldiers and 
commanders, there may be a great deal of resistance or hostility to the general idea of the 
law of war in combat. If the whole principle behind operational law is that it helps to 
make operations run smoother, and if that is no longer considered to be the case by US 
military personnel, suggested improvements or a full implementation of the law of war 
may be rejected. Attitudes towards the law of war within the Department of Defense 
should therefore remain an area of research for those interested in America’s relationship 
with the law of war.
This second ‘rejection’ scenario would be aided by a continued or increased acceptance 
of the neo-conservative/new sovereigntist critique of international law. If such a position 
attracts a sympathetic ear or even explicit approval within the US government in the 
future, there would be even greater pressure to reject the development of international 
law, especially in the areas of human rights and the law of war. Such an approach would 
mark an increasing tendency to base arguments regarding international law on political 
and moral grounds rather than legal arguments based on legal interpretation. It is 
probably too extreme to suggest that such an approach would result in the US 
withdrawing from the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the 1984 United Nations Convention 
Against Torture. However, it may mean a significant downplaying of the significance of 
such international legislation (perhaps going beyond the ‘quaint’ remarks of Alberto 
Gonzales), a clear indication that current international treaties on the matter (such as the 
Ottawa Convention to ban landmines) will not be ratified or even presented to the Senate 
to ratify, and a refusal of the US to participate in the drafting of further treaties of this 
nature.
221
The actual course of the US regarding its policies towards the law of war in the future is 
likely to fall somewhere in between these two scenarios. A second legal revolution may 
not be necessary in so far as what seems to be required is maintaining US military 
doctrine in all situations, rather than the ‘mixed bag’ approach mandated by the current 
administration. And, as has been argued here, the reluctance of the US to be seen as 
totally disregarding international rules will probably prevent a full-on ‘rejection’ 
approach to the law of war.
What then may remain indicative of the direction of US policies are arguments relating to 
linking purpose and tactics in fighting the war on terror. As was argued in Chapter 4, an 
increasing tendency for certain US legal scholars as well as Bush administration officials 
to justify the means employed based off of the political and moral imperatives to win the 
war on terror essentially involves re-linking jus ad bellurn and jus in bello -  a reversal of 
the legislative history of the last 160 years and customary trends of at least the last two 
centuries.
While this may seem an issue of semantics or even political and moral rhetoric, there are 
serious practical implications to the question. The need to win the war on terror has 
already caused many in the US government and in America to re-think the rules on 
torture and such an approach has clear implications for how issues like extraordinary 
rendition and the treatment of prisoners of war are handled in future conflicts.
Nor is it clear that a change in Administration will make a difference to this debate. 
Democratic President Bill Clinton demonstrated that, when push came to shove, he was 
willing to go against international legal opinion and it is fairly clear that Democrats or 
“soft Wilsonians” are not willing to sacrifice perceived American political and security 
interests in the name of international law. The debate here frequently crosses domestic 
political lines with many Democrats voting for the USA PATRIOT Act, and Republicans 
such as Senator John McCain speaking out against torture. Perhaps, then, the only thing 
which is clear is that the role of politics, ideology and perceptions of national imperatives
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will continue to have an effect on how the laws of war are considered and implemented 
by the United States and its military.
The Law of War after America
The issues highlighted in this study point to several questions regarding the future for the 
law of war. Perhaps the most blatant of these has been whether or not the law of war will 
survive beyond the war on terror and if so, in what form? In a speech on the need to 
reexamine the laws of war, one commentator stated:
Historically, of course, laws have always been adapted to better suit the 
times. When they have become out-dated, or less relevant, or less applicable 
to the realities of the day they have been modified or changed. This is true 
of all laws, domestic or international...
...since some change is less perceptible, more incremental, the balance 
between considerations such as obligation and entitlement, and freedom and 
security needs to be continually reviewed and, where necessary, re-forged.
If we act differently today from how we behaved yesterday, it is not 
necessarily wrong. Indeed it may be wrong not to. We owe it to ourselves, to 
our people, to our forces and to the cause of international order to constantly 
reappraise and update the relationship between our underlying values, the 
legal instruments which apply them to the world of conflict, and the 
historical circumstances in which they are to be applied, including the nature 
of that conflict.11
The remarks did not come from the Bush administration or neo-conservative think-tank 
but from the British Secretary of State for Defence -  an elected MP of the Labour 
Government. In his speech, titled “Twenty-first Century Warfare -  Twentieth Century
11 Rt Hon Dr John Reid MP, Secretary o f  State for Defence “Twenty-first Century Warfare -  Twentieth 
Century Rules”, Banqueting House, Royal Palace of Whitehall, 3 Apr 2006. Whether or not this accurately 
reflects the opinion o f Ministry Defense lawyers is, of course, unclear.
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Rules” he went on to question whether or not society was adequately convinced that it 
was protected from the threat of international terrorism under the current frameworks of 
domestic and international law.
What the speech demonstrates is that many of the questions and issues which are 
currently affecting America and international law also affect and stir other countries 
around the world. The way that America chooses to answer these quandaries will 
naturally affect the way the rest of the world perceives these issues. However, it is fair to 
say that the way the rest of the world answers the same challenges will probably also 
have an affect the United States.
Do we need new thinking on the laws of war? As suggested in Chapter 4, the issue was 
raised long before the war on terror began. The issue was raised, practically, in the 
Kosovo campaign. Today, the argument that we need new rules to combat a new breed 
of networked international terrorists, is the main moral and political justification for the 
Bush administration’s policies on Guantanamo Bay and interrogation.
Despite the outrage of human rights organizations, humanitarians and activists, these 
arguments are not incomprehensible. It can only be natural that when presented with a 
conflict that is, if only in size and scale, unprecedented, that the rules and restrictions 
which apply are put under some scrutiny. Should we compromise the safety of our troops, 
or even our societies, for the rights of terrorists? Should the West really engage in a war, 
with one hand tied behind its back, against an enemy who holds the very idea of restraint 
in disdain?
The premise of the question is, of course, that the law of war is the restraint which does 
hold the ‘one arm back.’ As argued above, this is not necessarily the case. Rather, the law 
of war is a tool which may be used to facilitate operations to help them go smoother. 
Because the law of war imposes both duties and rights on combatants, regarding the law 
as only restrictions and restraints is a mischaracterization.
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Perhaps then what we need is not so much ‘new thinking’ about the law of war in the war 
on terror, but a return to ‘old thinking’. Old thinking in this context refers to the approach 
that was outlined by the “activist lawyers” in the 1980s but also resonates with the 
approach taken in 1949. Old thinking recognizes that the law gives both rights and 
responsibilities to combatants and acknowledges that law which gives one side a distinct 
advantage is unworkable. In other words, defenders have an obligation not to base 
themselves in or near civilian areas and then expect that the other side will refrain from 
attacking. Additionally, old thinking emphasizes the need to keep the rules as simple and 
straightforward as possible for military personnel. This means that approaches that seek 
to over complicate the law of war with new and increasingly specific or complex 
regulations. However, keeping the rules simple also mean sticking to one policy -  
approaches which seek to apply different sets of rules to different areas of operation (or 
even in the same area) result in confusion and misunderstandings. Having one approach 
and sticking to it helps to keep things clear in confusing and dangerous situations and, 
crucially, it helps to prevent the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib.
Yet, what is key about ‘old thinking’, especially when compared to arguments for ‘new 
thinking’ on the law of war is the belief that the law of war can be flexible and be applied 
to unfamiliar and unprecedented situations. Where the ‘new game, new rules’ argument 
tends to looks upon our current law as outdated or no longer appropriate for the war on 
terror, old thinking looks for parallels and ways that our current law can apply in such a 
way that political and military imperatives can still be met.
As he sets out to look at the applicable law in the war on terror, Christopher Greenwood 
notes that much of the controversy over the American approach to the war on terror:
.. .has its roots in the fact that the events of 11 September -  a terrorist 
attack of unprecedented savagery, apparently carried out by a shadowy 
organization operating outside the control of any state -  did not fit easily 
within any of the obvious categories of international law. To some 
observers, the attack can only be regarded as an entirely new phenomenon
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falling wholly outside the existing framework of international law... For 
the members of that school of thought, a challenge on this scale of a non­
state actor to the one superpower calls for an entirely new thinking about 
the nature of international law. There is much substance in this argument, 
but does not help to answer the immediate questions about what law is 
applicable now. The fact that the events of 11 September may demonstrate 
a need to re-examine some of the assumptions on which the international 
legal system rests does not mean that those events occurred in a legal 
vacuum.12
Thus, questions about new thinking and old thinking are clearly an interesting area for 
further research. However, the point being made in this short discussion is that even 
where there is not a perfect fit between events and international law, this does not mean 
that there are no conventions to govern a particular operation or conflict. Custom and 
norms provide rules and surely most, if not all, circumstances in the war on terror can 
draw on at least one parallel from past conflicts or emergencies. In this way, our current 
law is flexible and is more adaptable than has been considered by many academics, 
politicians and even international lawyers. Ideas about precedence and finding ways to 
make the law work were the goals of “activist lawyers” in the post-Vietnam military 
context. A return to this kind of old thinking may then be more useful than finding and 
agreeing on alternatives in a fractured, post-9/11 world.
Conclusion: Putting it all together
Drawing on the previous chronological chapters, the final section of this work has tried to 
highlight the issues surrounding the United States and the politics of the law of war in a 
thematic manner. In doing so it has attempted to demonstrate that when it comes to these 
issues there are no clear separating lines. The major themes that run through this study all
12 Christopher Greenwood, “International law and the ‘war against terrorism’” International Affairs. Vol. 
78, No. 2, 2004. pp. 301-317. p. 301.
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relate and engage with one another. It is impossible to speak of a dualistic tendency or 
implementation without reference to ideology.
Therefore, this Conclusion, and the overall project, have also tried to emphasize the need 
for a hybrid approach to study these issues. The role of law in politics and the nature of 
politics in law need to be considered and examined. A political account which too easily 
dismisses the effect of international law and a shallow reading and analysis of a legal text 
tell us very little of how America engages with the law of war in modem conflicts.
Ultimately, rather than presenting a model, this study has tried to tell a story about how 
America has engaged with the law of war since 1945 and why, it chose to act in a 
particular manner. It has done so in the hope that interested individuals will be able to 
draw lessons and, perhaps better understand where the United States stands in relation to 
the law of war today and why. Such an understanding remains important because, despite 
its current pressures, America remains the world’s only superpower and is likely continue 
on in this role for at least the next few decades. As such it is reasonable to estimate that 
the US will remain militarily engaged, if only in the defense of its own territory. The 
dilemmas America faces in terms of the law of war are therefore likely to remain with 
important to us all for the foreseeable future.
If the past is any indication, it is likely that America’s relationship with the law of war 
will continue to change because of the effect of ideology, national tendencies and politics. 
America has an effect on international law and international law has an effect on America 
and this certainly includes the law of war. After all, it has been said that the law of war 
has been written in the blood of past conflicts -  and much of this blood, it may be said, 
has been American.
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APPENDIX A
Interrogation Techniques requested by the commander of the US 
Southern Command for use at Guantanamo Bay. 
Memo dated 25 October 2002.
On 2 December 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved all of the 
techniques in Category I and II and the fourth technique in Category III.
This permission was rescinded on 15 January and a working group was set up to assess 
the legal, policy and operational issues relating to the interrogation of detainees.
Category I
1. Yelling at Detainee
2. Techniques of Deception
a. Multiple interrogator techniques
b. Interrogator identity. The interviewer ma identify himself as a citien of a 
foreign nation or as an interrogator from a country with a reptation for 
harsh treatment of detainees.
Category II techniques
1. The use of stress positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours.
2. The use of falsified documents or reports.
3. Us of isolation facility for up to 30 days. Requests must be made to through the 
OIC1, Interrogation Section, to the Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). 
Extensions beyond the initial 30 days must be approved by the Commanding 
General. For selected detainees, the OIC, Interrogation Section will approve all 
contacts with detainee, to include medical visits of non-emergent nation.
4. Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation 
booth.
5. Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
6. The detainee may also have a hood placed over his head during transportation and 
questioning. The hood should not restrict breathing in any way and the detainee 
should be under direct observation when hooded.
7. The use of 20-hour interrogations
8. Removal of all comfort items (including religious items)
9. Switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs2
10. Removal of clothing
11. Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc)
12. Using detainee individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress.
Category III techniques
1 Officer in charge
2 “Meals Ready to Eat”
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1. The use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely 
painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family.
2. Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring).
3. Use of a wet towel dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation.
4. Use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest 
with the finger, and light pushing.
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APPENDIX B
Interrogation Techniques approved by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld for use at Guantanamo Bay after review by a working group 
in the Department of Defense. Memo dated 16 April 2003.
Techniques A-Q: from Field Manual 34-52
A. Direct: Asking straightforward questions.
B. Incentive/removal of incentive: Providing a reward or removing a privilege, beyond 
those that are required by the Geneva Conventions.
C. Emotional love: Playing on the love a detainee has for an individual or a group.
D. Emotional hate: Playing on the hatred a detainee has for an individual or a group.
E. Fear up harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee. (This is generally 
interpreted as yelling or throwing things but not touching the detainee.)
F. Fear up mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a detainee.
G. Reduced fear: Reducing the fear level in a detainee.
H. Pride and ego up: Boosting the ego of a detainee.
I. Pride and ego down: Attacking and insulting the ego of a detainee, not beyond the 
limits that would apply to a prisoner of war. (Caution given that this may violate Article 
17 of the Third Geneva Convention and consideration on these grounds should be given 
prior to application of this technique.)
J. Futility: Invoking the feeling of futility in a detainee.
K. We know all: Convincing a detainee that the interrogator already knows the answer to 
the question he is asking.
L. Establish your identity: Convincing a detainee that the interrogator has mistaken him 
for someone else.
M. Repetition approach: Continuously repeating the same question to a detainee within 
interrogation periods of normal duration.
N. File and dossier: Convincing a detainee that the interrogator has a damning and 
inaccurate file that must be fixed.
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O. Mutt and Jeff: Pairing a friendly interrogator with a harsh one.
P. Rapid fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing detainee to answer.
Q. Silence: Staring at a detainee to encourage discomfort.
Techniques which go beyond Field Manual 34-52 and require “Further 
implementation guidance”
R. Change of scenery up: Removing a detainee from the standard interrogation setting — 
generally to a more pleasant location, but not to a worse one.
S. Change of scenery down: Moving a detainee from the standard interrogation setting to 
one less comfortable, but not one that would constitute a substantial change in 
environmental quality.
T. Dietary manipulation: Changing the diet of a detainee, but with no intended 
deprivation of food or water and without an adverse cultural or medical effect, e.g., hot 
rations to MREs
U. "Environmental manipulation": Altering the environment to create moderate 
discomfort (e.g., adjusting temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell). Conditions 
would not be such that they would injure a detainee. Detainee would be accompanied by 
a^n interrogator at all times. [Caution: Based on court cases in other countries, some 
nations may view application of this technique in certain circumstances to be inhumane. 
Consideration off these views should be given prior to use of this technique.]
V. Sleep adjustment: Adjusting the sleeping times of a detainee (e.g., reversing sleep 
cycles from night to day.) This technique is NOT sleep deprivation.
W. False Flag: Convincing the detainee that individuals from a country other than the 
United States are interrogating him
X. Isolation: Isolating a detainee from other detainees while still complying with the 
basic standards of treatment.3
3 A lengthy guidance note here indicates that this technique requires detailed implementation instructions 
and that this technique has generally not known to be used for interrogation purposes for longer than 30 
days. Additionally, the note specifies that this technique may be in violation o f Article 13,14, 34 and 126 
of the Geneva conventions which outline guidance on acts o f intimidation, respect for the person, standards 
of treatment, etc.
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Appendix C 
Interviews
Professor Michael N. Schmitt, former Senior Legal Adviser US Air Force 
London,UK, 16 May 2006
Gary Solis, former Captain, US Marines, Visiting Professor of Law United States 
Military Academy at West Point
Washington DC, 30 March 2006
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